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Conor Michael Cullen 
 
 What do religions do and how do they do it?  In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
Émile Durkheim claims that religions are “grounded in and express the real” and center upon a set 
of ritualized practices that enact and embody in a distinctively intense and potentially 
transformative form the truth regarding the constitutive relations in which we stand to one another. 
With the help of Heidegger’s account in “The Origin of the Work of Art” of the way in which 
works of art work, along with Kierkegaard’s relational account of the health and sickness of the 
self in The Sickness Unto Death, I attempt in this dissertation to develop an improved version of 
the basic Durkheimian picture.  The central claim is that religious practices are in the game of 
cultivating and actively integrating the fundamental relationships upon which our being as persons 
in a most radical and literal sense depends.  Where successful, the heightened modes of 
relationality enacted in such practices transform us into more active, vital, and unalienated agents 
capable of tackling the concrete normative situations in which we lead our lives.  For these reasons, 
I argue that religious practices aren’t going and shouldn’t go anywhere.  If anything, we have 
grounds for leaning into them more if we hope to develop the existential resources to tackle the 
various forms of relational breakdown that constitute the true ground of the problem of 
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 Many of us call ourselves “Weird Christians” albeit partly in jest.  What we have in 
common is that we see a return to old-school forms of worship as a way of escaping from 
the crisis of modernity and the liberal-capitalist faith in individualism. 
 Weird Christians reject as overly accommodationist those churches, primarily mainline 
Protestant denominations like Episcopalianism and Lutheranism, that have watered down 
the stranger and more supernatural elements of the faith (like miracles, say, or the literal 
resurrection of Jesus Christ).  But they reject, too, the fusion of ethnonationalism, 
unfettered capitalism and Republican Party politics that has come to define the modern 
white evangelical movement. 
 They are finding that ancient theology can better answer contemporary problems than 
any of the modern secular world’s solutions… 
 … Weird Christianity is equal parts traditionalism, and, well, punk: Christianity as 
transgressive alternative to contemporary secular capitalist culture.  Like punk, Weird 
Christianity has its own, clearly defined aesthetic.  Many Weird Christians across the 
denominational and political spectrum express fondness for older, more liturgically 
elaborate practices… (Burton 2020) 
 
- Tara Isabella Burton, “Christianity Gets Weird: Modern life is ugly, brutal 
and barren.  Maybe you should try a Latin Mass.”  
 
On my altar at home, I keep a copy of the United States Constitution next to my 
candles and talismans, as a way of asking Spirit to protect our country from nefarious 
forces.   
I’m doing magic when I march in the streets for causes I believe in.  (The proliferation 
of “HEX THE PATRIARCHY” placards fills me with particular witchy glee.) …  
I use the word “witch” to signify both my Pagan spiritual beliefs – that nature is holy, 
thus the planet we live on and the bodies we live in are all sacred – and my role as a complex 
woman who speaks her mind, behavior that is still often met by society with judgment or 
disdain.   
I’m a witch when I’m celebrating the change of the seasons with my coven sisters, as 
well as when I stand against the destruction of the environment.  I’m a witch when I’m 
giving thanks to the sun, moon and stars, and when I’m working to subvert the corrosive 
narrative of sexism, racism, queer-phobia and xenophobia. (Grossman 2019) 
 
- Pam Grossman, “Here’s What Being a Witch Really Means: My grandma 
Trudy used to tell us that she had ‘healing hands.’ I soon discovered that I 
did, too.”   
 
“Among the people of QAnon, faith remains absolute. True believers describe a feeling 
of rebirth, an irreversible arousal to existential knowledge. They are certain that a Great 




- Caroline Mimbs Nyce, “QAnon Is a New American Religion”  
 
It was for a long time assumed, at least in elite educated circles, that religion was terminally 
ill.  Religion was, and often still is, understood to be an atavistic pre-scientific attempt to make 
sense of a mysterious and often threatening world.  Gods and spirits helped explain why the world 
worked the way it did and prayer and magic were (illusory) means of manipulating that world. 
With the rise of the natural sciences and modern technology, much more effective modes of 
explaining and manipulating the world were available than religion could ever provide.  
Admittedly, the world was in some sense less reassuringly human than it had historically been 
taken to be and many felt the Pascalian “dread” in the face of the “eternal silence of these infinite 
spaces” in the emphatically not human-scale world the sciences revealed (Pascal, 73 (233)).  
Nevertheless, with some adjustment of perspective we could and should realize that we could 
realize true human goods much better without religion and that where religious longings persisted 
we could and should simply toughen up and readjust our expectations.  Furthermore, once religious 
traditions and institutions had lost some of their aura we could see that many of them were often 
(merely) instruments of oppression and obstacles to meaningful human flourishing.  As we 
continued to make progress in our pursuit of knowledge and human liberation, religion was bound 
inevitably to atrophy and fade into the background.   It was a childish thing appropriate to 
humanity’s childhood and discarding it was essential to achieving full maturity and liberation.   
This narrative has come under attack and lost some of its sense of obviousness in recent 
years.  Traditional forms of religion have proved much more tenacious than many prognosticators 
anticipated and where they have retreated new forms of religiosity or, at the very least, more 
amorphous forms of “spirituality,” have tended to arise.  I’ve brought in the above passages in part 
as illustrations of the continued vitality of human religiosity, for better and worse.  There are at 
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least four ways to explain this tenacity.  First of all, one could say that human beings are simply 
incorrigibly irrational and prone to substitute a fantasy world for the real one.   Secondly, one could 
say, as Marx does, that it continues to persist as a kind of opiate that enables people to get by 
within an inherently oppressive, frustrating, and alienating existence by imagining that true human 
fulfillment is or will be possible for them in an imaginary future world.  Thirdly, and this is the 
view that is closest to my own and which is articulated by the likes of Hegel among others, one 
could say that they persist because there are certain truths embodied in them that can be better 
articulated in secular language but which most people can only access in their suboptimal, rather 
murky religious formulations.  These three kinds of view vary in a number of respects, including 
their relative sympathy with religiosity and religious people, but all of them are in agreement that 
in some crucial sense religious practices are inessential and that it is part of humanity’s progressive 
developmental process that they are progressively rendered obsolete.  Whatever truth, or at least 
aspiration for truth, that they may embody is one that is better served and articulated in a set of 
more rational beliefs and practices that are not essentially tied up with anything religious.    
I will be defending a version of a fourth kind of view that I largely develop out of Émile 
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.  This view, which understands religiosity 
essentially in terms of participating in practices as opposed to having certain beliefs, centers on 
the claims that (a) religious practices emerge as a means of putting participants in true relation to 
something essential about and for their lives, (b) religious practices are distinctively well-suited to 
establishing the relevant kind of true relation, and (c) what is involved in the relevant form of being 
true is not something that a set of beliefs can by themselves do.  That is to say that in attempting 
to understand what is distinctive about human religiosity we cannot take either the natural sciences 
or philosophy as a model.  Rather, the mode of understanding that religious practices are aimed at 
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cultivating is more akin to that which is appropriate to authentic engagement with works of art—
as Martin Heidegger describes it in “The Origin of the Work of Art.”  This is not to say the we 
should treat religious texts, rituals, or art simply as works of art or as works of art like any other—
in part, but not entirely, because our relationship to works of art tends to be distorted these days in 
a manner not unlike or unrelated to the distortions in our attitudes towards religion.  Rather the 
claim is that in thinking about how works of art can transform, reawaken, or sustain certain modes 
of understanding that can be eclipsed or atrophy in our everyday life, we can get a provisional 
sense for why attempts to understand Islam, say, as a philosophy of life or pseudo-science are 
essentially wrongheaded.   
Though this dissertation is centrally aimed at defending religiosity against a certain kind 
of rationalistic dismissal, that defense is qualified and the mistake I’m here associating with 
religion’s opponents or skeptics is also often made by religion’s defenders in the face of such 
rationalist skepticism or open hostility.  Fundamentalists who defensively react to the development 
of our scientific knowledge about the natural world by insisting that the book of Genesis is literally 
true, on this view, are making a mistake that mirrors that of the New Atheists scoffers who judge 
the Bible by the standard of the natural and historical sciences and find it risible.  The same goes 
for those who would, out of anxiety to defend what they self-consciously acknowledge is a rather 
weird religious practice, attempt to turn their religious identity into a matter of affirming some 
watered-down variation on the Golden Rule.  One of the reasons for grabbing at these analogies is 
that what scientific and philosophical belief are and how we deem them successful seems to be 
relatively tractable in ways that it is not for religious belief and practice, which tends to be 
compelling where it is in ways that people find difficult to clearly account for or articulate.  One 
of our aims is to help provide some resources for speaking more adequately about these things 
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while at the same time conceding and even foregrounding the importance and legitimacy of more 
indirect, poetic, and at times opaque manners of speaking—or refraining from speaking—about 
these matters.    
There are a couple of interpretive issues or points that the above passages, which I will be 
returning to and discussing in greater depth in the “Conclusion,” bring to the fore that I would like 
to emphasize.  The first regards weirdness.  Though I affirm the value of such defenses it is 
important to emphasize that I will be defending religion not just as a source of ethical or 
philosophical ideas that can be extracted from the world’s religious traditions and defended in 
abstraction from them, or as a set of edifying stories or beliefs.  Rather, I will attempt to defend 
certain forms of religiosity in their strange, embodied concreteness. So, the claim is not just going 
to be that there might be some really essential truths articulated in Islam but that it might be 
important to pray five times a day, go to the mosque on Friday, fast on Ramadan, etc. Second of 
all, though the Abrahamic faith traditions will serve as my main point of reference because of the 
central role they have played in shaping the American/Western world in which I live, I hope to be 
making the case for religiosity at a level of abstraction such that any number of concrete practices 
from any number of traditions, new or old, can serve as viable forms. That is to say that I think 
that the concreteness of religious practices is absolutely essential, for reasons I will present below, 
and that in a philosophical work like this one much of that crucial concreteness must remain off-
screen.  To cite Wittgenstein, taking his characterization of wisdom to be applicable to philosophy 
as the purported love of wisdom: “‘Wisdom is grey.’ Life on the other hand and religion are full 
of colour’” (Wittgenstein 2006, 62).  This dissertation will be a relatively grey case for engaging 
in a certain way with certain kinds of colorful things.  Thirdly, I am concerned with religion in no 
small part in the light of the power it potentially and actually possesses to transform our social and 
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political worlds, for better and worse.  I have many motivations for engaging in this project, but 
one of the central motivations is a sense that religious dynamics are central to social and political 
life in ways that thinkers, politicians, and activists on the left tend historically to overlook or 
dismiss to their peril.  Finally, I will be attempting to develop rough criteria for distinguishing 
between good and bad religion, for understanding why ethically and epistemically bankrupt forms 
of religiosity arise and how we can discern and appropriately respond to them.  If, as Heidegger 
put it, only a god can save us it’s important to have something to say to say about how we might 
discern the good gods from the demons, and how we can explain both why, say, a Trump supporter 
possesses the religious fervor she does and on what grounds we can say that her devotion is 
misplaced.    
* * * 
 
 In laying out the ways in which one might explain the seeming tenacity of religious belief 
I mentioned that there was one position that was closest to my own: namely, that which would 
attribute part of religion’s prevalence and power to the fact that many of the world’s central 
religious traditions embody, albeit in somewhat confused form, genuine truths.  Those truths are 
capable of philosophic rearticulation and justification that then renders the religious original in 
some sense obsolete.  Hegel and Feuerbach are two prominent proponents of such a view.  More 
recently, there is the work of someone like Mark Johnston who makes the case in Saving God and 
Surviving Death for reinterpreting religious talk about God and the afterlife in philosophical terms 
that render the claims rationally coherent and plausible in a way that they aren’t as standardly 
articulated in the religious traditions in question.  Another example, which has been very important 
in inspiring this project, is Akeel Bilgrami’s work on “secular enchantment” which similarly 
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affirms claims made by religious persons about the world’s possessing an objective sacred 
structure to which we need to attune ourselves while purging it of all explicit religious content.   
Both thinkers attempt to defend a kind of radical rethinking of human personal identity 
rational agency that emphatically rejects the homo economicus understanding of human persons 
as individuals pursuing essentially individual ends.  This relatively prevalent understanding of the 
task of living a human life involves for both thinkers a deep kind of distortion, one which Johnston 
attributes to a characteristic, natural defect in our perception of value of the sort that Christians 
call original sin, and Bilgrami attributes to a kind of very deep form of capitalism-enabling and -
sustaining ideology.  For what it’s worth, I think there’s plausibility to both claims.  They both 
aim, with reference of religious critiques of self-interest, to defend a view of the world and the 
human person’s place in it that shatters the obviousness of this frame for thinking about our lives 
and affirms that there is something essentially right about a kind of religious ascetic impulse and 
aspiration to get in the right kind of contact with some non-subjective ground of value that lies 
outside of the self.  In Johnston’s case, this non-subjective ground is a panentheist God and success 
in taking up the ethical task in question a means among other things of surviving death—in a 
distinctive sense that deviates substantially from what most people (still trapped in the narrow 
conception of the self) think of when they think of the afterlife.  There is a version of this self-
denial as self-fulfillment claim in Bilgrami as well, who argues that there is an alienating 
deformation in our attitudes towards our actual experience of value when we take the individualist 
paradigm as authoritative and turn “inward” to the purported inventory of our desires in seeking 
how to act.  Rethinking the task of living, as Gandhi does, as responding to the demands that the 
world, including non-human nature as well as all the human beings, make upon me involves a kind 
of self-realization and -affirmation of my true self as an ethical agent who is, as for Johnston, 
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constituted by an active responsive stance towards the world and fulfilled by acting in the light of 
the demands that it makes upon me. 
These are very powerful and compelling views, to my mind, and I am inclined to accept 
the gist of both of them, though accepting the argument of this dissertation, to the effect that 
religious practices have a distinctive power of putting us in true responsive contact with whatever 
self-transcendent grounds of value are of decisive importance for us, does not require that one do 
so. I’ve provided this brief summary of their positions not only because they’ve influenced me or 
because I would like to draw a contrast between the kind of project they’re engaged in and my 
own, but also because I think that there’s something very important about the contrast between 
two kinds of fundamental existential/ethical stances towards reality that they invoke.  One of these 
they associate with a kind of distorted, self-centered “common sense” and the other they associate 
with a rather ascetic higher ethical and existential calling that challenges what we take to be 
obviously the case about human flourishing.  I want to affirm the contrast and the relative valuation 
of the two stances and then, over the course of this dissertation, make the case that religious 
practices can be powerful transformative tools enabling us to move from a position of cognitively 
accepting the kind of picture Johnston and Bilgrami present to actually starting to, at least at times, 
fitfully, actually live it.   
In his book On Religion, John Caputo sketches out a somewhat idiosyncratic and very 
tendentious, but to my mind illuminating and rather delightful, account of this very general 
religious stance, which he glosses in terms of a (radically expansive and heterodox) notion of “love 
of God,” by riffing on various proposed etymologies of the Latin word religio:  
…religion kicks in…when we confess our love for something besides ourselves, when (on 
one etymology) we “bind ourselves over” (re-ligare) to something other, which means 
something other than ourselves, or (on another etymology) when we gather ourselves 
together (re-legere) and center ourselves on a transforming focus of our love…The 
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religious sense of life kicks in when I am rigorously loyal, “religiously” faithful (religio on 
still another etymology, meaning “scrupulous” or “in a disciplined way”) to something 
other than myself, more important than myself, to which I swear an oath, which has me 
more than I have it.  (Caputo 2001, 31). 
 
The fact of the matter regarding the etymology is less important for my purposes than the 
resonances and general coherence of these distinct but in some sense harmonious proposed root 
meanings, each of which will find some sort of confirmation or echo in the pages ahead.  The 
contrast between the religious and irreligious stance is a contrast between two deep modes of 
relating to the task of living well.  The religious stance is predicated on the sense that there is 
something of overriding significance that transcends us and to which we are called to be 
passionately attached in a defining, transformative relation.  The quality and character of our lives 
is in no small part a function of the character of that relation, which demands a passionate and 
disciplined all-in commitment involving a certain self-surrender and -abandonment.  Religious 
stances differ in that to which they relate themselves—or understand themselves to be relating 
themselves—in this relation, but they have this in common.  This external other can, of course, be 
God as traditionally understood (whatever that might mean), but it can also be an alternative 
ground of a subjectivity-transcendent normative order that demands a certain kind of pious, 
transformative relation.  Other human beings, as well as supernatural persons, can be the object of 
such a religious stance.  There is room for non-persons—e.g. metaphysical normative realities that 
are in some sense independent of persons—to play this role as well.  But for our purposes it will 
be relations with persons and person-like entities that are of central concern insofar as we will be 
attempting to explain some of the power and importance of religion in relation to the fact that the 
personhood of persons is in some deep sense constituted by the relations in which they stand to 
other persons.  
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 The irreligious stance, on the other hand, involves an insistence that the relation of the self 
to itself is in some sense sufficient.  There is no need to be caught up in some transformative self-
forgetful committed relation to something outside of the self.  Any notion of binding oneself over 
in such a way, and feeling obligated to discipline oneself in the light of that commitment, is felt to 
be an inappropriate restriction on our freedom and threat to our selfhood as opposed to a means of 
realizing it.  In some important sense the self provides itself with its own identity and both can and 
should rely on its internal normative and motivational resources.  Life is essentially a matter of 
self-realization—of a self that can and should in some sense define itself on its own terms.  There 
is a radical disavowal of ontological dependence in the irreligious stance and claim that one can 
and should on crucial existential matters rely only on oneself.  The true self is the self in isolation, 
as opposed to the self made in and through relation, and the task of living well involves fidelity to 
that self.   
What is important for our purposes is the contrast between the two stances and the claim 
that the religious stance is both more existentially fulfilling, as Caputo emphasizes (to some extent 
in the passage cited above and more throughout the rest of the book), and, as Bilgrami and Johnston 
emphasize, more realistic.  This realism is not that of “common sense” which, of course, thanks to 
in-built defects in human nature, the capitalist ideology in which we unknowingly swim, and/or 
any number of other causes, is in certain respects consistently deformed.  Rather, the claim is that 
we are in fact constituted by our relations to the world, that the standards and sources of value that 
we realize in our lives are in no way self-generated and come to us from without, and that we must 
live in passionate commitment and gratitude towards all those things.  The claim is one that, in 
repudiation of the Kantian and Hegelian emphasis on a certain ideal of autonomous self-
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standingness [Selbstständigkeit], Kierkegaard—or, rather, the pseudonymous author Anti-
Climacus—makes in the opening of The Sickness unto Death: 
…a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established itself or have 
been established by another self…The human self is such a derived, established relation, a 
relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another…If 
the human self had itself established itself, then there could be only one form [of despair]: 
not to will to be oneself, to will to do away with oneself, but there could not be the form: 
in despair to be oneself [on one’s own terms, in defiance of or abstraction from that which 
constitutes one]…If the despairing person is aware of his despair…and now with all his 
power seeks to break the despair by himself and by himself alone—he is still in despair 
and with all his presumed effort only works himself all the deeper into deeper despair… 
 The formula that describes the state of self when despair is completely rooted out is 
this: in relating itself to itself an in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the 
power that established it.  (Kierkegaard 1980, 13-14). 
 
In brief, he claims that to succeed at being a self one must recognize that one is always and must 
always be taking a stand on who one is.  But beyond this it is essential to recognize that in doing 
so one is relating oneself to that which posits oneself—namely, to God.  There is a constitutive 
ontological dependence at the heart of what it is to be a person and those who live in the light of 
this fact are said to “rest transparently in the power that established it.”     
 For Durkheim, there is a similar understanding at work but the positing other is not the 
Christian God but our social world as it is bound together and given fundamental shape through a 
shared understanding of and commitment to things held sacred.  As we will see, Durkheim makes 
a powerful albeit problematically reductive claim about the deep affinities between our 
dependence upon and aspiration to pious relation with our social worlds, and the relation in which 
the religious person stands to the god(s) whom she worships.  The societal embodiment of fidelity 
to the sacred is always only partial, always both here and on the horizon, yet to come —as the 
kingdom of God has been, so far at least, for Christians.  Though the phenomenology is in many 
respects harmonious with that of more explicitly religious thinkers like Kierkegaard—which is a 
central source of its insight and potentially explanatory power—his is a naturalist account that 
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would have religion be understood to be a means of relating ourselves to the most fundamental, 
identity-bestowing society of human beings to which we belong.  For aboriginal Australians this 
would be the clan and tribe, for modern Europeans it would be the nation and humanity as a whole.  
The key is that Durkheim provides a defense of religiosity that invokes no more than these very 
this-worldly, naturalistic assumptions.  I will be both following and parting ways with Durkheim 
here.  I will be following him insofar as I am trying to provide a defense of religiosity and the 
relations to which religious practices aim to be true that requires no further ontological supports 
that might seem “spooky” or supernatural.  I will be parting ways with him in that I will leave the 
question as to whether there are such further, deeper ontological supports for religiosity open.  That 
is to say that I am attempting to open up a space within which those with perhaps quite different 
ultimate ontological commitments can find some kind of common ground and mutual 
understanding—about their perhaps surprising similarities and points of agreement, as well as the 
points on which they must part ways.  
 So, whatever these fundamental, constitutive relations and relationships are, they need to 
be called to our attention, cultivated, sustained, and, where necessary, transformed if we are to 
flourish as persons.   And whatever the candidate for the relatum or relata that is/are the proper 
object of the kind of religious commitment that’s crucial, it’s going to be hard to relate to in an 
appropriate way.  In other words, they’re very easy to lose sight of and you’re going to have to go 
out of your way to cultivate them in a deliberate way if they’re to be kept healthy.  Or, at least, that 
is going to be true for most people—and it is to and of them that this dissertation primarily speaks.  
If it’s some variation on the God of traditional theism, it’s going to be radically other, invisible, 
and often hard to meaningfully connect up with our experience.  And if it’s humanity as a whole, 
life as a whole, or even simply the society with whose fate our lives are most intimately caught up, 
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it will also be far from obvious how to relate to those larger wholes in the right kind of way.  If it’s 
the world perceived as making demands upon us to which we are called to be responsive in a stance 
that radically decenters the individual self, it’s also going to be hard to discern and respond to.  
Whether, a la Johnston, because of constitutive defects in human attunement to the normative 
realities surrounding us and/or, a la Bilgrami, due to our deep immersion in capitalist ideology, 
and/or for some other reason, it seems that human beings struggle to perceive and act in the world 
in such a manner and that our perception and affect is cluttered with corrosively self-absorbed, 
self-referential attitudes.  The claim is that the religious practices are in the game of doing this 
relational work.  And the difficulty of that task is in part what accounts for the weirdness Tara 
Burton flagged above, as well as the desire to have a religious identity that would integrate so 
diverse a set of actions as those which Pam Grossman gathers together in accounting for her life 
as a witch. 
*   *   * 
 
Before turning to an overview of the argument of the dissertation I would like to say 
something about the decision to center this interpretation of religious life on what might seem to 
be the odd coupling of Émile Durkheim and Martin Heidegger.  Though, as I hope to show—
briefly in the summary below and more expansively over the course of the dissertation—that there 
are manifold affinities between these two thinkers, what is likely most obvious to any reader even 
somewhat familiar with the two of them are their differences. In what follows I would like to (a) 
say something briefly about a seeming disagreement about the character of human existence, (b) 
highlight some general Aristotelian elements that both share on matters central to this dissertation, 
and (c) make the claim that their different disciplinary approaches can be seen as, at least 
potentially and with some crucial modifications, more complementary than contradictory. 
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Heidegger opens the first chapter of Being and Time with the emphatic claim that the mode 
of being of human being(s) must be understood as essentially different from that of mere things of 
the sort with which the natural sciences concern themselves.  He introduces a distinctive 
terminology to distinguish the mode of being of mere things, equipment, and human beings.  He 
refers to the mode of being of mere things as occurrentness/presence-at-hand (“Vorhandenheit”) 
and that of human beings as, following Kierkegaard, existence (“Existenz”). The terminological 
point is less important than the firmness with which the natural scientist’s manner of understanding 
the non-human world is repudiated as utterly inappropriate to the understanding of human beings.   
Among other things this move seems to delegitimize an effort to claim, as Durkheim does, 
that when studying a certain distinctive set of facts about human beings—namely, social and 
mental facts—one must treat them “as things” (“commes des choses”) (Durkheim 2014, 7-8).  It 
also suggests a certain essential perversity to regularly using analogies drawn from physics, 
chemistry, and biology in attempting to understand distinctively human modes of existence, as 
Durkheim so often does.  There is definitely something to this worry, but I think that the problem 
is at least in certain respects less serious than it might at first appear.  We can see this by attending 
to the following attempt on Durkheim’s part to explain what his claim that “social facts must be 
treated as things” amounted to:  
It was deemed paradoxical and scandalous for us to assimilate to the realities of the external 
world those of the social world.  This was singularly to misunderstand the meaning and 
effect of this assimilation, the object of which was not to reduce the higher forms of being 
to the level of lower does but, on the contrary, to claim for the former a degree of reality at 
least equal to that which everyone accords to the latter.  Indeed, we do not say that social 
facts are material things, but that they are things just as are material things, although in a 
different way. 
 What indeed is a thing? The thing stands in opposition to the idea, just as what is known 
from the outside stands in opposition to what is known from the inside.  A thing is any 
object of knowledge which is not naturally penetrable by the understanding.  It is all that 
which we cannot conceptualize adequately as an idea by the simple process of intellectual 
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analysis.  It is all that which the mind cannot understand without going outside itself… 
(ibid., 7). 
 
There are two crucial points here.  First of all, the generality of the sense that he assigns to “thing” 
makes the claim that social facts are things a somewhat less problematic one than it might at first 
seem, and would seem to in some sense apply to all the entities whose modes of being Heidegger 
wishes to distinguish.  The second important point is that Durkheim is emphatic that the co-
emergence of human personhood and society involves the emergence of something that might be 
analogous to other phenomena in the natural world but is not reducible to them and has a mode of 
being distinctive to it.  This is not to say, of course, that Heidegger and Durkheim are in agreement 
on matters of fundamental ontology, but it is to say that their views aren’t as deeply at odds with 
one another as they might seem.     
 That being said, there is a deep tension between their manners of proceeding.  The 
phenomenological tradition out of which Heidegger developed his thinking is very much 
preoccupied with relating to phenomena from what we could crudely refer to as an “insiders” view.  
The aim is not to treat some external, objectifying theoretical stance as the authoritative perspective 
from which to achieve robust understanding.  That latter is important in certain respects but 
founded upon a more primordial, non-objectifying mode of understanding with which Heidegger 
and other phenomenologists are preoccupied and which they attempt to keep center stage.  
Durkheim, on the other hand, is very much in the grip of a crude scientistic perspective that would 
treat the objectifying perspective as being just as authoritative when it comes to understanding 
human social life as in understanding organic chemistry. Though Durkheim has genuinely 
insightful things to say about what it’s like to engage in religious practices and speaks with 
something that feels like personal familiarity, his objectifying attitude leaves him somewhat 
inarticulate on these points and leads him to say very little about the predicament of a contemporary 
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person who is wrestling with questions about what their religious practice and stance is or should 
be like.  
I would like, briefly, to make the case that these differences in their angle of approach to 
questions about human life generally and about religious life in particular are often enough, if not 
always, helpful in realizing the ends of this dissertation.  When it comes to talking about religion, 
there is a crucial challenge or problem that could be referred to as the insider/outsider problem.  
That is to say something very simple but important: the view of X religion from the outside is very 
different from that of those who are fully immersed in X religion.  Presumably there are aspects 
of the phenomenon in question of which those on either side of this distinction can claim distinctive 
understanding.  One of the advantages, as I see it, of bringing together Durkheim the social scientist 
and Heidegger the phenomenologist is that they are centrally concerned with the outsider and 
insider view, respectively.   
Durkheim I hope provides a way of seeing religion that can provide it with some 
substantive validation from without.  And the view from without, it turns out, suggests that one 
needs to go inside—of some religious practice.   And at that point—Durkheim doesn’t say this 
explicitly but I take it to be an implication of the most plausible version of his account—the 
objectifying social-scientific discourse in which his interpretation and defense is articulated 
becomes emphatically secondary.  The view from without remains and it remains immensely 
important for a variety of reasons: it allows one to engage with outsiders as non-participants in 
your religious life as well as participants in other forms of religious life, it gives one a helpful and 
potentially critical stance towards one’s own religiosity, and so forth.  A theory about religion isn’t 
a religion and if religion is in some sense essential to human life, one must be comfortable 
transitioning to speaking and acting religiously as opposed to theoretically.  It is at this point that 
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Heidegger the phenomenologist becomes crucial—along with the various religious thinkers we 
will be citing throughout.  Though insofar as we are not insiders to the relevant religious practices 
we cannot get a truly inside view, the hope is that one can at least get a provisional sense of what 
it is or might be like. And that’s about as far as a work of philosophy, which as a matter of course 
must have something like an outsider’s view on things, can go.   
All of this being said, even if there can be value in bringing together a thinker who by and 
large tries to understand X from outside and one who tries to understand X from the inside, the 
claim that they are or can be mutually illuminating hangs on our ability to make the claim that at 
some background level they have a similar understanding of the relevant X.  Their differences, in 
other words, need to be embedded in some kind of shared frame or understanding that allows them 
to engage with one another constructively.   I think there is such a common, shared frame of 
reference uniting Durkheim and Heidegger and would like to say something briefly here to 
vindicate that claim. 
There are any number of ways one could draw up and account for commonalities between 
Durkheim and Heidegger, but I think it’s helpful to do so with respect to the common influence 
that Aristotle had on both of them.1 More cautiously, to avoid getting bogged down in biographical 
debates about their respective intellectual formations, one could say that they in fact share several 
positions and assumptions in common with one another and with Aristotle.   All three see human 
beings as radically, constitutively social and would affirm some version of or variation on claims 
                                                 
1 Though Heidegger’s extensive engagement with Aristotle is well-known, the claim concerning the influence of 
Aristotle on Durkheim might seem surprising.  In his essay “Recovered Goods: Durkheimian Sociology as Virtue 
Ethics” Philip Gorski makes a strong case that (a) we can discern traces of Aristotle throughout Durkheim’s work and 
(b) that he downplayed these intellectual debts out of anxiety to distinguish sociology from philosophy and his own 
intellectual position from that of conservative Thomistic Catholics and (c) that once we see this we can see that there 
are a great number of respects in which Durkheim can be brought into productive dialogue with (republican) virtue 
ethicists.  Though I find this claim compelling, I will restrict myself here to the less ambitious claim that whatever the 
inspiration there are certain background affinities between these thinkers that allow them to be brought into 
engagement with one another productively despite their manifold differences.   
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that Aristotle makes at the opening of The Politics, on which (along with the Nicomachean Ethics) 
Durkheim taught courses the lecture notes for which have since been lost (Lukes, 106). 
 …[M]an is by nature a political animal.  Any one who by his nature and not simply ill-
luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman – he is like 
the war-mad man condemned in Homer’s words as ‘having no family, no law, no home’; 
for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in 
a game of drafts. 
But obviously man is a political animal in a sense in which a bee is not, or any other 
gregarious animal.  Nature…has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of 
speech.  Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by other 
animals…[and] serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is 
just and what is unjust.  For the real difference between man and other animals is that 
humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc.  It is the sharing of a 
common view on these matters that makes a household and a state.  (Aristotle 59-60, 
1253a1-7). 
 
Both Durkheim and Heidegger are committed to versions of three distinct claims that Aristotle 
makes here.  Firstly, both share Aristotle’s commitment to the view that participation in a social 
world is in some sense constitutive of human personhood.  They all affirm some version of the 
claim that human persons as such are always already being-with others and that whatever capacity 
they may possess to distinguish themselves as individuals is predicated and dependent on their 
prior belonging to the social whole that precedes, exceeds, and gives meaningful substance to their 
lives.  Secondly, all three understand that constitutive sociality to be constituted and governed by 
collective norms that direct and shape the cooperative life that enables human persons to persist 
and flourish as such and which we become attuned to in a not purely cognitive manner (i.e. not 
simply by conscious assent to them—more on this in connection with the Nicomachean Ethics 
below).  Thirdly, there is a sense that our ability to communicate about and reach some sort of 
agreement concerning good and evil and so forth is a function of certain concrete, embodied 
perceptual capacities—which is to say that for all three we must look to the world as opposed to 
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ourselves to discern and respond appropriately to the normative calls that our social/socially-
disclosed reality makes upon us as individuals.2   
 These positions are related to another point of commonality that is important for our 
purposes.  Durkheim and Heidegger both understand human existence as involving a kind of 
porousness that both problematizes overly individualistic accounts of human life and underlines a 
certain mode of what we could call ethical vulnerability that is characteristic of human life.  There 
are two aspects of this view that are I think important.  The first concerns the limits of merely 
rational reflection to set us up in the right kind of relation towards the world as agents, as opposed 
to as knowers, which makes us depend on other forces which are murkier and harder to control.  
The second concerns the ekstatic character of perception and experience. 
Aristotle famously claims early in the Nicomachean Ethics that ethical, as opposed to 
intellectual, virtue cannot be taught, and that one must be habituated to act in certain ways from 
youth to have a reasonable hope of becoming ethical.  If you’ve been habituated to act and feel 
and perceive in the wrong way, in brief, taking a class or two or three classes on ethics isn’t going 
to be enough to set you in tune with the normative truth.  This skepticism about the power of mere 
rational reflection to put us in the right relation to the world around us is shared by Heidegger and 
Durkheim.  For Heidegger our fundamental practical identity—as one among others, as we will 
see—is one into which we are habituated in a manner not essentially mediated by rational 
reflection.  We do not as a matter of course “own” it or our actions.  In “The Origin of the Work 
of Art” he argues that, for the ancient Greeks at least, the ability to take up a resolute, meaningful 
                                                 
2 The phenomenological point is more important for our purposes that than the vexed and vexing metaphysical 
questions that it raises. I will have some things to say regarding those metaphysical questions, but largely by way of 
sketching out plausible possibilities that can clear away theoretical obstacles to positive, open engagement with the 
phenomenology.  I am strongly inclined to accept a view like that which Akeel Bilgrami presents in the “Secular 
Enchantment” essays in Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment and “Value and Alienation: A Revisionist Essay on 
Our Political Ideals” in Nature and Value, but accepting such a view isn’t I think essential to what follows. 
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stand in one’s world was enabled by and dependent upon one’s being (recurrently, over time) 
brought into a certain kind of ekstatic transformative relation to a work of (religious) art that 
disclosed the truth about that world.  Similarly, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, we see 
a similar claim that it is only through participation in religious rituals that one can be habituated 
into being the kind of person who can respond appropriately to the demands that the world makes 
upon one to perceive, feel, and act in certain ways. The world is opened up socially and it is only 
through being in the right kind of social relations and being socialized in the right way that we can 
see, feel, and act towards the world in an appropriate way.  There is no pulling oneself up by one’s 
bootstraps in the ethical—or spiritual—domains.  And habitual action together with and in relation 
to others—and, it is worth recalling, religious action is paradigmatically habitual and, well, 
ritualistic—is going to be essential to maintain and develop ourselves as the persons we are.   
Finally, and related, all three reject the idea that we are in some sense trapped inside our 
heads or, to use Charles Taylor’s helpful term, that we’re by nature buffered as opposed to porous 
selves.  He defines the latter, which he associates with the rise of disenchantment, about which we 
will be speaking in the fourth and final chapter, as follows, as an understanding of the self 
according to which it “seems axiomatic that all thought, feeling and purpose, all the features we 
normally ascribe to agents, must be in minds, which are distinct from the ‘outer’ world” (Taylor, 
539). As all three thinkers see it we are rather, to use Heidegger’s term, always already being-in-
the-world.  In developing his account of the latter in Being and Time Heidegger cites Aristotle’s 
account of affect in his Rhetoric as a precursor to his own account of human beings as being always 
already outside of themselves in public moods and so forth.  Durkheim similarly, throughout his 
work understands moods, feelings, and even thoughts as in some sense moving through people 
who are more or less spontaneously attuned and open to one another.    That is to say that what we 
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are as meaning-responsive, thinking and feeling human persons is constituted by relations that 
involve transcending ourselves qua discrete, individual organisms.  And, furthermore, these 
relations are not ones over which we have some sort of sovereign control but rather ones in which 
we are in some sense deeply vulnerable, for both better and worse.   
It is worth flagging here the ways in which this general background understanding of the 
character of human existence is more in line with the religious stance as I sketched it above.  For 
these thinkers we are in our very being dependent on our relations to others and the task of living 
well involves deliberately working upon those relations in a manner that is embodied and centrally 
involves habits of imagination, affect, and concrete interpersonal relation.  These relations are 
emphatically not external or inessential to who we are and it is only with an awareness of our 
finitude and constitutive dependence upon them that we are in a position to lead a fulfilling human 
life.  In the pages ahead, this rather abstract picture will be made more concrete and, hopefully, 
more compelling, as will the deep relations it has to the claim concerning the deep importance and 
power of religious practices in human life.     
*    *   * 
 
The dissertation consists of four chapters.  The first two chapters are concerned with 
outlining some of the central, constitutive features of human existence that make it the case that 
we are constituted by relations and acts of self-transcendence.  The second two are concerned with 
the ways in which religion in general and today works to reconstitute, strengthen, and transform 
those relations and relationships, for better and worse.   
The aim of the first chapter is to provide an account of the conditions for existence of the 
person or, to use the standard religious language, soul.  Durkheim claims that the essence of human 
personhood is social, that human beings transcend themselves whenever they think and act, and 
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that there is a constitutive Pascalian tension in human being that he refers to as man’s “doubleness” 
(as body and soul/person). The aim of the chapter is to provide a naturalistic account of the 
emergence of human personhood and constitutive modes of transcendence of the sort that 
Durkheim sought to develop, and to use Heidegger and Buber to capture some of the 
phenomenology of that lived tension that Durkheim in his Pascalian moments is attempting to flag.  
Michael Tomasello provides a compelling evolutionary account of the emergence of human 
personhood through the evolution of capacities for joint and then collective intentionality that 
transform individual organisms into norm-governed members of various “we” relationships.  It is 
only at the conclusion of this process, with the full emergence of omnipresent and relatively global 
modes of collective intentionality, that persons in the full-fledged sense—as norm-responsive 
beings who take a meaningful stand on their lives—emerge.  In addition to the tension between 
the human person’s biological impulses and her identity as a member of various norm-governed 
communities, Tomasello flags a tension between the cultural orders established at the level of 
collective intentionality and the “natural morality” that he claims grounds our capacity to form 
joint intentions with particular others and serves as a perennial resource of critique for particular 
cultural orders.  In discussing these tensions, which Durkheim addresses at various points, we 
finally bring in Heidegger and Buber to both confirm and enrich the account that we’ve developed 
out of Durkheim and Tomasello.  This provides us with something like the existential map on 
which all that proceeds will be plotted. 
Having attempted to shed light on the ontological and normative grounding of the being of 
persons, I then attempt in the second chapter to say something about certain general conditions 
that need to be in place for persons to really flourish as such.  The aim is to sketch some of the 
ways in which our life as persons—or, existential vitality, as I will be referring to it—is enhanced 
23 
 
or diminished by the quality and character of the practical-identity-constitutive relations in which 
we stand to other people.   Insofar as religions are, for Durkheim, aimed at making persons more 
alive, stronger, more fully real, and more courageous, developing an account of these basic 
existential goods is essential to explaining the power of Durkheim’s account of religion.  I develop 
a Durkheimian interpretation of Kierkegaard’s account of the sickness unto death as a 
phenomenologically astute account of the deformations in our lives that are brought about by 
deformations in our relations to others, large parts of which can be taken on board without 
commitment to belief in the existence of (the Christian) God.  The relevant others include at least, 
though perhaps not exclusively, human contemporaries and past and future human beings.  On the 
first point I discuss the ways in which forms of social and political oppression and practices like 
solitary confinement, along with more small-scale inter-personal forms of relational trauma, can 
do violence to persons as persons through the assault that they enact on interpersonal relations.  
On the second I discuss Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife in connection with Durkheim’s 
account of the impersonal afterlife, flagging the ways in which our existential vitality today hangs 
upon the relationships in which we trust ourselves to stand to future generations.  The hope is that 
this chapter helps to reveal certain essential existential goods that are easy to overlook, 
fundamental to human flourishing, and at the heart of what religious practices are aimed at doing.   
In the third chapter I attempt to outline, defend, and expand upon Durkheim’s account of 
human religiosity as a response to the fundamental features of human existence that we’ve been 
outlining.  In brief, Durkheim argues that human communities are ultimately grounded and bound 
together by holding certain things sacred and that embodied, recurrent ritualistic attunement to the 
sacred and the deep structure of the world that it opens up is the essence of religiosity.  Though 
Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life is the central text for us here, Heidegger’s “The 
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Origin of the Work of Art” is almost equally central and essential.  The latter allows us to 
understand the rather vague though insightful things that Durkheim says about the truth and 
experience of truth at the heart of religious practice, as well as helping us to develop a more 
adequate account of religious narrative, art, and belief.  At the conclusion of the chapter a 
compelling account will hopefully have been developed of why religion has historically been at 
the heart of human life and why we should, even if we are agnostic or atheist naturalists, take very 
seriously the idea that religious practices will and should continue, albeit perhaps in very different 
forms, to be at the heart of human life.   
In the fourth and final chapter we attempt to address the objection that even if the accounts 
of the ways in which religious practices work are insightful in the contexts that Durkheim and 
Heidegger are centrally focused on—late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century aboriginal 
Australian societies and ancient Greece, respectively—they can’t work in an analogous manner 
today.  We will focus our discussion on Max Weber’s account of disenchantment, a variation on 
which was provided in the opening of this introduction, and which centers on the claim that we’ve 
discovered that there is no objective value and that religious forces do not exist.  The first aim is 
to explain why the essence of the view is, in the light of the account of religion we’ve been 
developing, false or, at least, implausible.  The second is to explain why it has proved to be such 
a powerful narrative and, in the process, to provide an alternative Durkheimian/Heideggerian 
account of the phenomenon that Weber describes that locates the deep problem in facts about the 
human as opposed to natural world, and sheds light on the ways in which religious practices can 
help to rectify it, with an eye to rendering plausible a version of Heidegger’s claim in his 




Chapter 1: Body and Soul: On Transcendence and the Relational 
Dynamics of Human Life 
1.1 Introduction: “man is double” 
As part of society, the individual naturally transcends himself both when he thinks and 
when he acts. 
 
- Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Durkheim 1995, 16) 
 
As a matter of fact, there is nothing more agreeable than collective life if one has had a 
little experience with it at an early age. It has the effect of enhancing the vitality of each 
individual.  The child feels himself stronger, more confident, when he feels that he is not 
alone.  There is something in all common activities that warms the heart and fortifies the 
will… 
 …There is a pleasure in saying “we,” rather than “I,” because anyone in a position to 
say “we” feels behind him a support, a force on which he can count, a force that is much 
more intense than that upon which isolated individuals can rely… 
 …he has known a new life more intense than the one he knew before; he is happy with 
it.  He is no longer supported by his own energy alone…He participates in the collective 
life, and his whole being is enhanced. (Durkheim 1973, 239-241) 
 
- Émile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory & Application of the 
Sociology of Education  
 
[The] true function of religion...is to make us act and to help us live.  The believer who has 
communed with his god is not simply a man who sees new truths that the unbeliever knows 
not; he is a man who is stronger…. (Durkheim 1995, 419) 
 
- Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life  
 
 Any attempt at understanding “religion” is doomed from the outset to fall short.  The term 
is used to refer to such a diverse collection of human practices, beliefs, institutions, experiences, 
and traditions that any attempt to say something substantive and illuminating about what religion 
is or does can only attempt to do justice to some aspect of certain religious practices, while leaving 
a great deal if not most of what we do or can refer to in talking of “religion” off-screen and obscure.  
This inability to uncover or bright to light anything other than a partial truth about something like 
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religion is something to Heidegger was attuned to a much greater extent than Durkheim and 
foregrounding this limitation is one of the many Heideggerian modifications to the Durkheimian 
account of religious life that I will be providing in the pages ahead.  Those provisos aside, I do of 
course think that the Durkheimian account sheds a great deal of light and it does this by situating 
religious practices in constitutive relation to the fundamental social relationships that are, for 
Durkheim, constitutive of and essential to the lives of human beings.   
Throughout Durkheim’s effort at understanding religion, he is guided by some loose 
principle of interpretive charity, which is applied in the light of his naturalist commitments as a 
social scientist.  His assumption is that if we want to understand why people engage in religious 
practices we have to assume that they’re attempting to respond appropriately, and ceteris paribus 
with some success, to reality as it can be understood from a non-religious perspective.  However 
strange religious practices might seem to a non-religious person, Durkheim is committed to the 
view that we cannot understand their ubiquity without assuming that they serve to put human 
beings in tune with truths that tend to be as essential to and salient in their lives as they take them 
to be.   To assume religious people are simply idiots is to give up on the project of genuinely 
understanding, or achieving an understanding with, them.  His “charity” of course is not of course 
going to be well received or perceived as such by all religious believers, but it does help to generate 
a mode of understanding religious phenomena that takes them seriously in a way that many 
naturalists do not, and thereby opens a door for moving from a form of naturalist.  He believes 
something similar to be true of the profoundly widespread belief that human beings have a soul as 
well as a body, and we will be attempting in this chapter to develop, strengthen, and improve upon 
the account that he provides of why such a belief might be well-grounded in reality, even if 
particular religious stories about it don’t themselves explain that grounding in a manner that is 
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satisfying or illuminating to a scientifically informed, agnostic or atheistic naturalist like 
Durkheim. 
The aim of this and the following chapter, which might on their face seem somewhat 
unrelated to the task of understanding religious practices, is to develop and defend a reconstructed 
version of the account of the radically social character of human existence that Durkheim sketches 
over the course of his career and which is essential to understanding his account of the ways in 
which religions work or what they can accomplish.3  This first chapter is aimed to sketch out the 
basic features of human existence that render plausible Durkheim’s claims about the constitutive 
self-transcendence of and centrality of “we” relation to lives of (human) persons. The second 
attempts to develop the kinds of claims about relative being, strength, and vitality that Durkheim 
makes above into an account of what I will, in a perhaps awkward marriage of Heideggerian and 
Durkheimian terminology, be referring to as the “existential vitality” of persons, with which, I will 
be arguing in the third chapter, religions are centrally concerned.      
The distinction between our life as human organisms and our life as human persons is 
essential to all that follows. Durkheim draws this distinction in an emphatic and simple way, 
affirming the proverbial claim that “man is double”—a kind of understanding reflected in the 
understanding of human beings as possessing both a body and a soul (ibid., 15). This doubleness 
is tied to our being both discrete individual organisms and members of social worlds that bestow 
on us identities and possibilities which radically transcend, supplement, and in many respects 
reshape our biological nature.  It is a doubleness that is traditionally articulated in terms of the 
                                                 
3 These terms are terms which Heidegger uses in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “Letter on ‘Humanism’” 
respectively that I think shed light on important dynamics at the heart of religious life to which Durkheim is attuned 
and which he attempts to describe, albeit using often problematically scientistic and crude language.  Both point to 
the ways in which what happens in religious ritual is best understood as a process of realization or making something 
real, something we will be discussing in greater depth in the third chapter.   
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contrast between body and soul.  He elaborates on this claim in the following passage, which 
terminates in the claim about transcendence that I cited above:  
[Reason owes its] power not to some mysterious virtue but simply to the fact that, as the 
well-known formula has it, man is double.  In him are two beings: an individual being that 
has its basis in the body and whose sphere of action is strictly limited by this fact, and a 
social being that represents within us the highest reality in the intellectual and moral realm 
that is knowable through observation: I mean society.  In the realm of practice, the 
consequence of this duality in our nature is the irreducibility of the moral ideal to the 
utilitarian motive; in the realm of thought, it is the irreducibility of reason to individual 
experience.  As part of society, the individual naturally transcends himself, both when he 
thinks and when he acts.  (ibid., 15-16).   
 
Durkheim distinguishes here between two dimensions of full-fledged human existence, which he 
in a somewhat unfortunate and arguably reifying manner refers to as “two beings.”  It is worth 
flagging at the outset that this talk of our being composed of “two beings” does not involve 
commitment to anything like the sort of dualism that we find in Descartes, despite the substantive 
talk.  For Descartes, man is in some sense double, but he understands that doubleness on the model 
of a sort of external association that isn’t definitive to either component of the self.  Our minds and 
bodies are radically different kinds of things and can be separated from one another without either 
losing its characteristic mode of being or essential properties.  A body is just extended stuff and 
mind just extensionless thought and though God decided to put them in relation to one another in 
creating human beings, He could very well have done otherwise and has no difficulty in separating 
them from one another once the body dies.  For Durkheim, on the other hand, insofar as a human 
being exists, these two components of herself are inextricably interrelated.  We cannot relate to 
our bodies simply as bodies and neither can we relate to our social, personal being in total 
abstraction from the fact of our being embodied.  It is for this reason that I have spoken of the 
bodily and social being of the human person as two aspects or dimensions of it.    
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It is important to note, looking ahead to the role that thinkers in the so-called existentialist 
tradition will play in our development of Durkheim’s position, that his account has important 
features in common with the account of human being that we find there.  There is an emphasis in 
Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Dostoevsky, among others, on the ways in which human existence is 
constituted by a tense, even paradoxical relation between a physical and spiritual dimension that 
is fundamental and ineliminable and which cannot be understood along dualistic Cartesian 
lines.  There are obviously clear and important differences between Durkheim’s account of human 
existence and the ways of construing human existence characteristic of the existentialist tradition, 
which tends to foreground individual particularity over the sort of shared social being with which 
Durkheim is centrally concerned.  That being said, I will be arguing that this is grounds for trying 
to bring them into productive dialogue with one another.  We can see this commonality in 
Durkheim’s essay “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions,” in which he cites 
Pascal’s claim that man is both “angel and beast” and a “monster of contradictions” as he develops 
his claim about the fundamental strife between these two aspects of our being.  He of course 
provides a different, naturalistic answer to the “why?” question but nevertheless thinks that 
Pascal’s account of the phenomenology of human existence is illuminating:4   
…According to Pascal’s formula, man is both “angel and beast” and not exclusively 
one or the other.  The result is that we are never completely in accord without ourselves for 
we cannot follow one of our two natures without causing the other to suffer.  Our joys can 
never be pure; there is always some pain mixed with them...It is this disagreement, this 
perpetual division against ourselves, that produces both our grandeur and our misery...The 
animal proceeds to his pleasure in a single and exclusive movement; man alone is normally 
obliged to make a place for suffering in his life.   
Thus, the traditional antithesis of the body and soul is not a vain mythological concept 
that is without foundation in reality.  It is true that we are double, that we are the realization 
of an antinomy.  In connection with this truth, however, a question arises that philosophy 
and even positive psychology cannot avoid: Where do this duality and this antinomy come 
                                                 
4 I will be making the claim in the next chapter that we can make a similar move when it comes to Kierkegaard’s 
similarly Pascal-influenced account of the character of the existential “sickness unto death” that is despair. 
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from?  How is it that each of us is, to quote another of Pascal’s phrases, a “monster of 
contradictions” that can never completely satisfy itself?  (Durkheim 1973, 153-4). 
 
As we will see, the tension will come for Durkheim not from our being both finite organisms and 
eternal souls but rather from our being both finite individual organisms and members of social 
worlds that give us a mode of personhood that, like that of the soul, transcends and is authoritative 
over while not simply replacing our merely animal nature. The tension between these two modes 
of our being, whatever its ultimate ontological ground, makes our existence in some sense 
problematic in a way that it is not for animals.  Namely, we have a task before us of finding a way 
to relate these two fundamentally heterogeneous aspects of our being in a way that allows us to 
affirm them both in their relation to one another, a relation that involves a kind of hierarchy.  To 
site Kierkegaard’s account of the self in The Sickness unto Death, which will be a central text for 
us moving forward, the self is “a relation that relates itself to itself”--i.e. the self is the act of taking 
a stand on itself as the relatedness of these two heterogenous elements (Kierkegaard 1980, 13).  
Though we aspire to construct rules and principles to help us resolve these constitutive tensions 
and provide us with guidance in deciding how to live them, and though such rules and principles 
are in many respects essential, they are inevitably inadequate to the complexity of our lives as 
concrete, mortal individuals attempting to live in meaningful relation with one another.  And they 
only speak to certain, more cognitive aspects of ourselves, which are essential but far from 
uniquely authoritative within or exhaustive of our nature as meaning-responsive persons.  Though 
we will not be focusing on these points at the moment, they will prove essential in our discussion 
of Heidegger and Buber and are important to keep in mind if we are to understand the plausibility 
of a characteristic religious claim that a complex ecosystem of beliefs, practices, relationships, and 
institutions are necessary to provide us with the right kind of fundamental orientation we need to 
the task of living well.    
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In explaining some of the upshots of Pascal’s insightful account of the tensions at the heart 
of human beings’ existence as persons, Durkheim describes his position as having two important 
upshots concerning our understanding of morality and rational thought, respectively.  First of all, 
he asserts that this essential duality of human nature is one that crudely reductive naturalistic 
accounts of morality fail to acknowledge.  Jeremy Bentham famously claimed that value is 
something identifiable in straightforwardly naturalistic terms--namely, pleasure--and that it is the 
same sort of thing whether it is found in human or non-human animals.  It is a property of bodies 
and its value can be understood purely with reference to those bodies.  According to Durkheim, 
this claim is fundamentally confused.  Value of the sort that we aim to respond to in acting morally 
cannot be understood in isolation from the creative social dimension of our existence as human 
beings, which has its own sui generis character and logic and which cannot be understood as 
standing in some sort of clear reductive relation to the material realm.  Once this social mode of 
existence has arisen, our biologically-grounded desires and forms of satisfaction are no longer 
brutely given.  Rather, they are always already being interpreted and related to in meaningful terms 
in the light of the social worlds in which we live.  Bentham’s line of reasoning might well have 
value in helping us to think about how we should relate to nonhuman animals, perhaps highlighting 
the ways in which we ought to relate to them in a manner more integrated with our socially 
generated modes of concern for one another.  That being said, insofar as it treats value as a brutely 
given thing it fundamentally misconstrues the character of human existence and the moral 
perspective to which it gives rise.  It is also worth noting that a similar critique might be made of 
evaluative orientations, typically of a more or less explicitly religious sort, that veer too far in the 
opposite direction, trying to understand value in abstraction from the fact that our personhood is 
essentially embodied.   
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The second upshot that Durkheim flags is that social self-transcendence is constitutive of 
rational thought.  The passage is embedded in a discussion of our cognitive capacities and he is 
concerned to emphasize the fact that these capacities too cannot be understood in abstraction from 
the modes of self-transcendence that characterize us as social creatures.  Though there are certainly 
forms of genetically hardwired intelligent environmental responsiveness that we find in both 
human and non-human animals, Durkheim wants to emphasize that full-fledged rational thought 
oriented towards an objective understanding of the world is only possible through varieties of 
cognitive self-transcendence made possible by our constitutive sociality.  All genuinely rational 
thought requires that we transcend our particular perspectives on reality in a fairly radical way and 
think about the world from a decentered, social perspective that transcends all particular individual 
perspectives.  For this reason, we cannot engage in properly rational investigations of the world 
save as social creatures concerned with how things appear from perspectives that are not our own 
qua particular embodied beings.  In addition to simply to taking up a social perspective in some 
abstract sense when we attempt to think in meaningful, rational ways about the world, he also 
emphasizes that our very concepts and categories are the products of an extensive, distinctively 
social mode of exchange between consciousnesses the progressive elaboration of which is directed 
by no single individual (Durkheim 1995, 435-6).  As a result, we are thinking in and through the 
collective experience of the indefinitely many persons living and dead out of whose relational lives 
these categories and modes of thinking came into being.  We are dependent upon these inherited 
contagious modes of thinking, while also at times finding ourselves compelled to revise or 
improvise on or eliminate certain of them that prove to be inadequate to the world as it is disclosed 
to us—which is to say that there’s always a tension between our individual lives and relationships 
and these more general categories we rely upon to make sense of them. 
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Later on in Elementary Forms, in the conclusion of an extended discussion of the soul, 
Durkheim ties this constitutive and tense doubleness of human beings to the modes of relational 
self-transformation and self-empowerment that it makes possible, which are at the heart of what 
he refers to as the “asceticism” characteristic of all social life.  This asceticism involves an ongoing 
need and aspiration to discipline our more individual and bodily desires in the light of the social 
relations that give true meaningful substance to our lives.  Crudely put, there is both a kind of 
Kantian negative duty to not simply submit to the desires one happens to have, and a more positive 
Aristotelian active desire for the good and the modes of fulfillment that it provides.  The former 
involves making tension-ridden, ambivalently social selves into members in good standing of our 
relational worlds and the latter involves active pursuit of one’s good qua relational being.  The 
former involves an act of self-transcendence qua animal that enables modes of self-fulfillment qua 
social being who is constituted as such by the former mode of self-transcendence.  This is 
addressed in Moral Education in terms of the negative “spirit of discipline” and positive 
attachment to the social group respectively.  In terms of religious practice, these two stances 
towards the self are the proper concern of “negative” cult, concerned with preparatory and often 
harsh disciplining of our animal nature, and “positive” cult of communion following the relevant 
transformation, respectively (Durkheim 1995, 312-14, 240-3). 
Through participation in the relational fields generated by our sociality we are able, 
according to Durkheim, to in some degree and in a certain sense free ourselves from merely 
physical imperatives and in so doing to realize ourselves as the kind of essentially social persons 
that we, essentially, are: 
[I]ndividuation is not the essential characteristic of the person.  A person is not only a 
singular subject that is distinguished from all the others.  It is, in addition and most of all, 
a being to which a relative autonomy is imputed in relation to the milieu with which it 
interacts most directly…  
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…the world of representations in which social life unfolds is added to its material 
substrate, far indeed from originating there.  The determinism that reigns in that world of 
representations is thus far more supple than the determinism that is rooted in our flesh-and-
blood constitution, and it leaves the agent with a justified impression of greater liberty.  The 
milieu in which we move in this way is somehow less opaque and resistant.  In it we feel, 
and are, more at ease.  In other words, the only means we have of liberating ourselves from 
physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces.   
…Passion individualizes and yet enslaves.  Our sensations are in their essence 
individual.  But the more emancipated we are from the senses, the more capable we are of 
thinking and acting conceptually, the more we are persons.  Those who emphasize all that 
is social in the individual do not mean by that to deny or denigrate personhood.  They 
simply refuse to confound it with the fact of individuation.  (ibid, 274-50). 
 
Durkheim points in this passage to the ways in which our constitutive transcendence in relation to 
a social world gives us a mode of being that is in some sense constitutive of 
personhood.  Furthermore, he flags the ways in which entrance into the personhood-constituting 
field of transcendent relation to others is an essential means whereby we can liberate ourselves 
from our merely animal and more self-centered nature.  It is only by taking up a meaningful, 
socially illuminated stand on our passions and sensations that we are able to reconstitute and 
reshape them in the light of possibilities for meaningful, collaborative engagement with others in 
whom we stand in a mutually-constitutive relation of personhood.  Once so constituted our 
cognition and agency cease to be confined to our particular, merely bodily perspective on things, 
and our experience of value can no longer be tethered to something as crudely biologistic as 
pleasure and pain.  We seek liberation of this sort insofar as our sociality and capacity for 
responsible membership in meaningful social worlds is an essential part of ourselves that is often 
frustrated by unregulated biological impulses, which are ultimately valuable and worthy of 
endorsement on condition of the role they play in our socially relational lives.  It is for this reason 
that the suffering inevitably involved in the asceticism at the heart of our social lives often is a 
35 
 
positive existential good, provided it bears good relational fruit.5  To the extent that it is successful 
we are freed from being slaves of our passions and enabled to become the social, meaning- and 
other-responsive persons that we at bottom aspire to be.  It is for this reason that he speaks of 
submission to the fundamental imperatives of our social worlds and the relevant other(s) with 
whom we do or ought to share it and the ties that bind us to them as enabling us to be “more” of a 
person and alive as such in a distinctive way, flagging the connection between that commitment 
to social relationships and our, as I will be speaking of it, existential vitality.6 
This chapter is divided into two sections.  In the first I will attempt to explain what 
Durkheim means in the first passage cited above about the transcendence constitutive of human 
life.  I will develop this claim with the help of Michael Tomasello’s account, grounded in 
evolutionary biology and developmental psychology, of human evolution and the emergence of a 
wide variety of distinctively human capacities thanks to our ability and inclination, and eventually 
                                                 
5 As we will see in the third chapter of this dissertation, Heidegger tends to refer to a (de-individualized) version of 
the tension of which Pascal and Durkheim speak in terms of the “rift” between earth and world, which can’t simply 
be aligned with the contrast we are attributing to Durkheim here, but which I think it is safe to say is not unrelated.  In 
the essay “Language” Heidegger connects, in a discussion of Georg Trakl’s “A Winter Evening,” pain with the rift—
now spoken of in terms of the relationship between world and things—in a very suggestive fashion: “But what is pain 
[here]?  Pain rends.  It is the rift.  But it does not tear apart into dispersive fragments.  Pain indeed tears asunder, it 
separates, yet so that at the same time it draws everything to itself, gathers it to itself…draws and joins together what 
is held apart in separation.  Pain is the joining agent…The rift…makes the limpid brightness shine” (Heidegger 2013, 
201-2).  Bracketing whatever Heidegger is precisely trying to say here, the description of a fundamental pain connected 
that gathers things that were separated together which in turn brings illumination applies nicely, I think, to the positive 
fruit of asceticism with which Durkheim is concerned. 
6 This conception of freedom through submission to a transformative relationship that allows us better to realize the 
goods we recognized but couldn’t wholeheartedly will prior to that ascetic relational act is one which we will be 
discussing in the next chapter and which, in certain broad strokes, can be productively aligned with the on the face 
rather puzzling claim in Paul that freedom is a kind of exchange of one kind of slavery (to Sin) for another (to Christ).   
Interestingly, it is seemingly contradicted by a claim made in Durkheim’s earlier work The Division of Labor 
in Society, where he critiques the Kantian line about morality being an expression of freedom: “We may say that what 
is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity…We can see how inaccurate it is to define it, as has often been 
done, in terms of freedom.  It rather consists much more in a state of dependence.”  (Durkheim 1997, 331). I think the 
two claims are essentially consistent and that the seeming contradiction involves a replacement of an individualistic, 
negative notion of freedom with a more religious, relational one of the sort that we find in Paul (albeit stripped of the 
Christian premises).  In brief, the social person is freed from subservience to whatever in the animal person would 
lead her to violate the norms that structure her meaningful social life with others.  Depending on which aspect of the 
self one has in mind, this can show up as either freedom or subservience.  
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fundamental need, to stand in “we” relations with others that radically transform our perspectives 
on and stances towards ourselves, one another, and the world that we increasingly understand as a 
shared world.   This involves the emergence, first, of an ability to form joint intentions with 
concrete others that is governed by an egalitarian “natural morality,” followed by the ability and 
need to stand perpetually in relations of collective intentionality with an indefinitely large group 
of persons with whom we co-disclose a shared meaningful world.  Not only are we able and 
positively inclined to seek out such relations, according to Tomasello, but there is a real sense in 
which our very existence as persons who take a meaningful stand on their lives depends upon such 
relations.  These basic, constitutive self-transcendent relations generate the ethical and cognitive 
norms that Durkheim speaks of in the passages above.  The claim is that Tomasello provides a 
powerful version of the kind of naturalist, emergentist account that Durkheim sought but was 
unable himself to provide of the development of distinctively human modes of sociality that are 
sui generis and need to be understood on their own terms.   
The second section of the essay aims, in effect, to enrich and complicate the general story 
that Tomasello tells with the help of Martins Buber and Heidegger. Durkheim at various points, as 
we will see, approvingly cites Pascal’s phenomenological claims regarding the constitutive tension 
at the heart of our existence as persons, though he interprets them in a manner that doesn’t hang 
upon accepting Christian premises regarding the body and soul, and Heidegger and Buber help us 
to develop a richer phenomenological understanding of some of these tensions.    There is also a 
related, though distinct, Aristotelian emphasis on the limited power of explicit rules and conscious 
intentions to get us in the right sort of relation to the task of living well throughout Durkheim’s 
writings.  The aim here is to do better justice to these tensions, complexities, and opacities and the 
challenges of living in and with them from a more phenomenological angle.  We will aim to say 
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something about the different kinds of identity-constituting relations in which we stand to others, 
the ways in which they are related and both can supplement and harmonize with or stand in deep 
tension with one another, the ways in which we can be alienated in and/or otherwise undermined 
or harmed by them, and some of the means whereby we can work to transform them.  Though this 
discussion must necessarily be somewhat cursory, the aim is to lay the groundwork for the 
discussion of the way in which such relations can enhance our existential vitality and to lay the 
groundwork for developing a basic understanding of the aspiration for and character of the kind of 
existential integration and orientation that participation in religious practices can bring about. 
This interpretation of human beings’ constitutive self-transcendence along social lines, 
finally, is one that I hope points to the ways in which talk and experience of encounters with 
transcendent things can be made sense of along “naturalistic” lines, while nevertheless leaving 
open the possibility that part of the constitutive, transcendence-enabling/mediated social field is 
composed of participants of a more traditionally religious sort.  In cultivating the right kind of self-
transcendent relations with those with whom we share our social worlds and with whom our lives 
are essentially intertwined, we might also be relating ourselves to God, gods, saints, demons, jinn, 
etc.  To make the case for the central and enduring importance of religious practices to human life, 
Durkheim claims, we only need to think that self-transcendent relations to other human beings are 
essential to our lives.  If there are also these other persons and realities that we are called upon to 
relate ourselves to then, of course, the need for religion becomes yet stronger.  What’s crucial for 
our purposes is that, if the Durkheimian account is right, the case for religion doesn’t hang on the 
truth of any of the kinds of beliefs about such “supernatural” entities that we think of as 
characteristically religious.  But the aim is to leave things emphatically open-ended, even if human 
relations are always at the center of our discussion.  The aim in leaving things open-ended in this 
38 
 
way, is to allow for those who find themselves on either side of the religious vs. non- or anti-
religious divide, as traditionally construed, to meet to productively discuss and engage with 
religious questions without that process being obstructed by their conflicting ontological 
commitments.  In doing so I hope to lay the groundwork for a partial transcendence of that divide, 
pointing the way towards reconstituting it along less antagonistic lines, and perhaps open up ways 
of participating in and thinking about religious life—from without or without—that would render 
such differences in some sense moot. 
1.2 The I and the We: The Evolution of Human Personhood 
…[W]hat is so readily deemed unacceptable for social facts is freely admitted for other 
domains of nature.  Whenever elements of any kind combine, by virtue of this combination 
they give rise to new phenomena.   One is therefore forced to conceive of these phenomena 
as residing, not in the elements, but in the entity formed by the union of these elements.  
The living cell contains nothing save chemical particles, just as society is made up of 
nothing except individuals.  Yet it is very clearly impossible for the characteristic 
phenomena of life to reside in atoms of hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen...Life cannot be 
split up in this fashion.  It is one, and consequently cannot be located save in the living 
substance in its entirety…  
 …[T]his synthesis sui generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new 
phenomena, different from those which occur in consciousness in isolation...these specific 
[social] facts reside in the society itself that produces them and not in its parts… This does 
not mean that they are not in some sense psychical, since they all consist in ways of thinking 
and acting.  But the states of the collective consciousness are of a different nature from the 
states of the individual consciousness; they are representations of another kind.  The 
mentality of groups is not that of individuals: it has its own laws. (Durkheim 2013, 10-11) 
 
- Émile Durkheim, “Preface to the Second Edition,” The Rules of Sociological 
Method  
   
[I]t is a miracle that we are moral, and it did not have to be this way.  It just so happens 
that, on the whole, those of us who made mostly moral decisions most of the time had more 
babies.  And so, again, we should simply marvel and celebrate the fact that, mirabile dictu 
(and Nietzsche notwithstanding), morality appears to be somehow good for our species, 
our cultures, and ourselves… (Tomasello 2016, 162-3). 
 
- Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality 
 




- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
 
The word “transcend” comes from Latin and its root meaning is “to reach beyond” (OED 
2021).  For both Durkheim and Heidegger, the “reaching beyond” that grounds our existence is 
constituted in and by our participation in a social world that gives us our fundamental identities, 
modes of other- and self-relation, and capacity for meaningful thought and feeling.  There are two, 
related senses in which human life is distinctively transcendent in character.  First of all, though 
we are animal organisms we are always, insofar as we are persons, transcending our merely animal 
nature.  We relate to and take a stand on ourselves continually in virtue of the meaningful relations 
in which we stand with others and the commitments and meanings that enable and sustain those 
relations, assessing our desires, beliefs, and so forth in the light of the perspective granted us 
through those relations.  The model for thinking about this constitutive self-transcendence is that 
of standing in “we” relation to actual or potential others.  If you and I are building a boat, I remain 
me but also am, insofar as I am immersed in the task at hand, relating to you and myself as we who 
are engaged in this task, and treat that identity as having, ceteris paribus, normative authority over 
my merely individual self.  That is to say that the transcendence involved requires “reaching 
beyond” our merely individual organism, concerns, and interests, in an act that reconstitutes 
ourselves as a social agent.  The latter is constituted by continuous, ongoing acts of transcending 
the former.  And, looking ahead to some of the complexities we will be discussing once we’ve got 
a complex matrix of such relations on the table, as well as the kind of self-transformation referred 
to by the religious term conversion, when the relations in question shift radically for the better 
there is room to speak of positively transcending one identity or stance as a social agent in favor 
of another.  To refer to such a change as a further act of transcendence, as opposed simply to a 
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change, is to suggest that it better realizes the fundamental self-transcendent, relational existential 
task of self-transcendence that is essentially connected to the cultivation of existential vitality. 
As we’ve described it, the self-transcendence process in question involves what were 
discrete entities coming to define themselves in terms of certain modes of collaboration and 
identification with one another that generate new entities.  The “I” becomes the member (in 
good/decent/poor standing) of a “we”—or, rather, as we will see, many “we”s.  The process in 
other words involves a progressive emergence of new phenomena out of novel configurations in 
more primitive phenomena, with the attendant claim that we cannot understand the new by 
reducing it to the old.  This kind of emergentist picture was very important to Durkheim, because 
it allowed him to provide a thoroughly naturalistic account of human beings while at the same time 
delegitimating attempts to deny that there is something genuinely distinctive about human 
existence that is tied to our sociality and must be understood on its own terms.  In his recent work 
attempting to explain what makes human beings distinctive, Michael Tomasello has provided a 
very compelling version of just such an account.7 
In A Natural History of Human Thinking, Michael Tomasello lays the groundwork for his 
account of distinctively human forms of transcendence by situating it in a deeper story concerning 
the evolution of life on planet earth as outlined in John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry’s book 
The Major Transitions in Evolution.  In that work, Smith and Szathmáry identify eight major 
transitions in the evolution of life on earth.  What is significant about this account for Tomasello, 
                                                 
7 There are any number of tensions between Heidegger and Durkheim that must simply be acknowledged, including 
in some sense Durkheim’s commitment to a certain kind of scientific naturalism that would attempt to emphasize 
continuities between (a) human and other natural phenomena and (b) the ways in which those phenomena ought to be 
understood.  That being said, it is worth flagging the seemingly emergentist understanding of the emergence of what 
he calls worldhood that Heidegger points to in the following passage from The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 
“[1.] the stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming.” (Heidegger 




is the claim that many of these transitions can be characterized in the following terms: “entities 
that were capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a 
larger whole after it,” which transformation is accompanied by a “change in the method of 
information transmission” between and within the relevant entities (Smith & Szathmáry, 6).    
The formation of multicellular organisms was one such leap.  Crudely speaking, this 
evolutionary event involved the rise of a new mode of transcendence that reconstituted the living 
entities that entered into it.  Two organisms became one and the distinctive truth, as well as its 
mode of responding to the world, was radically transformed.  The existence of each cell was now 
fundamentally connected to that of the other, and each was able to persist only insofar as it not 
only maintained itself but also maintained the larger multicellular organism of which it was an 
essential part and without which it couldn’t survive.  This movement towards greater complexity 
enabled a sort of very preliminary division of labor that enabled the larger organism to develop 
more complex means of engaging with its environment.  The most recent such development, of 
course, is the emergence of the radically social, language-speaking human beings with which we 
are concerned here.  The claim would be that though the Rousseauian state of nature in which 
humans live isolated lives and reproduce sort of at random as they happen across one another is 
conceivable, it would be a state in which human organisms existed and reproduced but not human 
persons.  For human persons to reproduce they must be and remain part of a certain kind of robust 
social world.   
Smith and Szathmáry make clear that this developmental tendency does not support crude 
assumptions of inevitable evolutionary progress in this direction, insofar as plenty of organisms 
(e.g. bacteria) have retained a relatively simple structure for hundreds of millions of years, and 
insofar as there seems to be no good grounds for assuming that evolution of organisms couldn’t 
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have plateaued in a state of relative simplicity (ibid, 4).  That being said, to the extent that there is 
a discernible tendency in at least in some strands of biological evolution towards increasing 
interdependence among living entities it is a suggestive one that helps us to see the ways in which 
constitutive features of human existence are in some sense in line with broader tendencies in 
organic life as a whole.  Acts of reconstitutive self-transcendence that enable the emergence of 
more complex organized entities with heightened powers of responsiveness to the opportunities 
presented by their environment can generate new kinds of entities in the world that are 
characterized by greater evolutionary fitness.  At each of these stages a new kind of whole emerges 
that reshapes the parts composing it and must be understood on its own terms, and, as we will see, 
though the crude Darwinian model doesn’t apply to the personal domain as it does to the purely 
biological, there is a new form of fitness oriented towards extending the substance of one’s person 
beyond one’s individual, biological death that is crucial here too.   
Tomasello’s basic claim is that the emergence of humanity involves two decisive 
evolutionary steps, each of which can be aligned with the tendency towards greater 
interdependence and intercommunication of the sort that Smith and Szathmzáry foreground, and 
each of which involves individuals’ developing the ability to act in the light of shared intentions 
generated through the formation of “we”s that transform their agential perspective and powers in 
the world in radical ways.  The first step took place with the rise of the ability to form “joint 
intentions” with particular human beings in order to undertake particular, discrete collaborative 
actions.  Here individuals acquired the ability to deliberately commit to collaborating with one 
another as members of a particular “we” generated for and centered on the performance of some 
task (e.g. collaborative hunting).  Essential to this ability is that of transcending their particular 
bodily and desiderative perspective in order to take up the cognitive and practical stance of the 
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“we” into which they had entered and, in entering it, accepted as in some sense authoritative over 
them for the duration of the collaboration.   This mode of self-transcendence involves the 
emergence of a fundamental, second-personal “natural” morality, according to Tomasello, and 
constitutes a huge evolutionary advantage insofar as robustly collaborative human beings are much 
more successful in securing their biological ends than those who are less collaborative.  That being 
said, it is crucial to flag that the normativity in question here, as well as at the next stage with the 
emergence of collective intentionality, cannot be reduced to self-interest even if there is an 
evolutionary explanation for it.  It is a genuinely new, sui generis emergent phenomenon.   
The emergence of joint intentionality involved a step beyond the basic theory of (other) 
mind(s) and collaborative powers that we find already in the higher apes. These close evolutionary 
relatives of ours are able to interpret the actions of their peers as being a function of their beliefs 
and desires and the practical intentions that are directing their actions.  For this reason, they are 
able to engage in what look like acts of collaborative hunting.  Chimps, for instance, are good at 
responding to one another’s actions in an intelligent manner when several of them are engaged in 
hunting a monkey.  This constitutes a form of cognitive and practical self-transcendence, insofar 
as they are able to adjust their actions in the light of one another’s behavior.  That being said, they 
do not act as a “we” in the manner in which human beings do because each of them is simply 
trying to get the monkey for themselves.  It is not “we” who are working together to hunt a monkey 
for “us” to enjoy eating if we are successful.  The chimps are, rather, competing with one another 
to get to the monkey first, and whoever does end up getting it feels no obligation to share it with 
the other pursuers unless she feels like it--because they are family members or connected by some 
sort of emotional bond.  (Tomasello 2016, 28).  In brief, their actions are informed by those of the 
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others but they do not engage in any fundamental realignment of their goals and desires in the light 
of the relations in which they stand to them.   
When it comes to our capacities for joint and collective intentionality, ontogeny follows 
phylogeny and children from a very young age possess the capacity and active inclination to 
generate joint intentions with other people, often without needing or even being able to explicitly 
articulate them.  Tomasello describes such joint intentionality as follows: 
A collaborative activity structured by joint intentionality possesses a dual-level 
structuring of jointness and individuality: each individual is both the “we” that is pursuing 
with her partner a joint goal (in joint attention) and at the same time an individual that has 
her own role and perspective…they now form what we may call a joint agent… 
The formation of a joint goal relies on a mutual sense of trust… when fourteen- to 
eighteen-month-olds are collaborating with an adult partner who just stops interacting for 
no reason, they make active attempts to reengage him in the task by doing such things as 
beckoning and pointing—whereas chimpanzees in this same experimental situation never 
attempt to reengage their partner at all.  And the children in this experiment are not just 
attempting to reactivate the adult as a “social tool” toward some personal end: when there 
is some reason for the interruption (e.g. the adult is called away by another adult), children 
wait patiently for his return, even if they could easily perform the task by themselves…The 
reengagement attempts are thus sensitive to the adult’s intentional state…and children are 
attempting not just to reinstate a fun activity but, rather, to reconstitute their lost “we” 
(ibid., 50-1).   
 
These children, whose ability to speak is rudimentary at best, demonstrate an ability and active 
desire to stand in “we” relations with others that is often useful in securing their own ends but 
which they also, crucially, value for its own sake.  Such a trait emerged for evolutionary reasons—
namely those who were capable of and actively sought out and were reliable partners in such 
collaborative ventures got more food and so forth—but it itself involves a valuation of others and 
standing in relations of solidarity with them for their own sake.  This capacity to form joint 
intentions is structured by a kind of basic, “natural” second-personal morality and has a number of 
other important upshots.   
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If they collaborate with others to secure some desirable good, they feel they ought to share 
it with their collaborators.  If they don’t get a fair share of the good in question they rarely feel 
compelled—or need—to do much more than point this out to their collaborator for her to even 
things up, and vice versa.  No explicit contract, in other words, is needed for this norm to obtain--
it is in some sense built into their capacity to collaborate and is felt to obtain whenever 
collaboration is undertaken. (ibid., 61).  If they decide to back out of the collaborative project after 
it has gotten underway they feel some need to (implicitly or explicitly) apologize and explain 
themselves in a way that gives appropriate weight to the collaborative intention that they had 
formed.  (ibid, 69).  They understand that a genuine “we” has been formed and that it imposes 
constraints on their actions, even if each party to that “we” retains the right, in appropriate 
circumstances, to back out of it.  If it is to be legitimate, such backing out needs to be motivated 
by the right sorts of reasons, reasons which “we” can see as legitimate.  One takes a stand on one’s 
desires from without, as it were, by attending to them in the light of that “we” and in that light 
certain desires and goals are endorsable while others are not.  Here we have the beginnings of what 
Durkheim calls the “inherent asceticism in all [human] social life” (Durkheim 1995, 321).  As we 
mentioned above in connection with the goods of that asceticism, though a certain willingness to 
deny our immediate more selfish desires is present and can involve a kind of suffering, there are 
also distinctive modes of positive fulfilment that it opens to us qua members of the “we” relation—
as we see in the positive efforts to maintain and re-establish “we” relations even in the absence of 
any compelling self-interested motive.   
The rise of the joint intentionality characteristic of human beings involved transformations 
as well in the way in which human beings perceive the world that they are now in a position to 
more robustly share with others, to take up the affective and cognitive perspective of that joint 
46 
 
agent, and to regulate both one’s own and the other’s behavior in the light of that “we.”  It is at 
this point, Tomasello claims, that a basic understanding of there being different perspectives on a 
fundamentally shared world fully emerges (ibid, 52).  When one stands in such a “we” relation to 
another, the world’s significant possibilities are revealed partially in the light of the relevant “we.”  
For this reason, the behavior of the other with whom we stand in this “we” relation is revealed in 
its significance for “us.”  The relevant ability to attend to the actions of others as part of “our” 
larger action shows up in the fact that children who engage in collaborative activities can easily 
switch roles, having attended throughout to the other’s action in the light of the collaboration, 
whereas chimps cannot (ibid., 51).  In the absence of a real “we,” chimps respond to the other’s 
behavior as it bears upon their ability to achieve their individual end, but don’t otherwise identify 
with the others’ pragmatic stance towards the world or see it as related to their own by some higher 
shared practical stance.  Though the idea of a real objective reality that transcends and is 
authoritative over the subjective perspectives of all particular individuals only fully arises with the 
next step in the evolutionary process, the seeds of that awareness are laid here.  
Hunter-gatherer societies are remarkably egalitarian by our standards and there is every 
reason to believe that early hunter-gatherer hominids who had not yet developed capacities for 
collective intentionality would have been on if anything even more fundamentally equal footing 
insofar as there wouldn’t have been any socially-established rank or distinctions of role or identity 
within the larger group.  At least in part for this reason, the in-built norms of joint intentionality 
that arose in this context are essentially egalitarian and rest upon the commitment, ceteris paribus, 
to the equivalence and equality of the two collaborators.  The rise of this form of joint intentionality 
required and was constituted through a more or less inbuilt understanding that such collaborations 
must be structured by reciprocal norms of fairness. (ibid., 40-44).  Tomasello therefore 
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characterizes this first step in the evolution of human modes of self-transcendence as involving the 
generation of “natural morality” characterized by second-personal mutual respect which he argues 
is an enduring and essential component of human life (ibid, 126-7). Though the next step in human 
evolution would introduce an alternative source of normative authority that shaped and constrained 
our relationship to this “natural morality,” the latter remains absolutely fundamental to human life 
and its distinctive authority is a recurrently invoked vehicle for the critique of cultural norms that 
violate its basic.  There is, in other words, an in-built capacity and at times obligation or need to 
suspend our more complex and differentiated hierarchical social identities, rank, and so forth and 
simply relate to one another as individuals deserving of some basic, open-ended second-personal 
recognition and care.  Before turning to that abiding tension, we must finish the story by clarifying 
what the emergence of collective intentionality with homo sapiens sapiens proper involved.   
 The second stage in human evolution came with the emergence of what Tomasello refers 
to as “collective intentionality.”  This development would have been prompted, he argues, by 
increasing competition for resources between increasingly collaborative bands of human beings, 
and the resultant evolutionary imperative to generate new collaborative powers to compete with 
one another.  Collective intentionality is distinguished from joint intentionality in that it is enduring 
as opposed to episodic and binds together entire communities of human beings, as opposed to mere 
collaborative pairs, in enduring “we” relations that fundamentally shape the identities and practical 
orientations of their members.  (ibid, 85).  Tomasello describes this new collective intentional 
orientation as follows, in terms that in many respects echo those in which Durkheim will speak 
about (aboriginal Australian) “society” in Elementary Forms and the ways in which Heidegger in 
Being and Time speaks of the way in which our default mode of comporting ourselves in the world 
is that of das Man: 
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[A]round 150,000 years ago, [homo sapiens sapiens] began forming separate and distinct 
cultural groups that competed with one another for resources.  Interdependence now 
reigned not just at the level of the collaborating dyad, and not just in the domain of foraging, 
but at the level of the entire cultural group, and in all domains of life…Outsiders were 
essentially free riders or competitors—barbarians—and so excluded… 
 … [Skills of collective intentionality] enabled individuals to create among themselves 
various types of conventional cultural practices, shared in the cultural common ground of 
the group.  The roles…were fully agent independent: their role ideals were what anyone 
who would be one of us (i.e. any rational person) would need to do to promote collective 
success.  At some point, these maximally generalized ideal standards came to be 
conceptualized as the “objectively” right (not wrong) ways to perform the role, including 
the generic role of simply being a contributing member of the culture… [When it came to] 
things about which individuals already had second-personal moral attitudes...the normative 
role ideals specified not just conventional right and wrong but moral right and wrong…  
…The issue was that…the largest and most important collective commitment of their 
culture—its conventional practices, norms, and institutions—were things that individuals 
did not create for themselves: they were born into them.  The individual therefore faces, in 
theory, the problem of the social contract and its legitimacy.  In practice, however, 
individuals naturally saw the self-regulating collective commitments into which they were 
born as legitimate because they identified with their cultural group; they assumed a kind of 
coauthorship such that the commitments were made by “us” for “us.”  In the case of moral 
norms, this legitimacy was fortified by its connection to second-personal morality.  The 
cultural rationality of modern humans was thus to freely relinquish much control of their 
individual actions to an unreflective conformity to the conventions, norms, and institutions 
of their group, with autonomous decision making…mostly confined to resolving conflicts 
between norms (ibid., 85-6). 
 
With the emergence of collective intentionality of this sort we arrive at the stage at which 
Durkheim’s claim that we transcend ourselves whenever we think and act becomes true.  Here 
human beings are born into an elaborated social world structured by an understanding of what we 
are about and what one does as one of us that is always already there and to which they must in 
some basic sense, at least at the outset and for the most part, submit and to which they are always 
relating themselves, even in acts of creative innovation or defiance.   
With the rise of the ability to form such an all-encompassing and abiding we, which almost 
inevitably precedes and outlives the particular individuals that compose it at any given time, there 
emerges an orientation towards the world as a broadly objective and shared reality within which 
we all live.  This objective world would have been the world that is opened up by our culture. (ibid, 
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95).  It’s the world that exists regardless of what we as individuals happen to think about it, 
populated by roles and practices the general normativity which particular individuals would have 
been required to accept as a condition of their participation in it (ibid, 96-7).  Our ability to relate 
to the world objectively depends upon our pragmatic, collaborative membership in a social world 
that gives us the relevant skills of thinking about reality from a more or less radically decentered 
perspective.  It can achieve relative autonomy from our cultural world, but it can never exist in a 
cultural vacuum.  A claim to this effect can also be found in Heidegger’s construal of the cognitive 
relation to the world at the center of the natural sciences as a founded mode of being that emerges 
out of our more pragmatic immersion in a shared, culturally disclosed world (Heidegger 2008, 88), 
as well as positions in the philosophy of science that centralize the role that the culture(s) of 
scientific practice are the ultimate ground of the objective claims that are made by scientists.   That 
is to say that our standing in the right kind of normatively governed, collaborative relations to one 
another is the fundamental concern and good of human life, which makes possible while also 
possessing a certain kind of authority over our more purely cognitive endeavors in and toward the 
world.  This is a way of saying, with Levinas, that ethics is first philosophy or, with Nietzsche, 
that the single-minded scientific pursuit of truth for its own sake is founded on a moral faith.    
One of the complications here, of course, is that those interpersonal relationships tend 
ceteris paribus to have an us vs. them structure.  This is not some fixed inescapable natural fact, 
but rather a tendency that needs to be acknowledged.    The cultural worlds of such collective 
groups would invariably have understood themselves as set over against other such groups, and 
typically have taken their own orientation to be the truer orientation.  This divergence would 
therefore, in other words, rarely be understood simply as a difference.  As Tomasello points out, 
this would often have been understood in terms of a contrast between us and them along the lines 
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of that between genuine, full human beings and barbarians. Thus, was generated one of the most 
fundamental features of human psychology: namely, the tendency to group human beings in an 
“us” over against a “them,” with those who find themselves grouped among the latter often being 
deprived of full-fledged standing as human persons.   The “us” can be quite expansive, and tends 
to grow as collaborative ventures become more expansive along with attendant forms of human 
interdependence.  Durkheim’s account of the rise of “international gods” in aboriginal Australian 
societies is one instance of such a transformation at the religious level (Durkheim 1995, 298).  
Furthermore, the natural, second-personal morality is always a means by which the collective 
intentional identities that divide us can be problematized and broken open.   
It is only at this stage of evolution that full-fledged human beings like ourselves emerge 
onto the scene, humans who are genuine persons.  These persons are, to use Heidegger’s preferred 
phrase, always already standing in meaningful relation to other persons in abiding “we” relations 
constituted at the level of collective intentionality that constitute the background against which 
more concrete, second-personal relations take form: 
Whereas early human individuals needed to create and keep their identity as a competent 
cooperative partner--by acting like one--now, with modern humans, the need was to create 
and keep an identity as a competent cultural agent, a “person,” in a particular group by 
doing things in conventional ways, by chastising those (including the self) who do not do 
things in conventional ways… (Tomasello, 107).   
 
Full-fledged personhood is maintained only through robust integration into and identification with 
a social world that is structured in terms of shared, conventional meanings.  It is essentially 
language-based, though ritualistic modes of bodily comportment will play an essential role in 
sustaining these forms of active personhood.  With such abiding membership in one or more 
encompassing “we”s, all of one’s actions come to have potential social significance, and one 
occupies an agential perspective on the world and on oneself that is shot through with 
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transcendence insofar as one is always in a position to assess and judge one’s impulses and actions 
in terms of their actual or potential, manifest or merely implicit significance in and for the defining 
“we”s in which one currently or potentially stands. 
Durkheim makes a similar claim, which we will also find in Heidegger, in the following 
passage.  In a sense, the passage is a recapitulation of his construal of the claim that “man is 
double,” and thus allows us to return to the place from which we started, hopefully with a richer 
understanding of the kind of view to which Durkheim is committed: 
[Two] sorts of elements produced the idea of person. One is essentially impersonal: It 
is the spiritual principle that serves as the soul of the collectivity.  That principle is the very 
substance of which individual souls are made.  It is not the property of anyone in particular, 
but part of the collective patrimony; in and through that principle, all the consciousnesses 
commune.  From a different point of view, if there are to be separate personalities, some 
factor must intervene to fragment and differentiate this principle; in other words, an 
element of individuation is necessary.  The body plays this role… Hence, even if all the 
consciousnesses situated in those bodies view the same world--namely, the world of ideas 
and feelings that morally unify the group--they do not all view it from the same viewpoint; 
each expresses it in his own fashion.   
Of those two equally indispensable factors, the impersonal element is certainly not the 
less important, since it is the one that furnishes the raw material for the idea of the soul. … 
(Durkheim 1995, 273).  
 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, the etymology of the English word “principle” is traced through 
that of the French word that Durkheim is using--“principe”--to the Latin “principium.”  The root 
meaning is construed as follows: “origin, source, first cause...rule of conduct...fundamental source 
from which something proceeds” (OED 2021).    Insofar as no social order can be fully articulated 
in a single principle, it is best to read Durkheim as deploying this root sense, or using the more 
literal term as a metaphor for giving expression to that root sense. What is important for our 
purposes here is the claim that our personhood depends upon our internalizing the animating spirit 
of our social world.  We are individuals in virtue of our particular bodies--both their intrinsic 
physiological nature and the distinctive position which they occupy in the physical world--but we 
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could not be persons without our embodying some kind of shared orientation and manner of getting 
around in meaningful, more or less collaborative ways with others that frames and shapes our 
actions as normatively significant.  Durkheim’s talk of a spiritual principle points to the ways in 
which the essential something that we internalize from our social world is inherently normative in 
character.  We will turn in the next section to a more nuanced discussion of the ways in which we 
are shaped by and relate ourselves to this spiritual principle in the light of our individuality. 
 Before moving on to discussing Heidegger and Buber it is important to underline the 
significance of the tension that Tomasello flags between “natural” second-personal morality and 
collective normativity.  Though they can often align, with the former giving distinctively moral 
substance to certain norms constituting the latter, there can often be a tension between them.  In 
some such cases the tension leads us to bend rather inflexible and crude rules to fit particular 
circumstances.  Such instances, it seems, are a good example of snapping out of autopilot and 
awakening to the need to decide between norms that Tomasello refers to at the end of the general 
account of collective intentionality quoted above.  But the tensions can be more acute: collective 
normative orders can illegitimately exclude and denigrate entire groups or classes of people 
deemed “other” and, of course, can oppress in all manner of ways those who are officially 
identified as part of the in-group, as one of us.  In all of these cases, second-personal morality can 
be a source of critique and transformation that reshapes our default attitudes and cultural orders.  
Tomasello describes one way in which such tension can be foregrounded to transformative effect:  
[Things] can change.  It can happen that so-called norm entrepreneurs take a risk and 
attempt to promote a value in some new way that is not already shared in the group…The 
problem is that people with “no voice” in the discourse almost certainly will not be seen as 
leaders and are not in the communicative networks of the majority.  But there is one method 
that has been proven effective in this situation, and it is the very revealing of the “natural” 
morality possessed by all human beings.  The method, perfected by Mahatma Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King, is for the people without a voice to bring in front of the voiced people’s 
eyes the way in which they are being treated: a kind of second-personal protest writ large.  
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For example, in the southern United States in the 1960s, African-Americans sat at all-white 
lunch counters, refused to leave when asked, and so incurred the expected police brutality.  
The key was that it needed to be in front of many eyes, preferably television cameras.  
Individuals in the white majority who previously just did not, or chose not to, think about 
these things then had them presented to them in their cultural common ground (mostly in 
their living rooms) exactly what was going on.  African-Americans’ protests did not tell 
the white majority precisely what to do, it only displayed their resentment, under the 
assumption that the majority already knew the right thing to do. (ibid, 133-4). 
 
In “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King describes this process as that of bringing “to the surface 
the hidden tension that is already alive.  We bring it out into the open, where it can be seen and 
dealt with” (King 2015, 135).  What both King and Tomasello claim here is that if the problem is 
put before us in the right way we know how to deal with it, that we have by nature some basic 
capacity to recognize the wrongs in question and orient ourselves to the task of resolving them 
together.   
 While Durkheim’s account might seem to center more emphatically on collective 
intentionality, there are grounds for thinking that Durkheim’s account of the means whereby social 
practices and worlds can change requires that something very much like this natural capacity to 
generate sustainable norms between people must exist. We see it both in his claim that if 
individuals are put in relatively sustained contact with another they will tend to generate 
normatively relationships or, at the larger scale, societies of a relatively stable sort (Durkheim 
1997, 218).  The spontaneous emergence of normative orders of this sort, along with the recurrent 
claim that there is a deep connection between the health of societies and their moral structure, 
suggests that human beings must have a basic aptitude for and investment in the moral character 
of their social worlds and that this involves a kind of background, natural common ground out of 
which particular cultural orders emerge.  That is to say that not any collective normative order will 
do and that there are some background, fundamental norms to which such orders must, ceteris 
paribus, ultimately be accountable.  But at the same time there are any number of ways of more or 
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less successfully responding to and attempting to implement and acknowledge that basic 
normativity, and thus any number of different cultural orders might, in context, be relatively 
legitimate and, as a result, tend towards stability—until the relevant context changes (Durkheim 
1984, xxvi). 
Secondly, he is committed to the idea that there is a progressive moral telos in human 
history oriented towards the more and more thorough recognition and celebration of the sacredness 
of individual persons and personality.  The following passages, from Suicide (1897) and 
“Individualism and the intellectuals” (1898) respectively speak to this ultimate moral ideal that we 
are called upon better to realize (this seems to involve a move from the liberalism of the French 
Revolution to a socialism that more adequately affirms the sacredness of all individual persons):  
It is demonstrable that the exaltation of human personality is one of the aims pursued…by 
modern societies… 
 Now, not only is this aim really one of the aims of modern societies, but it is a law of 
history that peoples increasingly detach themselves from every other objective.  (Durkheim 
1979, 336). 
 
The human person…is [today] considered sacred in what one might call the ritual sense of 
the word…It is conceived as being invested with that material property which creates an 
empty space around holy objects, which keeps them away from profane contacts and which 
draws them away from ordinary life….Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s life, on a 
man’s liberty, on a man’s honor inspires us with a feeling of horror, in every way analogous 
to that which the believer experiences when he sees the idol profaned.  Such a morality is 
therefore not simply a hygienic discipline or a wise principle of economy.  It is a religion 
of which man is, at the same time, both believer and God.  (Durkheim 1994, 62).   
 
This descent of the divine into humanity is, of course, in some sense a very old Christian story, 
and Durkheim is very much inclined to see this cult of individual personality—which is prosocial 
and emphatically not to be identified with a corrosive, egoistic species of “individualism” with 
which it might be confused—grows out of the Abrahamic faith tradition.  And, of course, proper 
attunement and responsiveness to the dignity in question involves an essentially religious attitude 
as towards something sacred.  But it has some kind of fundamental grounding in reality that is at 
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work throughout human history and which will find its fullest flowering, Durkheim believes, in 
the future.  Insofar as we have not only the capacity but the active inclination to belong to large-
scale communal and small-scale interpersonal “we”s to maintain, cultivate, and enrich our 
personhood, one could say that the ultimate relational goal of human life is to belong to a “we” 
that is maximally expansive and fully accountable to the fundamental, bedrock imperatives of 
second-personal morality.   
This claim is crucial for our purposes because it allows us to, at a high level of abstraction 
and without wading into complicated and important questions about our ultimate obligations to 
one another that are outside of the scope of his dissertation, assert a kind of qualified normative 
realism that will be important down the line in distinguishing good from bad forms of religiosity.  
One form of realism that we do not wish to affirm is one according to which there are a set of 
moral rules or more general normative prescriptions that apply directly and make unambiguous 
demands on all people at all times.  One could think of a kind of crude Kantianism or utilitarianism 
as providing such a comparatively context-insensitive account of what we owe each other.  It seems 
that the ways in which our cultural worlds shape us, the richness and indeterminacy of persons’ 
interests and attitudes in. abstraction from such cultural formation, and the immense variety of way 
in which human beings   
 We have with Tomasello’s help attempted to vindicate Durkheim’s claim that human life 
is constituted by relations of self-transcendence and that we are for this reason radically dependent 
upon the relations in which we stand to others for our ability to take a meaningful stand on our 
lives and engage in meaningful, effective action.  In doing this we have begun to develop a 
Durkheimian account of the features of human existence that underlie and warrant a religious 
stance along the rather schematic lines sketched out in the introduction.  We have thus far laid out 
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an admittedly general and cursory account of certain crucial respects in which we depend on the 
relations in which we stand with others to position ourselves in relation to a world understood as 
transcending our subjective experience of it, as meaningful in a public manner that is not simply a 
function of our spontaneous biological impulses, and as shot through with moral significance.  It 
is only in looking to others in a committed, trusting way that involves transcending our subjective 
stance for the sake of standing in a transformative “we” relation with them, that we are capable of 
living a recognizably human life.  Caring for and cultivating these relations is therefore going to 
be of the utmost importance in human life—and for religion, if the Durkheimian account is correct.  
It is in our relations to others that we are converted into human persons, in other words, and it is 
upon these basic relational dynamics that we’ve begun to sketch that the more recognizably 
religious forms of conversion are grounded.  And as the conversions involved in the rise of joint 
and collective intentionality simultaneously transform us and the way in which other persons and 
the world that we share with them show up, so too will religious practices be in the game of 
transforming our mode of relating, perceiving, attending to, and acting the in world in a manner 
that opens up possibilities for new life. 
 We have also flagged, in a cursory way, some of the tensions and potentially problematic 
features of this basic relational field in which we find ourselves and towards which religious 
practices are oriented to re- and, when things are going well and they obviously often are not, 
better attune us.  There is a kind of basic normative orientation that we are called upon to take 
towards individual others that involves a basic sense of equal respect and need for a certain kind 
of reciprocity.  On the other hand, participation in our social worlds and the opportunities for taking 
up meaningful life projects, engaging in complex collaborative activities, identifying with a group 
that precedes and will survive us, and so forth, requires a kind of default and by and large 
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unreflective submission to a complex network of norms and practices and so forth that are often 
in various respects that we don’t (fully) recognize oppressive, alienating, and divisive. Tomasello 
does a good job of foregrounding the moral tensions in question, but I would like to turn in the 
final section of this chapter to Heidegger and Buber to illuminate a kind of alienating and 
existentially enervating relational breakdown that isn’t simply a matter of immorality, though it is 
often caught up with and/or facilitates or follows from it.   
1.3 Pascalian Tensions Cont’d: Heidegger and Buber 
As we mentioned above, Durkheim cites approvingly Pascal’s recurrent claims about the 
deeply paradoxical, tension-ridden character of human existence.  Tomasello’s account of the 
characteristic tension between second-personal morality and collective normative orders captures 
only something of this tension.  There is a deeper, more expansive dimension to this tension to 
which Durkheim is to some extent attuned, but which can only be elaborated with the help of 
thinkers who are positioned more directly in the “existentialist” tradition.  In what follows I will 
briefly discuss two passages from “The Dualisms of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions” that 
get at this tension and then discuss them briefly in connection with some claims that Heidegger 
makes about the contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity and some claims that Buber 
makes regarding a related contrast he draws between the I-It and I-You stances.  The central aim 
here is to develop some general claims out of these text that can help us make sense of the 
Durkheimian account of religiosity that we’re developing and not to defend particular readings of 
the texts in question on their own terms.  That is to say if the accounts are plausible on their own 
terms but as readings of Being and Time or I and Thou strike the reader as creative misreadings 
that is okay. 
58 
 
 Durkheim elaborates on the general Pascalian claim about the deep tension at the heart of 
human existence with reference to various features of our relationship to the world, ourselves, and 
one another.  For our purposes I would like to cite and briefly discuss two passages that get at this 
tension as it concerns the tensions between the relative universality and seeming perspicacity of 
the meanings in terms of which we make sense of the world to ourselves and others, and the 
specificity of our concrete, physical embodiment.  The first passage, from Elementary Forms, is 
from the discussion of the idea of the person that we cited above and though it makes no reference 
to Pascal it helps set up the Pascal-inspired passage which we will be discussing next: 
The body plays this role [of individuating the impersonal, social spiritual principle at the 
heart of personhood].  Since bodies are distinct from one another, since they occupy 
different positions in time and space, each is a special milieu in which the collective 
representations are gradually refracted and colored differently.  Hence, even if all the 
consciousness situated in these bodies view the same world…they do not all view it from 
the same viewpoint; each expresses it in his own fashion. (Durkheim 1995, 273).   
 
The basic claim here is that we depend upon participation in our social worlds to be in a world that 
is lit up for us as significant and meaningful in a public, shared manner.  And we need to be porous 
to that light in order for us to be able to fully participate in that public world and, in so doing, 
realize our nature as personal beings.  At the same time, the way in which that light is refracted in 
and illuminates each of our lives and the concrete, particular situations in which we lead them is 
distinctive.  That is to say that though the social norms constituted in and by our participation in 
our social worlds are crucial to our lives and worlds showing up as meaningful, they don’t directly 
dictate the proper way in which we should understand, respond to, and attempt to realize, remain 
faithful to, or transform those meanings in our concrete lives.  Mere commitment to the explicit 
norms of the sort the Tomasello focuses on, and commitment to recognizing the authority of 
“natural” mortality, is not sufficient to properly navigating the world as it is lit up by our 
participation in our social worlds.   
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Another, related dimension of this tension is captured in the following passage which 
comes out of his attempt to develop a sociological, naturalistic (and, admittedly, quite toned down) 
account of the Pascalian view, and which is in broad strokes similar to a claim that Heidegger 
makes about the relationship between earth and world in “The Origin of the Work of Art” that I’ve 
paired with it (as well as Buber’s contrast between the I-It and I-You stances which we will be 
discussing below): 
...We understand only when we think in concepts.  But sensory reality is not made to 
enter the framework of our concepts spontaneously and by itself.  It resists, and, in order 
to make it conform, we have to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to all sorts of 
laborious operations that alter it so that the mind can assimilate it.  However, we never 
completely succeed in triumphing over its resistance.  Our concepts never succeed in 
mastering our sensations and in translating them completely into intelligible terms.  They 
take on a conceptual form only by losing that which is most concrete in them, that which 
causes them to speak to our sensory being and to involve it in action; and, in so doing, they 
become something fixed and dead.  Therefore, we cannot understand things without 
partially renouncing a feeling for their life, and we cannot feel that life without renouncing 
the understanding of it.  Doubtless we sometimes dream of a science that would adequately 
express all of reality; but this is an ideal that we can only approach ceaselessly, not one that 
is possible for us to attain.  (ibid., 153). 
 
Color shines and wants only to shine.  If we try to make it comprehensible by analyzing it 
into numbers of oscillations it is gone.  It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed 
and unexplained.  Earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it.  It turns every merely 
calculational intrusion into an act of destruction.  (Heidegger 2002, 25).8 
 
A crucial distinction between Heidegger (and Pascal) and Durkheim is that Durkheim treats the 
inadequacy of science to the reality it attempts to capture as grounds for ceaselessly aspiring better 
to capture that reality in scientific terms, as opposed to an indication that that very effort is an 
importunate and wrong-headed imposition.   That being said, Durkheim does acknowledge that 
                                                 
8 Briefly, Heidegger understands us to live in an “Open” that is opened up by the tense “rift” between “world” and 
“earth.”  The former is the domain of relatively clear, illuminating social meanings in terms of which we make sense 
of ourselves and our worlds and one another.  The world is housed in the “earth” which is a term Heidegger uses to 
refer to all of those aspects of the “Open” that remain in some sense undisclosed, opaque, mysterious, and so forth in 
the manner described.  The “rift” is the name for the tension between earth and world insofar as the latter can be 
housed in the former but always prove in some way inadequate to it.  We will discuss these matters in greater depth 
in the third chapter.    
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there is a complexity, concreteness, and opacity that defies any attempt to capture it in a final, 
comprehensive theory.  He will cite this kind of consideration in his claim that science cannot 
replace religion because science is always incomplete and in some sense inherently incomplete at 
an alien to the stance we need to take up to act in the world  (Durkheim 1995, 432) and I think it 
points to his partial attunement to the truth of the very similar claim that Kierkegaard/Johannes 
Climacus makes in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, “…system 
and existing cannot be thought together; because systematic thought in order to think life must 
think of it as annulled and hence not as life” (Kierkegaard 2009, 100).  As we proceed, we will be 
running with the more emphatic delimiting of science’s authority that we find in Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger and which Durkheim, in his aspiration to epistemically legitimate sociology on the 
model of the natural sciences, fell short of affirming.  For reasons that Durkheim himself in large 
part acknowledges, as we will see, in his attempt to describe the discrete, equally legitimate roles 
played by religion and science in human life, a proper defense of religiosity requires such a 
delimitation.   
 There are two points that need to be distinguished.  On the one hand, there is the simple 
fact that the public categories, norms, practices, institutions, and so forth do not fully capture the 
concrete reality of the world, persons, relationships, and so forth that give substance to our lives.  
To assert this is to assert something about the finitude and incompleteness of the meaningful grip 
we have on the world and, in Heideggerian terms, the way in which the unconcealment of truth 
rests inevitably upon concealment—only certain things can be made intelligible and brought to 
light while others are left in obscurity.  The second point can be divided into two related points.  
The first is that where we are unduly deferential to these shared, public modes of understanding—
either those of our society at large or of a subgroup within that society to which we belong—can 
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become closed off from a proper attunement to their inadequacy in a way that renders our relations 
thin and false.   We can lose sight of the way in which the light is refracted differently in our 
discrete, mortal, concrete lives and the responsibility we have to acknowledge and concernfully 
relate ourselves to the concrete situations and persons in which they are housed.  
 I would like to address some of these issues with reference to Heidegger and Buber.  I will 
start by discussing Heidegger’s account of our default collective intentional orientation to the 
world, of the ways in which we are (a) always already with and being towards others as (b) simply 
one among those others.  I will then, without diving too deeply into the interpretive waters, make 
some general claims about what authenticity involves, why it is reticent, and why it involves some 
kind of confrontation with our mortality.  The claim is that we ought to understand authenticity 
(again, regardless of whether or not this is how the Heidegger of Being and Time understands it) 
as centering on confronting features of our existential predicament that Durkheim arguably flags 
in making the point about the light of the social being refracted in distinctive ways in every 
concrete bodily, moral person and situation.   Such authenticity involves (a) an acknowledgment 
of the limited ability of our public modes of understanding to do full justice to the concrete 
specificity of our persons and lives and the need to own our decisions in the face of the limits to 
our ability to justify ourselves in those terms and (b) an acknowledgment of our mortality as those 
transient bodily vessels of these shared public meanings and values.   
If the tensions outlined in the first section underlined the need to cultivate some kind of 
embodied willingness to relate to others in a second-personal manner that can override and 
problematize oppressive or otherwise destructive forms of collective intentional order—i.e. a 
certain committed, courageous fidelity to the so-called Golden Rule—and an aspiration to realize 
a form of mutual belonging that harmonizes these distinct and often tensely related spheres of joint 
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and collective intentionality, these reflections point towards two other imperatives that will be 
important to our reflections on religion.  First of all, there is a need to find a way of relating to the 
task of living that is not dependent simply on applying a set of categories or rules to experience, 
but rather aims at cultivating a certain way of attending to experience that allows us to respond 
appropriately to the situations and persons we find ourselves standing in relation to in a manner 
that is attentive to their concrete specificity.    Second of all, it points to the need to confront and 
take a meaningful stand on the fact of our mortality. Our interpretation of religion will center on 
its ability to respond to both of these existential imperatives. 
* * * 
 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger commences his investigation of the meaning of being by 
developing an account of the fundamental ontology of that being that has an understanding of 
being—namely Dasein.  “Dasein” is a term, formed from the words “da” (there/here) and Sein 
(being), that in German ordinarily just means “existence.”   Heidegger uses this term to pick out 
the kind of being characteristic of human persons, which he later glosses, echoing the being-there 
root meaning, as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein).  The term itself, as well as his construal 
of Dasein as essentially being-in-the-world, points to the radically relational character of human 
persons—contra Descartes, a person utterly isolated from a (humanly meaningful, subjectivity-
transcendent) world is unthinkable because persons are as such, in their very being, constituted by 
the relationship in with others with whom they share a meaningful world.  He characterizes the 
existence of Dasein in the following terms:  
Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal 
pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are.’  
 Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another.  Dasein has 
always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je 
meines].  That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself 
towards its Being as its ownmost possibilities…And because Dasein is in each case 
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essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can 
also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so.  But only in so far as it is 
essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have 
lost itself and not yet won itself.  As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity…are 
both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. 
(Heidegger 2008, 68 [42-3]). 
 
What concerns us here is the account of the character of persons and how it can help us to 
understand the distinctive relational dynamics of human existence, with an eye to shedding light 
on the ways in which religious practices can be understood as a response to and effort to work with 
and upon those dynamics.  I will be interpreting his account of authenticity as a matter of exercising 
our agency responsibly in the light of the constitutive relational tensions at the heart of human life.  
   One of the constitutive features of Dasein is that it is always already being-with others. 
The default mode in which we are with others, which we will turn to momentarily, is that of das 
Man, or of acting simply as one among others who stands among and acts with others in the light 
of the collective intentionality that constitutes our shared, meaningful world.  The authentic 
individual exercise of our agency is only possible against the background of this default shared 
stance and constitutes a modification of our mode of being-with others as opposed to disavowal of 
it.  Our default mode of acting involves taking up a sort of impersonal pragmatic orientation 
towards the world that helps ground and sustain the shared modes of being-in-the-world in the 
light of which we for the most part live our lives.  On the one hand, this default identity is essential 
to us insofar it is only in virtue of our participation in it, and our being partially possessed by it, 
that we can find ourselves living in a meaningful world in the light of which we can take a stand 
on ourselves.  On the other hand, if we passively accept that default mode of comporting ourselves 
in too global a manner we run the risk of never acting in the light of the fact that we are ultimately 
self-responsible individuals whose constitutive life projects can never be understood as being 
simply prescribed to us by our social worlds.  That being said, regardless of our relation to that 
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default identity we are always already with others in modes by and large shaped by and with 
reference to it.  Regardless of how we act, we do so in the light of our constitutive relations to 
others with whom we share the default socially significant world.  
Heidegger’s term for the default social identity which serves as the fundamental kernel of 
our identity and avenue for participating in our social world is das Man, which is translated in the 
standard John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson translation of Being and Time as “the They.”  This 
translation is less awkward than the literal translation, which would be “the One,” and it does 
successfully flag the fact that actions undertaken in the grip of this identity are not fully self-
responsible, but it is misleading insofar as “the They” suggests the “not-I.”  Insofar as das Man is 
a fundamental structure of our being-in-the-world, “[the] one” is in some sense to be preferred.  It 
also flags the fact that it is the default and universal character of das Man intentionality that 
underwrites our living in one world and being to that extent, however insubstantial this form of 
unity may at certain times feel, “one” in our sharing of one world in common.  Das Man is the 
term that is used in German in locutions like “one eats with a knife and fork” or “one ought to be 
respectful to one’s elders” that articulate general claims about how any anonymous person in a 
given social world does or ought to behave in some sort of generic situation.  Heidegger’s claim 
that the default mode of Dasein is das Man is a claim to the effect that our default mode of orienting 
ourselves is an impersonal and standardized one that we take over from the social worlds to which 
we belong.  Our default mode of acting is that of a generic member of the “we”s to which we 
belong and which provide us with our basic meaningful orientation in the world.  As a rule, I do 
what one does and this involves the kind of relinquishing of individual agency “to an unreflective 
conformity” of which Tomasello speaks in his characterization of collective intentionality.  
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Heidegger emphasizes the non- or sub-cognitive dimension of these default identities and 
the modes of understanding that sustain them, the ways in which our bodies, affects, forms of 
imagining, habits of attention, and so forth need to be gradually cultivated through our initiation 
into practices as part of our upbringing within our given culture.  The following passage from 
Pierre Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice, cited in Dreyfus’s commentary on Division I 
of Being and Time, in which he describes the pedagogical influence at the level of meaningfully 
responsive comportment that a not explicitly educational environment has on a child, helps shed 
light on these basic dynamics:   
So long as the work of education is not clearly institutionalized as a specific, autonomous 
practice, and it is a whole group and a whole symbolically structured environment, without 
specialized agents or specific moments, which exerts an anonymous, pervasive pedagogic 
action, the essential part of the modus operandi which defines practical mastery is 
transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining the level of discourse. The 
child imitates not “models" but other people's actions. Body hexis speaks directly to the 
motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, 
because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged 
with a host of social meanings and values: in all societies, children are particularly attentive 
to the gestures and postures which, in their eyes, express everything that goes to make an 
accomplished adult - a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting 
and of using implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and 
(how could it be otherwise?) a certain subjective experience. (Bourdieu, 87). 
 
Children, eager to participate more fully in the surrounding world, more or less spontaneously take 
up the practices that they see around them without having to be explicitly taught the rules of the 
proverbial game.  The adults whom the children imitate in Bourdieu’s example are not explicitly 
flagged as “models,” but the child experiences them as making a claim upon them insofar as they 
wish to attain a similar level of skillful participation in the social world and they progressively 
internalize the prevailing modes of responding to their meaningful environment that they see in 
the competent adults surrounding them. Mere involvement, alongside adults, in the relevant 
environment shapes these children into increasingly adept collaborators in them.  No distinctive 
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educational practice is needed for the dissemination of das Man modes of comportment to take 
place.  They are of course taught and internalize certain rules, but much of what they have to learn 
can’t be articulated in such explicit form.  Learning to get by in the world as one does is much 
more like learning to ride a bicycle, in other words, than learning how to do geometry or 
memorizing the branches of government.  We need to get our minds aligned with others, but the 
most fundamental ways of relating to the world are not essentially cognitive in nature.  Looking 
ahead, it’s worth flagging that religious rituals must be understood as exercising something like 
this anonymous pedagogic action on those who participate in them. 
This dynamic is not restricted to children.  When we begin some interaction with another 
their actions and/or mode of address flag the form of shared relating to the world which they are 
calling us to take up.  We tend spontaneously to accommodate ourselves to the comportment of 
those with whom we engage insofar as their form of comportment constitutes an appeal to us to 
respond appropriately to the situation which that comportment lights up.  For these reasons, it is 
important to note, as Bourdieu’s construal already implicitly makes clear, that the forms of care 
that animate our social worlds are ones that we tend to encounter first and foremost in the people 
around us.  They are out there in the world, not simply in people’s heads, and we feel called to 
respond to the claim that that world itself makes upon us.  Our basic mode of relating to matters 
of care is therefore not a purely intellectual one.  For this reason, the animating “spiritual 
principle[s]” of our social worlds will tend not to be best disclosed by lists of explicit norms for 
action, regardless of the important place that such norms have in our lives.   
One instance of such a concretely embodied incarnation of a meaningful pragmatic stance 
is found in exemplary individuals who are held up as models or whose distinctive forms of action 
display modes of comportment distinctive from our own.  If we wish to be better participants in 
67 
 
our social worlds, or sub-worlds within those worlds, we tend to give shape to this aspiration by 
relating ourselves, imaginatively or actually, to others who incarnate it and on whom we would 
like to better model our lives.  Such relations to exemplary figures are not purely imitative, insofar 
as we the task of living better lives in our social world requires that we attend to the specificities 
of our individual character and situation.  Though this mode of relating ourselves to our social 
worlds and the task of living responsibly within them involves a more self-aware decision and 
deliberateness than we find in the process that Bourdieu describes, the fundamental dynamics that 
such a decision sets in motion will be ones that can be understood in part on analogy with such 
processes.   
In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger describes the basic happening of truth in a 
culture as being brought about not by a list of shared principles, but rather by works of art that 
disclose a way of seeing and caring about the world that is constitutive of our culture.  He thinks 
that the character of the contemporary world, with its constitutive practices and attendant 
understanding of being, has undermined our ability to relate to works of art in this way, and he 
therefore focuses his discussion on the working of a Greek temple in an ancient Greek polis.  We 
will not be looking at this account in detail until the third chapter.  What matters for our purposes 
is his general claim that in the temple and the practices that were centered around it in the Greek 
polis, Greeks were allowed to see a distilled incarnation of the fundamental significance of the 
pragmatic stance towards the world that gave basic shape to their shared lives.  Insofar as they 
responded to this incarnated call, they were preservers of the world thereby opened up.  This 
involved a form of knowledge, but not one that could ever be distilled into a set of rules:  
Preserving the work means: standing within the openness of beings that happens in the 
work.  This “standing-within” of preservation, however, is a knowing.  Yet knowing does 
not consist in mere information and notions about something.  He who truly knows what 
is, knows what he wills to do in the midst of what is.  
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 The willing here referred to, which neither merely applies knowledge nor decides 
beforehand, is thought of in terms of the basic experience of thinking in Being and 
Time.  Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains a knowing, is the existing 
human being’s entrance into and compliance with the unconcealedness of Being.  The 
[authentic] resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, 
but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of 
Being…the nature of Existenz is outstanding standing-within the essential sunderance of 
the clearing of beings.  (Heidegger 2013, 64). 
 
Explicit beliefs were, of course, a part of Greek religion (though less central than they would 
become in the West with the rise of Christianity), but what mattered most was art and stories and 
forms of ritualistic interaction that made radiantly manifest the deep existential orientation towards 
the world to which one was supposed, as a member of the polis, to be responsive and to a greater 
or lesser extent incarnate in one’s life.  Belonging to a religious community was essentially a 
matter of what one did--namely participate in the religious rituals in question and it involved 
stepping outside of our ordinary relations to one another, suspending their profane instrumental 
relations in order to re-relate to one another in the light of what were taken to be the fundamental, 
essential relations that bound their lives together  Such participation would of course, crucially, 
have had effects on people’s beliefs and attitudes, but it was the participation that was understood 
to be essential.  The Greeks would have lived with their gods and heroes in such a way that they 
felt called upon by them to better embody the modes of heightened, active, self-responsible action 
in their socially disclosed worlds that those exemplary figures incarnated in radiant form.  
We will be talking about authentic resoluteness shortly and about living with gods in the 
third chapter of this dissertation.  What matters here is that it is, for Heidegger, a matter of, in some 
sense, the heightening of our transcendence towards what he calls here the “openness of 
Being.”  We are more open, in other words, to the deep significance of our predicament.  His claim 
that this involves reaching beyond “captivity in that which is” points to the ways in which that 
deep disclosure or unconcealedness of being is never exhausted by whatever relation to things we 
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currently possess.  There are further possibilities of responsiveness that call for us to transcend our 
current relationships with things in a determinate, albeit typically difficult to clearly articulate 
(hence the essential “reticent” character of authenticity), direction.  In other words, whatever 
particular theories we might have about our worlds, and whichever practices we have set up within 
those worlds, do not exhaust the meaning to which we are called to respond.  And opening 
ourselves to that surplus of significance is something that requires that we loosen the grip which 
our habitual modes of thought and practice have on us.  One way in which heightened attunement 
to these possibilities of transcending (in) our current situation, I will argue, is through the 
development of sub-worlds in which such transformed attunement is possible.  Before turning to 
that topic, however, we should flag the ways in which the default, everyday modes of acting as 
one among others can tend without our realizing it to close us off to the possibilities for such more 
open attunement. 
Though our tendency to defer to the shared, taken-for-granted, public way of doing things 
embodied in the practices central to our everyday lives is essential to our ability to lead intelligible 
lives with one another, it also involves distinctive dangers insofar as we defer to them too 
completely and unreflectively.  It tends to be relatively superficial and automatic precisely so as 
to make it easy for us to interact and collaborate with one another without having to continually 
renegotiate and reinterpret our relations to one another.  One trend that can amplify this tendency 
that we will be discussing in greater depth later is the breakdown of sacred rites of the sort that 
surrounded the temple, which involved relating to one another in the light of our sacred identities 
in a way that was in productive tension with our more profane, instrumental relations.  Where we 
are not regularly attuning ourselves to the limitations of our everyday modes of comportment, our 
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unthinking deference to the das Man stance can easily morph into a problematically global, 
personality-effacing submission to what he calls the “dictatorship” of das Man: 
This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of 
Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, 
vanish more and more.  In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real 
dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded.  We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] 
take pleasure; we read see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge...In [the] 
averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over 
everything exceptional...Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as 
something that has long been well known…  
…Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get 
interpreted, and it is always right...because it is insensitive to every difference of level and 
of genuineness and thus never gets to the “heart of the matter” [“auf die Sachen”] ...  
Everyone is the other, and no one is himself.  (ibid, 164-5). 
 
Heidegger is describing the ways in which our deference to the “ways of the world” can become 
so total that we mindlessly accept its way of going about things and cut ourselves off from 
everything that does not fit into its well-worn categories.  Sometimes these categories, practices 
and modes of attunement are straightforwardly superficial, inaccurate, or distorting.  Alternatively, 
they might not be inherently problematic provided that we are always mindful of their limitations 
and inadequacies and the need to be willing to reinterpret and at times suspend or complement 
them as the situation requires. Whether the problem is the submissiveness per se or that to which 
one submits or a combination of both, it can result in a kind of dissolution of our own individuality 
as well as that of the others with whom we interact and the situations in which we find ourselves, 
insofar as it closes us off to relevant complexities within ourselves and others.  Its destructive 
effects, in other words, affect both the individual in the grip of this conformism as well as the other 
people with whom such a conformist interacts.   
There are three angles from which such excessive deference can be problematized and 
persons be awoken to their responsibility for taking a responsible stand on how they will interpret 
and relate themselves to the various relational orders in which they find themselves that are 
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important for our purposes.  First of all, our participation in various sub-worlds that potentially 
stand in tension with one another can problematize the norms governing each in a manner similar 
to and often requiring resolution through reference to second-personal normativity.  Secondly, our 
discrete second-personal individual encounters with concrete others can problematize the norms 
governing worlds that we share either in ways that call for some specific reinterpretation or 
suspension of them, or which can motivate more sustained collective efforts to transform them.  
Finally—and this is the central avenue for Heidegger in Being and Time—the anxious 
confrontation with the tension between our concrete, mortal, and individual lives and the socially 
prevailing norms and attitudes in the light of which we live them can itself foreground our need to 
reinterpret, modify, or reject certain of those collective intentional stances.  In some sense the more 
sociality-centered account of the provocations to authenticity arguably involves taking issue with 
this latter, seemingly more purely individual account but I hope to show that there are ways in 
which we can interpret it so as to integrate all three. 
Each social world houses a host of distinctive and often specialized sub-worlds 
characterized by their own characteristic practices, attitudes, modes of care.  This is particularly 
true in modernity, characterized as it is by an increasing division of labor and pluralization of 
religious, ethnic, professional, etc. sub-worlds centered around distinctive interpretations of what 
makes a human life worthwhile. Hubert Dreyfus’s gloss on the notion of world and some of the 
sub-worlds that it contains is helpful on this front:  
The world is “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” (93) 
[65].  This sense of world is reflected in such locutions as “the child’s world,” “the world 
of fashion,” or “the business world” (this, as opposed to one’s place of business, is what 
one is “in” when one is in business).  What Kuhn calls a “disciplinary matrix”--“the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given 
community--would be a world in this sense…. It helps here to contrast the physical 
world...as a set of objects...with the world of physics--a constellation of equipment, 
practices, and concerns in which physicists dwell.  Another way to see the radical shift in 
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senses is to note that we can speak of the sins of the world, but not the sins of the universe… 
[Sub-worlds are] “modes” of the total system of equipment are practices that Heidegger 
calls the world.  Their way of being given Heidegger calls the “phenomenon of world” 
(119) [86]. 
...It is important to note that all such “special worlds,” as he also calls them, are 
public.  There is no such thing as my world, if this is taken as some private sphere of 
experience and meaning, which is self-sufficient and intelligible in itself, and as more 
fundamental than the shared public world and its local modes…. (Dreyfus, 89-90). 
 
Though there are certain modes of comporting oneself that will be relatively stable and shared 
across these “special worlds,” there will also be a number of ways in which the modes of acting, 
perceiving, and relating ourselves to one another that serve as an unreflective default in one world 
will be in tension with those of in others.  Though we often disavow or fail to attend to these 
tensions, attunement to them can help us to critically interrogate one or several of them and make 
a decision as to whether and how we ought to relate ourselves to them so as to resolve or find a 
way to live with those tensions better.  The different sub-worlds one occupied as a successful 
investment banker, a volunteer at a soup kitchen, a mother, and a practicing Muslim might call on 
one to act, feel, and behave in conflicting ways such that the need to and stakes of taking an 
individual stance towards all these sub-worlds (and perhaps withdrawing from one or more of them 
and joining others) will be at times painfully or at least confoundingly foregrounded.  It is at that 
point up to the individual to authentically respond to the conflict and take a stand, or to deny or 
otherwise disregard it.   And insofar as one has, perhaps in a more solitary way, decided that a 
certain kind of transformation in one’s larger social world is necessary or desirable, attempting to 
join or generate a different such a divergent sub-world can help to reinforce and enrich one’s own 
individual efforts to bring about such a change.   
 There is also an important (related) sense in which our deference to these default das Man 
modes of understanding and acting in the world can be complicated and problematized by our 
concrete individual interactions with others, in a manner that Tomasello’s account of the second-
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personal normativity helps us understand but which goes beyond the narrowly moral tensions that 
he focuses on.   In his account of interpersonal relations, Heidegger draws a contrast between 
authentic and inauthentic modes of relating ourselves to other persons and makes the claim that if 
we relate to others in an authentic manner this can enable them to be awakened to their need to 
themselves become authentic.  This involves relating to others as self-responsible agents who are 
not simply understood as passive vessels of collective intentional agency, which relating can help 
to break the conformist spell under which we tend to fall and open up the possibility for more 
creative modes of living that better respond to the concrete specificity of our mortal lives and the 
particular situations in which we find ourselves living them.   
 The one extreme mode of positive interpersonal relation is that which Heidegger construes 
as “leaping in” for the Other.  Heidegger describes this form of solicitude for the other as involving 
taking the other’s care away from them.  The best way to understand it is as a form of positive 
solicitude towards others that is centered on securing some particular good on the other’s 
behalf.  The relevant other might be struggling or unable to secure the good or, in more 
paternalistic cases, perhaps (also) unaware that they ought to be trying to secure it.  He describes 
this variety of positive solicitude as dominant in our relations with others, insofar as these have a 
straightforward pragmatic character, and as pertaining largely to the instrumental/equipmental 
realm of the ready-to-hand.  While this is often genuinely worthwhile and worthy of affirmation, 
it can take on the character of dominating the other and rendering them dependent, insofar as it 
does not involve relating to the other in the full complexity and freedom as 
Dasein.  (ibid ,158).  Acts of charity that tend to pacify instead of empower their recipients, and 
modes of what is commonly referred to as “helicopter parenting” would both qualify as overly 
dominating forms of taking away the other’s care.  Though it can have these pernicious effects, it 
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often does not, as the existence of genuinely helpful acts of charity and good paternalistic parenting 
attest, and thus has an important role to play in our interpersonal relations.   
 Heidegger describes the other extreme end of positive solicitude towards others as “leaping 
ahead” of the other.  Here we are not concerned with securing some good end for the other that 
they can’t or won’t secure for themselves, or helping them out in an instrumental sense.  Instead 
of taking away the care of the other by securing them such an end so they don’t have to, here we 
“give [that care] back to him authentically as such for the first time...it helps the Other to become 
transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it” (ibid, 159).  Whereas the former tends 
towards domination, insofar as one relates to the other not in her capacity as free and capable of 
authenticity but rather as lacking some worldly good that can be secured on her behalf, here we 
relate to the other in her freedom with the aim of allowing her better to take hold of it for 
herself.  There is a coordinate relation here between the stance we take towards the other and our 
own relationship to ourselves.  It is only as a similarly free, and in that sense at least potentially 
authentic, person that one can leap ahead of the other and thereby free them for their own authentic 
exercise of their freedom.  Those who are totally in the grip of worldly conformism, in other words, 
are not in a position to “leap ahead” of others in a freedom- and authenticity-facilitating manner.   
 If the reader is familiar with Martin Buber’s I and Thou, this account should sound 
somewhat familiar.  The contrast between an instrumental-oriented approach to others that doesn’t 
involve relating to them fully as the beings that they are and which tends towards domination and 
inequality, with another approach that treats others as the free and individual beings that they are 
echoes the contrast that Buber makes between the two basic attitudes towards others and the world 
that we can take up: the I-It and the I-You (I will, following Walter Kaufmann, use the latter in 
lieu of I-Thou insofar as the latter involves an antiquated personal pronoun that for many people 
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bears connotations at odds with the open engagement the term is supposed to denote).  According 
to Buber, there are two fundamental dimensions of reality that are opened up by these two 
fundamental attitudes towards the world, each of which establishes a distinctive mode of existence 
and each of which he refers to as a “word pair” (Buber, 53).  He characterizes the distinction 
between these two fundamental stances towards the world in the following passage from the 
opening pages of I and Thou: 
Whoever says You does not have something for his object.  For wherever there is 
something there is also another something; every It borders on other its; It is only by virtue 
of bordering on others.  But where You is said there is no something.  You has no borders. 
Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing.  But he stands in 
relation…   
 
  We are told that man experiences his world.  What does this mean? 
 Man goes over the surfaces of things and experiences them.  He brings back from them 
some knowledge of their condition--an experience.  He experiences what there is to things. 
 … [what experiences] bring to him is only a world that consists of It and It and It…  
All this is not changed by adding “inner” experiences to the “external ones” ... 
And all this is not changed by adding “mysterious” experiences to manifest ones…  
 
  The world as experience belongs to the basic word I-It. 
 The basic word I-You establishes the world of relation.  (ibid, 55-6) 
 
The I-It stance is one which involves a certain degree of alienating distance, of assuming that one 
has already got that with which one is engaging in some sense in hand.  You know what or who it 
is and how it fits into the rest of the intelligible world and your engagement with it is limited in 
advance by that purported knowledge.  One tends to buffer oneself against attunement to whatever 
in the thing related to is potentially out of sync with that form of default, relatively “obvious” 
understanding.  In the I-You relation, in contrast, one suspends that knowing attitude, and opens 
oneself more completely to the person or thing with which one is engaging in its full, partially 
mysterious and even unknowable alterity and allows it to engage with those aspects of oneself that 
also fall outside of the official social script or theory.  The point we made above about the ways in 
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which the two positive modes of solicitude involve different modes of relation to oneself that are 
coordinate with the different modes of relation to the other applies here as well.  In the I-You 
relation one opens oneself not only to what defies clear categorization in that to which one relates, 
but also to that which eludes those categories in oneself.  It is therefore only in such relations that 
one can be more fully in relation, insofar as one brings one’s self into relation with the other in a 
more open-ended manner not constrained by some rigid prior commitment to a particular, familiar 
understanding of that relation grasped in advance of the encounter.   
The affinities between these two accounts should be clear.  That being said, one thing 
which is arguably missing in Heidegger’s account is Buber’s emphasis on the fundamental 
“reciprocity” characteristic of the I-You relation (ibid, 58) and the claim that when we are in such 
a radically porous and open-ended reciprocal relation with another that we experience the world 
“in his light” (ibid, 59)--i.e. that we form, for the duration of the interrelation, a distinctive I-You 
sub-world.  The construal of authentic interpersonal relationality as “leaping ahead” of the other 
seems to have a somewhat one-sided character and to lack the notion that this relation is a 
genuinely mutual relation in which we are fully, openly responsive and responsible to one 
another.  There is, in other words, a real suggestion that we are not fully, to speak metaphorically, 
touching one another.  Each is helping the other to do her own thing, with emphasis being placed 
on the fact that it is her own thing, and not essentially informed by the (somewhat inarticulate and 
open-ended) character and structure of a transformative I-You “we.” Though the relation is aimed 
at facilitating freedom, his construal of it suggests that the exercise of that freedom is an ultimately 
solitary and individual affair.   
I and Thou was published in 1923, four years before Being and Time.  In The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger writes about the I-You relationship and, insofar as Buber 
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was the one to first articulate it as part of a fundamental ontology (Gordon, xii), it seems clear that 
he had Buber in mind in addressing the issue.  In those lectures he writes somewhat dismissively 
about the attempt to seek some deep ontological significance in such relations.  He claims that the 
privileging of the I-You relation is a matter of simply replacing “the solipsism of the isolated ego” 
with the “solipsism en deux” of the I-You relation (Heidegger 1988, 278).  Though he 
acknowledges that such a relation is a real and important one, he thinks that the Buberian account 
neglects the fundamental priority of the default mode of being-with others that serves as the 
essential and fundamental background of such relations (ibid, 298; also cf. the discussion of the 
non-primordial character of empathetic relations with particular others in Being and Time).  Insofar 
as Dasein can only relate to others in the context of the meaningful world which they share, the 
broad outlines of which are established and illuminated by das Man intentionality, the idea that 
one can make a total break with that more or less clearly and publicly bordered world in an I-You 
relation that is total and exclusive of all of one’s other relations is essentially confused.  
Heidegger’s critique here is, I think, a powerful one. Buber’s emphasis on the “exclusivity” of the 
I-You relation seems often to be too literal and thus to constitute a denial of the impossibility (and 
undesirability) of wresting ourselves entirely free from the grip of larger social worlds in which 
we are embedded.  That being said, there are grounds for thinking that Tomasello’s account of the 
prior emergence—both for the species and for human beings over the course of their development 
from infants to adults—of joint intentionality points to a certain truth in Buber’s claim.  Though 
Heidegger is right that fully matured and acculturated human persons can only ever relate to one 
another as individuals against the background of the collective intentional orders to which they 




It is important to note that Buber’s basic distinction between these stances has implications 
that extend beyond the character of our interpersonal relations in ways that resonate with similar 
claims made by Heidegger. Buber makes clear in the passage which follows that cited above, in 
which he contrasts an I-It and an I-You relation to a tree, that these attitudes apply not only to our 
interpersonal relations but also to our relations to the world as a whole and non-human things that 
we encounter within it.  It is for this reason that he can refer to the I-It and I-You relations as the 
basic words through which we can relate to reality.   
I contemplate a tree. 
I can accept it as a picture… 
I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its construction 
and its way of life. 
I can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I recognize it only as an 
expression of the law--those laws according to which a constant opposition of forces is 
continually adjusted…  
Throughout all of this the tree remains my object and has its place and its time span, its 
kind and condition. 
But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am 
drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an It.  The power of exclusiveness has seized 
me. 
This does not require me to forego any of the modes of contemplation.  There is nothing 
that I must not see in order to see, and there is no knowledge that I must forget.  Rather is 
everything, picture and movement, species and instance, law and number included and 
inseparably fused…  
The tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no aspect of a mood; it confronts 
me bodily…  
One should not try to dilute the meaning of the relation: the relation is reciprocity. 
…What I encounter is...the tree itself.  (ibid, 58-9). 
 
The relationship here is distinguished from the typical I-It relations in that it is comprehensive, 
open-ended, and truly ecstatic in a manner that involves a certain degree of humble openness and 
uncertainty.  Typically, we engage with things purely in the light of some task that gives shape in 
advance to our encounter, and we relate to things in the light of that task.  The sort of encounter 
that Buber is describing here is one in which we drop our rigid pragmatic stance and engage with 
something in a more open-ended manner.  He speaks of it in terms of an encounter with the tree 
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itself but what he’s trying to describe is not the sort of immediate experience that Hegel famously 
critiques in the “Sense Certainty” chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit.  It does not involve a 
disavowal of any of the things we know or typically see in trees.  All of those things are in play 
because they are all essential to the ways in which the tree is lit up for us as an entity within the 
world.  Rather, what is distinctive is that we allow ourselves, in all of our complexity and opacity 
(his flagging of the involvement of the body as well as the mind is important here) to openly engage 
and be moved by the tree in all of its complexity and opacity.   
These more open-ended encounters make it possible for us to break free from the 
routinized, alienated das Man attitudes into which we tend to fall.  It echoes what Heidegger said 
in the above-quoted passage from “Origin” about the ecstatic openness to being characteristic of 
those who are resolutely authentic, insofar as that involves an openness that extends beyond the 
routinized modes of relating to worldly entities characteristic of das Man.  This ability to break 
free from the grip of the more alienated stance characteristic of everyday life, in relation to things 
as well as persons, is essential to our ability to liberate ourselves as the unique and uniquely 
situated selves that we are.  It allows us to awaken to aspects of ourselves and our situation that 
tend otherwise to be papered over.  And to the extent that we are moved and change, subtly or 
dramatically, in enduring or more fleeting ways, it can change the way in which we inevitably 
return to characteristic das Man modes of thought, feeling, and action.  We might be less 
automatically submissive to them, and willing to make variations upon them that are inspired by 
our more openly attuned experience of ourselves and our situations.  Looking ahead, this kind of 
stance is going to be crucial to the authentic religious stance, as well as, looking yet further ahead, 
to the task of opening ourselves up to experiences that challenge and reconstitute our default 
“disenchanted” modes of relating to the world.    
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I would like now to turn to an interpretation of the more familiar, central strands of 
Heidegger’s account of authenticity in Being and Time with which more readers are familiar, 
which involves a certain kind of confrontation with our mortality.  Recalling the claims Durkheim 
makes in his discussion of the truth of Pascal’s claims about the tensions at the heart of human 
existence, we have thus far been emphasizing the limited ability of the categories and norms in 
terms of which our shared social lives are structured to fully capture and do justice to the concrete 
specificity of our individual lives and the concrete situations in which we live them out.  I would 
like to conclude by discussing the significance of the fact that those social meanings and relations 
and the light that they shed are refracted through the not only individual but also mortal lives of 
persons.  Heidegger thinks, plausibly, that one of the tasks of living an authentic life is that of 
confronting the tension between the relative stability of the collective intentional orders in which 
we live and our own individual mortality.  In unpacking certain of the claims Heidegger makes 
about what an authentic relation to our death looks like, I will be invoking the account of 
authenticity that Denis McManus has developed, which uses Heidegger’s prior lectures on Paul’s 
account of the authentic Christian mode of relating to the Day of Judgment as the key to 
understanding the kind of authentic, self-responsible stance that Heidegger describes. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes authenticity as achieved by owning up to the deep 
structure of finite existence and taking responsibility for ourselves in the light of that deep 
structure.  We are essentially self-responsible creatures who cannot simply defer to the forms of 
comportment constitutive of das Man as decisively authoritative without alienating us from the 
deep truth of our indeterminate and open-ended existence.  We are always choosing ourselves in 
responding to possibilities and taking a stand on our existence, and authenticity is the shape that 
that choosing takes when it is undertaken in full awareness of the genuine character of our 
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existence.   We are essentially finite temporal beings born out of a past that we did not create and 
cannot step outside of and assess from some authoritative external perspective, and projecting 
towards death in a way that we cannot ultimately control.  Resoluteness is the way in which we 
relate to the fact that we are not the authors of our being, cannot create ourselves from the ground 
up, and must simply make a decision as to who we are going to be that we cannot vindicate through 
reference to some authoritative set of principles that can prescribe that determinate action for us, 
despite the reassurances of das Man that our way of doing things is the “obviously” correct 
one.  Our mortality involves not only our having been born but our having to die.  Death is an 
inevitable but also indeterminate possibility, and facing up to this fact is essential to our taking 
responsibility for ourselves as the mortal creatures we are--now and not in some indefinitely 
postponed future.   Anticipation is the way in which we live our lives in relation to the abiding and 
inevitably possibility of our death, not as an event that is far away and which we hope to forestall 
but rather as a constant possibility that calls us to take up and exercise our agency now and here 
as opposed to postponing its exercise to some indefinite future.  
In the passage from “Origin” which we cited above we saw the way in which characterizes 
the resoluteness of the authenticity as a matter of their more robustly transcending in relation to 
being that is attuned to more than the “obvious” categories of das Man can lay hold of.  Insofar as 
the “dictatorship” of das Man tends to alienate us from being, and from the deep structures of our 
finite existence, overcoming that state of alienation involves a heightening of our transcendent 
relationality.  We see that same emphasis in the following passage: 
Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor 
does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I’.  And how should it, when resoluteness 
as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-
world?  Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what 
is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others. 
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 In the light of the “for-the-sake-of-which” of one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, 
resolute Dasein frees itself for its world.  Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first 
makes it possible to let the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-
Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forward and 
liberates.  When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others.  (Heidegger 
2008, 344). 
 
The emphasis on the need to strike the right balance between will and grace that we saw in Buber 
is in some sense echoed here, insofar as there is an acknowledgment that certain fundamental 
features of our existence in the light of which we can’t help but act are outside of our control.  That 
being said, Heidegger places much more emphasis on individual decisiveness than does 
Buber.  This tendency shifts in his later works and, in the chapters ahead, I will be tending to 
privilege that later emphasis over that emphasis here on the exercise of the individual’s in some 
sense groundless self-responsibility.   
I would like at this point to affirm the central strands of Denis McManus’s interpretation 
of Heidegger’s account of authenticity, which centers on the claim that the key to understanding 
Heidegger’s account can be found by looking at Paul’s account of the proper way for a Christian 
to relate to the looming possibility that the Day of Judgment could come at any moment.  Paul 
emphasizes the ways in which many Christians’ concern with knowing when that Day will come 
reflects a weakness of faith and is an indication that in some sense one is not really a committed 
Christian.  That day is the day upon which the truth of one’s character as a Christian will be 
decided.  The claim, in effect, is that those who are preoccupied with trying to fix the date are 
trying to figure out if they can postpone living fully in the light of the faith which they claim to be 
the decisive truth of their existence.  If there is more time, they can, to invoke Augustine, ask God 
to make them chaste, but not yet.  As the day approaches, they will turn their lives around and get 
across the finish line with their Christian credentials secured.  This attitude involves a kind of 
internal alienation insofar as there is a disconnect between the avowed commitment to Christian 
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faith and the more powerful desire to continue to live in accordance with the “ways of the 
world.”  Being an authentic Christian involves desiring to live always in the light of the imminent 
possibility that the Day of Judgment, because doing so constitutes wholehearted commitment to 
living in the light of one’s defining commitment to God.  The thought is that the Christian has 
purportedly committed herself to a defining relation with God in the light of which the real 
significance of and essential truth concerning their lives is disclosed, but in fact remain despite 
their avowals subject to and furtively committed to the world that rejects that relationship.   
McManus takes these lectures as the key to understanding Heidegger’s account of an 
authentic relation to death, which involves proper responsiveness to the “fact that there will be a 
determinate body of fact about who I will have been, a body the final make-up of which can be 
determined at any time” (McManus, 267).  Becoming authentic is a matter of awakening to our 
existential task of taking an active stand on what our lives are about and which of our defining 
relationships are decisive in our lives and in what way.  For Paul and other early Christians this 
involved repudiating the default ways of the world and committing oneself to God and living a life 
informed by that defining commitment.  True commitment to that relationship meant attempting 
to live in its light at all times, in the light of the fact that at any moment one’s life could be 
concluded and with it one’s opportunities for living the relational commitment that one took to be 
decisive to one’s identity as the person one was.  In Being and Time the reference to God is 
removed and it is left open-ended what kind of commitment one can undertake to take the relevant 
form of meaningful stand on one’s life, though it does involve choosing and committing oneself 
to a “hero,” which is to say that a committed relationship to a person or persons remains crucial to 
authentically responding to the task of living a meaningful, valuable life as the kind of radically 
relational being that we are (Heidegger 2008, 422 & 437).  And in taking a committed stand on 
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ourselves we are doing so in relation to others—in a more solicitous manner, as Heidegger asserts 
in the passage discussed above, than we otherwise would be.  That is to say that it involves a 
commitment to a certain “we” as ultimately authoritative in orienting us in and determining the 
ultimate significance of our lives.  This in turn points to the ways in which certain defining relations 
are going to be more viable contenders to constitute the truth of one’s life than others.  Certain 
such relations are going to be more capable of illuminating my mortal life with a significance that 
I can fully commit myself to despite the fact that the project of living a life of fidelity to it will 
terminate some day in my death.   
Common to Heidegger and Buber is a basic contrast, which applies to a wide variety of 
forms of relatedness, between an alienated and an unalienated relation to (entities in) the world 
that tends to be correlated with a similarly alienated or unalienated relation to ourselves.  Some 
degree of alienation is, as we’ve made clear, often just a requirement for getting by in the world 
and securing the goods with which we are centrally concerned, and if we can affirm such more 
attenuated modes of relation for those reasons, and are able to regularly stand in other less alienated 
relations in which our fuller selves are allowed to be seen, it is not a substantial threat to our 
existence.  Das Man ways of comporting oneself in the world are often thin and superficial, but 
that is part of their value.  It’s a good thing that I don’t have to have an open, vulnerable, and 
potentially transformative interaction with every person I encounter throughout the day.  Provided 
that we are able to consistently step outside of such alienating modes of relation to persons and 
things in our world, as well as to the world itself, this is not a serious problem. Striking that balance 
is not always easy or even possible if our social worlds don’t consistently enable us to enter into 
such experiences of heightened relationality.  If too many of our actions have an alienated 
character, due to a misalignment in our intentional stance towards the world and ourselves, a 
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culture’s elevation of an alienated mode of relation to paradigmatic status, a breakdown in the 
relations of trust in one’s social world, or one’s occupying a position of relative disempowerment 
and marginalization in one’s social world, this can generate a more global deformation in our 
relation to ourselves and our world.  Such relatively comprehensive forms of alienation, which we 
will be discussing in greater depth in the next chapter, constitute a deep threat to our full-fledged 
existence as persons or, in the terminology I will be developing below, to our existential vitality. 
Before turning to that discussion, I would like to set it up finish laying the groundwork for 
it by developing the claims of Tomasello, Heidegger, and Buber concerning positive, robust forms 
of interpersonal relation to give an account of the central varieties of deep interpersonal 
relationship within which we can find these modes of transformative heightened relationality.  To 
this end I will briefly discuss familial relations, friendships, romantic relationships and the sub-
worlds that they open up.  Each is an instance of a relation of the whole person to a relational field 
that involves a robust and somewhat self-effacing and (as such) -transforming form of care.  These 
will tend to be relationships that embody, to some degree, the mode of heightened relationality 
that we described above in connection with authentic “leaping ahead” and I-You forms of 
interpersonal engagement.  Having provided this schematic outline, we will have all of the central 
self-transcendent forms of interpersonal relationship in hand and will be able to discuss the shape 
that existential vitality and sickness can take when those relationships are of the right or wrong 
sort, respectively.  It will also shed light on reasons why it might be the case that relating to our 
social worlds as a whole through an intense, loving attachment to deities who are understood to 
embody and disclose the deep significance of that world might help us to gather and interrelate our 




It is worth dwelling a bit more on the fact that in childhood the I-You relation initiates us 
into the realm of the collective “we” that quickly assumes a more or less all-encompassing role in 
shaping our lives as we mature.  We are initiated into the human world, when things are going well 
(I will have more to say about what happens when things go wrong in the next chapter), through 
the loving embrace of family members (family being defined here not biologically but in terms of 
playing the relevant caretaking roles).  Our membership in the family is in some sense the 
fundamental mode of belonging that sets the stage for everything that is to come.  We are 
welcomed with a reliable and more or less comprehensively committed form of love that enables 
us to relate to ourselves as meaningful and meaning-responsive persons and to trust that all due 
efforts will be made to secure our most basic needs.   
Furthermore, the family forms a larger “we” that has its own collective intentional structure 
but our position within that we is constantly being affirmed and enriched in open I-You relations 
between its particular members.  These relations are in an important sense much more 
comprehensive and genuine (even if at times fraught and repression-ridden and so forth) than many 
of those which we find subsequently outside of the home, and they serve as a sort of model—
again, when things are going well—for what it is to fully belong to a we.  Insofar as each, at least 
some of the time, is truly loved for their own sake, they stand in a relation of robust, mutually 
supportive openness that encourages each to develop their personality in an authentic and 
particularized manner. And the family, as a small-scale community permeated by these second-
personal modes of address, provides a model for the open-ended modes of mutual belonging that 
are at the heart of a fully human life. Families tend to have their own mythologies, canons of shared 
history and memory, and idiolects all of which serve as means of lighting up the distinctive 
priorities and modes of concern that set the family apart and which constitute their distinctive 
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varieties of belonging and the distinctive satisfactions of their relational life together.  Though that 
development can only be fully realized through entrance into extra-familial relations that allow us 
to develop aspects of ourselves to which family members cannot be fully attuned, it is important 
to see that when things are going well it is given basic shape and grounding in the family.  It should 
thus not be surprising that familial symbols and imagery are often used as a means of expressing 
(aspirations to) a similar form of robust mutuality and sacrifice-facilitating identification and 
commitment within religious and national communities, such as those forms of religiosity that 
center on a parental God of whom we are all children or (religious) relations to the nation that 
understand it on the model of a family or siblinghood that demands that we heed the call of 
something like fraternité.   
This sort of robustly comprehensive I-You relation finds new forms and is further 
developed in friendship and romantic love.  Both serve as a means of cultivating more robust forms 
of mutual self-transcendent relationality than are typically achievable among people simply in 
virtue of their shared identities as members of a given society.  Typically, these more unalienated 
and robust forms of interpersonal connection are understood as involving some variety of 
resistance to or healthy deviation from the prevailing cultural order.  In extremely resistant forms 
engendered by deep-seated alienation—such as, looking ahead, that which perhaps characterizes 
our “disenchanted” world—this resistance can flare up in a simultaneously alarming and alluringly 
tempting burst of doomed resistance to the status quo.  Romeo & Juliet and Bonnie & Clyde are 
examples, respectively, of mythic and mythologized paragons of such self-destructively defiant 
resistance.  What moves us in such depictions of passionate, doomed love is the way in which they 
give expression to the fact that our world is not yet, and likely never will be, fully able to 
acknowledge the deep longing and aspirations of all of its members.  Even if we do not see such 
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lovers as a model to be emulated, there is a way in which such stories give expression to an ethical 
imperative to be more attentive to the ways in which our worlds are exclusionary and blind to the 
full reality of their constituents, and a sense that there is some kind of relational problem with a 
social world that would stand essentially opposed to the pursuit of such intense relationality.   
Popular art’s celebration of friendship tends to center on those generated in intense 
situations that expose us to some relatively comprehensive existential threat and drive us to reach 
out to others in a more vulnerable and wholehearted manner than is characteristic in quotidian 
life.  This relationality-facilitating intensity serves a connective function broadly similar to that of 
overpowering erotic desire in the case of romance, both of which issue in a kind of robust 
love.  Bonds formed between soldiers in war who are united by their contention with death and 
moral horrors serve as one such example.  Childhood friendships, particularly those set against the 
background of an alienating family or school life and an encounter with some sort of fundamental 
existential threat are also characteristic.  Huckleberry Finn, the movie E.T., the Harry Potter books 
and movies, and the show Stranger Things are all instances of this generic kind of story.  The 
supernatural/science-fiction examples are interesting because the power of these fictions, which of 
course does not depend on our literal conviction in the possibility of the reality of these 
otherworldly entities, derives it seems from a sense that there is something mysterious and 
powerful and important and potentially destructive that we’re open to in childhood, particularly if 
we’re not in a position to fully identify with the normal/obvious categories of the world, to which 
we close ourselves off as we become routinized agents in the collective adult world.  They 
therefore embody a kind of lament, as we saw above in connection with doomed romantic 
relations, concerning the inability of our social worlds to respond adequately to the underlying 
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realities of our existential predicament that is again potentially related to problems connected with 
a general deformation in our normal relational life. 
All of these relations are varieties of love and as such involve a movement beyond mere 
responsiveness to relatively impersonal norms, though the latter, particularly those characteristic 
of second-personal morality, will certainly tend to have their place here.  If our being is constituted 
by forms of meaningful care generated in and by “we”s and if love is the most radically robust 
form that such care can take, the privileging of relations of love as being central to our ability to 
achieve full flourishing as persons makes sense.  These relationships are ones which in some sense 
do something which is not possible insofar as we occupy the das Man stance.  The modes of care 
definitive of that latter stance have their place but even if we were able to fully affirm them in 
whatever determinate shape they happen to take in our social world, we would be unable to rest 
secure in the absence of further, loving relations that provide us with something the former cannot.  
Looking back to the discussion of Heidegger and Buber’s accounts of authentic relationality, it 
seems that there are grounds for claiming that such relations require some form of love to truly 
take shape.  Buber makes this explicit when he writes that “Love is responsibility of an I for a 
You” (Buber, 66).  The willingness to wholeheartedly engage the other person in the manifold 
richness of their situated care requires, it would seem, a loving attitude that underlies a full opening 
of ourselves to them and of them to us.  Furthermore, one might think that achieving the sort of 
robust, resolute commitment to a concrete path in life that gives definite shape to one’s life requires 
that one stand in one or more relations of defining love.  As we mentioned above, Heidegger’s 
account arguably owes a good deal to Paul’s account of the Christian’s proper relation to the Day 
of Judgment.  Though he does speak of authenticity as facilitating more solicitous being towards 
others, the account might arguably have been enriched had he been similarly attentive to Paul’s 
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claims concerning the centrality of love to a Christian life.  As we will see in the third chapter, 
there is some deep truth to John Caputo’s claim that “Religion is for lovers, for men and women 
of passion…[the] opposite of a religious person is a loveless person” (Caputo, 2). 
Finally, Heidegger connects our ability to live authentically and be open to our concrete 
mortal situation with anxiety.  He construes this as anxiety in the face of our being-in-the-world 
as a whole, of it being a mood in which our world and our place within it is put globally into 
question, in which it is disclosed to us as essentially strange and “uncanny” (Heidegger 2008, 
233).  This experience individualizes us radically and throws us back upon ourselves.  The matter-
of-course way in which we relate to our being-in-the-world as das Man is broken and our existence 
is put radically into question in a manner that requires of us a fundamental decision as to how we 
are to relate to our existence in the light of the fact that there is no rulebook that can tell us how 
we ought to go about doing so.  I think that we can connect these general claims about anxiety 
with the discussion of the existential importance of the kinds of intense, loving interpersonal 
relations we’ve been discussing by attending briefly to a passage from Erich Fromm’s The Art of 
Loving. In it he interprets anxiety as essentially being anxiety over the possibility of our separation 
from others, one which can only be rooted out through standing in active, definitive loving 
relations to others.  If unreflective submission to das Man modes of comportment inherently 
involves a failure of full relationality to those with whom we live—and to that in ourselves that 
would elicited by such more wholehearted, thorough, I-You relations with others—then there is 
something lonely and stunted about it, a kind of separation from that in ourselves and others that 
can and should be brought into the light of (inter)personal being. The basic claim is made in the 
following passage: 
The experience of separateness arouses anxiety; it is, indeed, the source of all 
anxiety.  Being separate means being cut off, without any capacity to use my human 
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powers.  Hence, to be separate means to be helpless, unable to grasp the world--things and 
people--actively; it means that the world can invade me without my ability to react… The 
awareness of human separation, without reunion by love--is the source of shame.  It is at 
the same time the source of guilt and anxiety. 
The deepest need of man, then, is the need to overcome his separateness, to leave the 
prison of his aloneness.  The absolute failure to achieve this aim means insanity, because 
the panic of complete isolation can be overcome only by such a radical withdrawal from 
the world outside that the feeling of separation disappears--because the world outside, 
from which one is separated, has disappeared.  (Fromm, 8-9). 
 
Fromm’s interpretation of this basic mood, informed as it undeniably is by Heidegger’s account 
of it in Being and Time, is one that I think connects up with the biological precariousness of our 
existence in the absence of loving interpersonal relations, while also disclosing the possibility for 
biology-transcendent modes of defining loving relation insofar as our being as persons transcends 
and cannot be reduced to our being merely biological organisms.  It makes sense at both the level 
of the organism and that of the person—insofar as in our radically social mode of existence both 
cannot flourish in isolation—that our tendency to deep anxiety would be an anxiety in the face of 
the possibility of our being radically cut off from the human world that sustains us.  It is also 
important to note that his discussion of the insanity-inducing experience of being confined to the 
prison of the self resonates, as we will see in the next chapter, with the experience of many who 
have been subjected to prolonged solitary confinement and have experienced a global breakdown 
in their ability to relate meaningfully to themselves and their worlds. 
These considerations help to explain the centrality of concrete, more or less loving relations 
to persons, real or imagined, to attempts to generate and bolster social solidarity and identification 
at the broader, more anonymous social scale.  The centrality of charismatic leaders to social and 
political life, as well as pantheons of quasi-mythic heroes, and myths and stories involving 
concrete interactions between typical and/or (typically) exemplary individuals that are held to 
capture something essential about the social worlds in which they are ritualistically told and 
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invoked, are all instances of this attempt to enrich our relations to the anonymous others in our 
social worlds.  These efforts can be both genuinely illuminating and solidarity-enhancing, or they 
can be merely ideological fictions that paper over the actual truth about our social worlds.  We will 
discuss those issues below.  What is important to note here is the fact that we find it much easier 
to relate in a wholehearted and identity-(re)constituting manner to an individual than to a diffuse 
group.   Such relations, even if they are largely imaginary and not grounded in an actual 
interpersonal familiarity with the person in question, can reshape our sense of ourselves in a 
manner powerful enough to motivate profound sacrifices.  It is worth noting that when Heidegger 
speaks in Division II of Being and Time about cultivating an authentic relation to tradition and the 
cultural past out of which our present social life has emerged he focuses that discussion on the task 
of selecting an individual hero in relation to whom one can undertake the task of leading a creative, 
authentic life responsive to but not simply mimicking that of this particular predecessor (Heidegger 
2008, 437).  And, as we will be discussing in the final chapter, a central source of nationalism’s 
motivational and identity-shaping power—like that of religions that center on sacred persons—is 
a function of its ability to connect up our attachment to the abstraction of the nation with our more 
concrete and existentially fundamental interpersonal relations in ways that more abstract principle-
centered communities struggle to do.  These means of enhancing solidarity with strangers are not 
simply a means of deploying one affective orientation as a tool to modify others, but express a 
desire, grounded in our (often idealized and nostalgia-distorted, more aspirational than actualized) 
ideas about the forms of full-fledged trust and mutual affirmation that we find in loving families, 
friendships, and romantic love.  Such radical integration in and with the lives of others is a guiding 
star in the firmament of our fundamental possibilities that stands as an essential orienting feature 
of the deep background against which we live our lives.  The goal is, in other words, to achieve a 
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form of radical self-constitutive transcendence that involves bringing all that we, with the help of 
others, could care about and affirm in ourselves into fundamental relation with the larger human 
world with which we are essentially connected and upon which we radically depend, too often in 
unsatisfying, alienating, and chaotic ways.  On that note, I would like now to turn to a discussion 
of the health and sickness, life and death of persons insofar as it is a function of the scope and 
character of our self-transcendent interpersonal relations.  Achieving this goal is central to the task 
of cultivating existential vitality, which is in turn the end of the kinds of religious practices that I 
































Chapter 2: On Existential Vitality 
 
The wages of sin is death. (KJV) 
- Romans 6:23  
 
Paul often spoke of ‘Sin’ in the singular and without an article.  He saw it as a quasi-
personal power which ruled this world.  But in the Christian churches, both Catholic and 
Protestant, sin has been used predominantly in the plural, and ‘sins’ are deviations from 
moral laws.  This has little to do with ‘sin’ as the state of estrangement from that to which 
one belongs--God, one’s self, one’s world. (Tillich 1975, 46) 
- Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Volume Two  
 
Despair is the sickness unto death. (Kierkegaard 1980, 13) 
- Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death  
 
The believer who has communed with his god is not simply a man who sees new truths 
that the unbeliever knows not; he is a man who is stronger.  Within himself, he feels 
more strength to endure the trials of existence or to overcome them. (Durkheim 1995, 
419) 
- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life  
 
 I opened the last chapter with a passage from Moral Education that could just as well have 
served to open this chapter.  I put it there because Durkheim’s discussion of the child’s desire to 
say “we” rather than “I” and the distinctive forms of satisfaction that are opened up to the child 
through her initiation into collective life set the stage nicely for the discussion of “I” and “we” in 
Tomasello, Heidegger, and Buber.  In terms of the aims of this chapter, what is particularly 
important in that passage is the claim that such participation “has the effect of enhancing the 
vitality of each individual” and that one of the upshots of such participation is that the participant’s 
“whole being is enhanced” (Durkheim 1973, 239-241).  The claim that being wholehearted, active 
participants in more expansive social relations (in terms of the number of others to whom we relate 
and in terms of how much and how well we are related in these relations) enhances our being and 
vitality as persons is one that we wish to develop and substantiate in this chapter with reference to 
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what I will be referring to as existential vitality.  The thought here is that of wedding the degrees 
of being and degrees of vitality talk, using the term “existence” to refer, as it does in Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger, to the mode of being that is distinctive of persons.  In the last chapter I defended 
the claim that we are always already relating to others and transcending ourselves as persons.  In 
this chapter the aim is to say something more about the ways in which we depend upon the relations 
in which we stand to others and the work that we can do to improve those relations in a manner 
that in some sense enhances our vitality and being as persons.  This will set us up, finally, to discuss 
the ways in which religious practices can help to transform, expand, and integrate these relations 
in a manner that allows us better to respond to the task of living out our mortal, social lives as 
human persons. 
 If we are constituted by and in some sense ontologically dependent on the relations in 
which we stand to others, breakdown in those relations will tend to undermine our being as persons 
while the strengthening and deepening of those relations will tend to enhance it.  The passages that 
I’ve cited above all speaks of such a spiritual death that is born of a breach, breakdown, and/or 
denial of our relations with God that is understood as “sin.”  Given that we are attempting to defend 
religious practices without assuming determinate religious premises, we will be taking these claims 
as phenomenologically illuminating accounts at least of the ways in which our existential vitality 
depends on our relations with other human beings—and maybe also, though this possibility will 
not be directly discussed, our relationship to God(s) and other such entities.   
In Elementary Forms, Durkheim regularly makes the move of understanding talk about 
and experience of the divine with reference to the complex network of interpersonal relationships 
that constitutes “society.”   Though I do not wish to endorse the move insofar as it is simply 
reductive and dismisses god talk as nothing more than an indirect way of really talking about 
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something else, I think that such translations yield genuine insights concerning the religious 
attitude we ought to take towards one another and the power of religious practices to help us better 
cultivate that attitude. The passage in which Durkheim most powerfully draws the analogy 
between society and God reads as follows:  
Society in general, simply by its effects on men’s minds, undoubtedly has all that is 
required to arouse the sensation of the divine.  A society is to its members what a god is to 
its faithful.  A god is first of all a being that man conceives of as superior to himself in 
some respects and one on whom he believes he depends.  Whether that being is a conscious 
personality, like Zeus of Yahweh, or a play of abstract forces as in totemism, the faithful 
believe that they are bound to certain ways of acting that the nature of the sacred principle 
they are dealing with has imposed upon them.  Society also fosters in us the sense of 
perpetual dependence.  Precisely because society has its own specific nature that is 
different from our nature as individuals, it pursues ends that are also specifically its own; 
but because it can achieve those ends only by working through us, it categorically demands 
our cooperation.  Society requires us to make ourselves its servants, forgetful of our own 
interests.  (Durkheim 1995, 208-9).   
 
Though the reifying language here is in some sense unfortunate, it is in others accurate enough.  
There is a sense, as we’ve seen, particularly when it comes to the comprehensive normative orders 
established at the level of collective intentionality, in which the “we” is the one that’s doing things, 
as opposed to the individuals who are caught up in it.  In this sense the talk of society as a thing to 
some degree autonomous of the particular members composing it is appropriate, though of course, 
as we discussed, any given society is going to be in point of fact a complex ecosystem of worlds 
and sub-worlds, societies within societies, and to that extent such talk will need to be complicated 
though not rejected.   
If we were to reinterpret the claims in the passages cited above along the lines that 
Durkheim sketches here, the upshot would be that a violation of the foundational, normatively 
governed relations in which we stand to our social worlds and the person populating and sustaining 
them leads to a kind of existential sickness unto death.  These breaches are not simply a function 
of individual misdeeds, however, but are a function as well of certain powerful forces that move 
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through and structure our relational lives in ways that are often alienating, destructive, and 
deadening and which cannot be straightforwardly attributed to any particular, individual misdeeds.  
Both the active individual defiance of the “we” relations in which we stand and are called to stand, 
as well as those social forces that tend to undermine and obstruct them, would do violence to the 
persons we are in light of those relations.    
The aim of this chapter is to unpack these notions with reference to a rather motley crew 
of thinkers and motley set of phenomena.  My hope is that the relatively simply idea at the heart 
of this chapter will be made clearer by presenting it in a diverse collection of examples, through 
the lens of a diverse set of disciplinary lenses.  We will start by discussing Kierkegaard’s account 
of despair as the sickness unto death through a Durkheimian lens.  As we did with Pascal in the 
last chapter, we will attempt affirm the phenomenology while offering an alternative possible 
ontological ground for it.   We will then turn to a discussion of Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the 
Afterlife, which provides a powerful argument, with a number of deep Durkheimian resonances, 
for the claim that our ability to affirm our lives as meaningful in a great many respects depends 
upon a faith in the indefinitely extended existence of the social worlds in relation to which our 
lives have meaning and to which we are called in our lives to be accountable.  Having developed 
this general account existential vitality and sickness—in Kierkegaardian terms, faith and despair—
we will then turn to some of the ways in which the collective intentional normative orders that 
constitute our social worlds can do violence to the existential vitality of certain oppressed, 
marginalized, and traumatized persons and social groups.  The hope is that by the end of the chapter 
the importance of this existential good, which is related to but distinct from other goods such as 
happiness and moral goodness, can be clarified so as to set the stage for our discussion in the 
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following chapters of the ways in which religious practices can work to cultivate and sustain such 
vitality.   
* * * 
 
In the opening pages of The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard says that the self is spirit 
and that the existence of the self/spirit must in some sense--here we have a version of the “man is 
double” idea in Durkheim--be distinguished from the being of the human being.  A human being 
is, he claims, a synthesis of infinite and finite, freedom and necessity, the temporal and the 
eternal.  All of these binaries can be aligned with those between the dimension of meaning-
responsiveness and that of our physical, organic being as a certain kind of organism.  Being a self 
is a task that we must perform, and the task is that of taking a stand on how we relate these different 
components of ourselves, which are in a potentially creative but nonetheless ineliminable tension 
with one another.  In taking a stand on the relation of these components or dimensions of our 
human being, he claims, we relate ourselves to the source of our human being, namely the God 
who both created us as physical beings and who through His self-revelation disclosed to us the 
(otherworldly) values in the light of which we ought to live.  Because of this constitutive 
ontological dependence, we are always, in taking a stand on ourselves and thereby relating 
ourselves to ourselves, simultaneously taking a stand towards and relating ourselves to the source 
of our being.  We can engage in this task either in the mode of denying our dependence on the 
source of our being or by, as he puts it, “rest[ing] transparently in the power that established [us]” 
(Kierkegaard 1980, 14).  If we do the former we are alienated from the source of our being and 
therefore in some sense from our true selves (where our true self is the self as it stands in dependent 
relation to the sources of its being), whereas if we are able to do the latter we are in a state, which 
he aligns with faith, in which “despair is completely rooted out” (ibid.).  This involves a kind of 
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existential vitality that is grounded in our active fidelity to the relationship(s) most constitutive of 
our fundamental agential identity as persons.  For Kierkegaard this relationship is that with God, 
attendant with the relationships to others and creation that it opens up, but there is ground for 
thinking that one can endorse the general contrast between defiance or evasion and active 
affirmation of our defining relations, whatever they might be. Whether or not God is involved, the 
kind of existential integration of the various relations in which we stand and the modes of acting 
that they prescribe to us would qualify as such a transparent, non-despairing stance  
One way to unpack the broader potential significance of his account of despair is to 
examine the following passage from one of the “edifying discourses” in Purity of Heart: Edifying 
Discourses in Various Spirits.  In contrast to his other, pseudonymous works, which often involve 
indirect, ironic modes of communication, Kierkegaard’s edifying discourses involve a direct, 
earnest attempt at communicating about matters of utmost existential importance with his readers.  
The discourse in question centers on an interpretation of the following passage from the epistle of 
James: “Draw nigh to God and he will draw nigh to you.  Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and 
purify your hearts, ye double-minded” (James 4:8).  Here he very directly construes despair as a 
mode of being divided against oneself, of attempting to evade one’s true relational responsibilities 
and the identity that one has as participant in the fundamental normatively governed “we” 
relations—to God and the human race that He created.  At the outset of the discourse he claims 
that “he who in truth wills only one thing can only will the Good” (Kierkegaard 1973, 271).  This 
is of course a function of his monotheistic faith in one God who is the ground of all value.  He 
goes on to elaborate this basic claim in the following passage:  
[The true lover] loves with all of his love.  It is wholly present in each expression.  He 
continues to give it away as a whole, and yet he keeps it intact as a whole in his heart…If it 
changes continually, then he himself becomes changeable, double-minded, and 
unstable.  And this continual change is nothing else than impurity. 
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…For what is despairing other than to have two wills?  For whether the weakling 
despairs over not being able to wrench himself away from the bad, or whether the brazen 
one despairs over not being able to tear himself completely away from the Good--they are 
both double-minded, they both have two wills.  Neither of them honestly wills one thing…In 
this fashion has God, better than any king, insured himself against every rebellion…each 
rebel against God, in the last instance, is reduced to despair…Despair is the limit.  Here are 
met the cowardly, timorous, ill-temper of self-love, and the proud defiant presumption of 
the mind--here they are met in equal impotence.  
…weakness is a man’s misfortune; strength the sole salvation… (ibid, 276-8). 
 
We quoted at the outset Durkheim’s claim that religious faith is essentially concerned with making 
human beings stronger, and we are attempting in this final section to give sense to this claim 
through provision of an account of the existential vitality of persons.  Kierkegaard’s account of 
despair gives us a basic frame for doing so.  The strength in question is personal strength to act in 
accordance with the deep normative structure of the defining relations in which one stands, which 
is to say that it is not the kind of celebration of strength in a more value neutral way that one might 
associate with a Nietzschean story about the will-to-power or the kind of Nietzsche-inspired 
National Socialist rhetoric that Heidegger got swept up in in the 1930’s.   
 The basic claim here is that we stand in constitutive relation to the “power that established 
us,” as he puts it in The Sickness unto Death.  For Kierkegaard, this is God.  For our purposes, it 
is the deep relational orientation constitutive of the human world that generates and sustains our 
being as persons.  The basic claim here is that the effort to live in defiantly diminished relation to 
this constituting power is one which is doomed to fail.  It is doomed to fail because it involves a 
mode of self-alienation born of dividing ourselves, of setting at self-enervating odds our 
fundamental identities in relation to that constituting power, and the identity that we affirm even 
in defiance of it.  The account of the would-be Christian’s alienation from herself in her attempt 
to postpone preparation for the Day of Judgment is an example of such an ambiguous, divided, 
enervating response to one’s defining existential relations.  Being in a state of despair is essentially 
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a matter of being in a state of deep hopelessness, whether acknowledged or consciously disavowed 
and repressed, of the futility of our efforts to project ourselves into the future that is born of a deep 
impotence and the fact of our being defined in relation to a task that simply cannot be realized.  It 
is only through establishing an affirmative and open relationship to the power that established us 
that we are able to achieve full agential coherence and to stand in an open, affirmative relation to 
our future in the light of that agential coherence.  It is only in such a state that we can achieve a 
true “knowing that is a willing” of the sort that Heidegger discusses in “The Origin of the Work 
of Art,” a form of responsiveness to the world that generates a more or less coherent and 
wholehearted pragmatic stance that allows, to invoke the Durkheimian analogy, the light shed by 
our defining social relations to be porously refracted through our mortal lives.   
This account of the uprooting of despair is also, I would like to claim, an account of the 
uprooting of unfreedom, which amounts to a deformation in the relation between our constitutive 
care and our relation to the world.  Insofar as this is the case, we can understand such freedom as 
being central to the possibility of achieving robust existential vitality.  For those who understand 
“freedom” in a libertarian sense of being able to do whatever one wants, or as a matter of our 
willing being in some deep metaphysical sense indeterminate, this claim will not make 
sense.  Those understandings of freedom strike many as plausible because they point to the ways 
in which freedom requires that we not be coercively manipulated by a world alien to our 
being.  They go wrong in assuming that sociality is inherently alienating and in assuming that mere 
nature, and the natural laws that govern it, is alien to our being.  We spoke early on in the last 
chapter of Durkheim’s construal of a kind of freedom that we can achieve in ascetically 
establishing ourselves in good, faithful standing within our defining social relations and it is this 
notion of freedom that is crucial here.  Were it possible for us to simply be animals being “slaves” 
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of our passions wouldn’t be problematic or be appropriately characterized as slavery at all.  But, 
for reasons we laid out in the last chapter, this is not in fact the case.  Insofar as we are persons we 
stand in normative relations with others the legitimacy of which is essentially caught up with our 
personhood itself.  As a result, our being subject to desires that conflict with those normative 
relationships involves the subservience of our personal self to our animal self and counts, therefore, 
as a form of unfreedom.  It is only by reshaping and discipling our desires such that their 
satisfaction is not at odds with those relationships that we can be free as persons and truly 
transcend, by reconstituting as opposed to abandoning, our animal nature.  It is through this lens 
that we can, I think, affirm a variation on the Pauline claim (forcefully rearticulated in Martin 
Luther’s “Preface to Romans”) that we must hope to replace our slavery to our sinful nature with 
slavery to Christ or God, where the latter is understood as a matter of truly being the kind of person 
who spontaneously and fully wills to do what is right by the light of that defining relationship with 
the divine. The related claim that grace is essential to our ability to succeed in this project is I think 
also interpretable along such more naturalistic lines, insofar as we are only ever capable of 
transforming ourselves in that way with a great deal of care and support from persons in relation 
to whom we are constituted as the norm-responsive persons we are.  This point will be particularly 
important later in this chapter when we think about the ways in which existential harm through 
forms of relational violence directed against oppressed and traumatized people’s persons can be 
healed.   
In The Reasons of Love, Harry Frankfurt provides a helpful, germane account of which 
freedom as an achievement brought about by our personhood-constitutive modes of care that helps 
to uproot the kind of internal division against oneself that Kierkegaard describes.  Care is, for 
Frankfurt, the second-order attitude that we take towards the desires which we find within 
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ourselves.  This ability to take up second-order attitudes towards ourselves is, if the account of the 
constitutive sociality of human personhood we’ve been outlining is correct, a function of our 
ability to live in the light of meaningful norms and caring attitudes into which we are initiated 
through our relations with others.  Frankfurt does not give due priority to this constitutive sociality, 
but I think that with such supplementation his construal can be brought into harmonious relation 
and shed light on with that which we have been providing.  Furthermore, in his claim that love is 
foundational in our caring relationship to ourselves, he echoes the centralization of love to full 
existential vitality that we affirmed at the end of the last chapter.  Given our embodied and 
constitutively affective character, full constitutive relationality requires that our most fundamental 
world- and self-relations take the form of love.  He makes the basic claim about freedom in the 
following passage: 
Caring is indispensably foundational as an activity that connects and binds us to 
ourselves.  It is through caring that we provide ourselves with volitional continuity, and in 
that way constitute and participate in our own agency…By its very nature, caring manifests 
and depends upon our distinctive capacity to have thoughts, desires, and attitudes that are 
about our own attitudes, desires, and thoughts.  In other words, it depends upon the fact 
that the human mind is reflexive… 
…When various motivating forces within us conflict, we are generally not passive or 
neutral with regard to how the conflict is to be settled.  We do take ourselves seriously. …  
Sometimes, of course, the desires by which a person is motivated when he acts are 
desires by which he is entirely content to be moved.  He may be effectively moved by a 
desire to be generous, for example, and this motive may be welcome to him; it may be the 
very desire by which, in the circumstances, he would like his conduct to be governed…[In 
such a case it is] true of him that he is desiring freely, in the parallel sense that what he is 
wanting as he acts--namely, to be generous--is exactly what he wants to want….  
Under these conditions, I believe, the person is enjoying as much freedom as it is 
reasonable for us to desire.  Indeed, it seems to me that he is enjoying as much freedom as 
it is possible for us to conceive.  This is as close to freedom of the will as finite beings, 
who do not create themselves, can intelligibly hope to come.  (Frankfurt, 17-20).    
 
Frankfurt’s account of freedom as being a form of robust agential coherence, of acting in the light 
of desires that we affirm as meaningful, echoes Kierkegaard’s claims to the effect that internal 
division undermines our being as persons and that robust agential coherence of the sort brought 
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about through a comprehensive, definitive loving faith relation is essential to full existential 
vitality.  There is a relation to the world here insofar as there is a form of care that orients us in 
and gives substance to our relation to the world, and a situation that offers us the opportunity to 
act in the light of that constitutive care, but more needs to be said about what full freedom requires 
in terms of our relation to the world.   
In Freedom’s Right, Axel Honneth provides a Hegelian construal of what he, following 
Frederick Neuhouser, describes as social freedom, a notion which both find first clearly articulated 
in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right.  Honneth argues that this understanding of freedom 
is the proper, most fully developed one, and one which best captures the intuitions concerning 
freedom to which modernity has given rise.  He construes this understanding of freedom as 
follows: 
For modern subjects, it is obvious that our individual freedom depends upon the 
responsiveness of the spheres of action in which we are involved to our own aims and 
intentions.  The more we feel that our purposes are supported and upheld by these spheres, 
the more we will be able to perceive our surroundings as a space for the development of our 
own personality.  As beings who are dependent on interacting with our own kind, the 
experience of such a free interplay with our intersubjective environment represents the 
pattern of all individual freedom.  (Honneth, 60).   
 
Honneth’s construal of the ways in which our freedom fundamentally depends upon the character 
of our intersubjective environment flags something essential about the requirements of existential 
vitality with which Kierkegaard does not give us the tools to engage.  We have been focusing so 
far on the form of robust, coherent relationality that persons must attempt actively to cultivate in 
order to achieve robust existential vitality.  For Kierkegaard, the fundamental object of one’s 
constitutive relation is utterly secure both in its existence and in its worthiness of love, being the 
eternal world-creating God.  In part as a function of this commitment, as well as his acceptance of 
a fairly radical construal of the Christian imperative to be in but not of the world, his account is 
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overly individualistic.  If we do not accept the claim that there is such an utterly stable ground of 
our being, the character and vitality of our social worlds themselves will be essential to our ability 
to maintain our freedom and avoid falling into despair.   
One dimension of this need to stand in robust constitutive relation to human others with 
whom we share our constitutive social worlds and in relation to whom we are able to develop and 
heighten our personal being is temporal, concerning our constitutive relations with the human past 
and future.  We will focus on these relations first before describing the relations in which we must 
stand to our contemporaries, which themselves can require this broader mode of constitutive 
relation. One very powerful case for our deep need to relate ourselves to the human future is 
provided in Samuel Scheffler’s Death & the Afterlife, which, as we will see, echoes points that 
Durkheim himself makes concerning the character of the concern for (impersonal) immortality 
that he discerns in aboriginal religious culture in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.  The 
basic claim of Scheffler’s book is that our ability to affirm many of the central projects that give 
shape to our lives requires a belief that the social worlds within which we live will live on after we 
die.  The “afterlife” referred to in the title is not the afterlife with which many traditional religions 
are concerned, but rather the afterlife of our social worlds in the lives of those who will be born 
after we die.   
The book is partially inspired by P.D. James’s novel The Children of Men. The plot centers 
on an imagined future in which all of humanity is suddenly and mysteriously rendered 
infertile.  For decades no new children have been born and the novel describes a world that is 
increasingly characterized by despair and violent division.  The aspirations of political life have 
ceased to be democratic in character, focusing on the securement of basic security and comfort 
and relations of care for those at the margins have been much diminished.  A suicide pill called 
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Quietus is widely available for purchase. The idea seems to be that in the absence of a hope that 
our way of life will be carried on by future generations, people’s attachment to many of the values 
and forms of constitutive care that have given shape to their lives will tend to come undone.  
 Scheffler finds the implicit claim presented here plausible and takes it to reveal important 
facts about the character of the quintessential forms of human valuing.  Those which are most 
fundamentally under threat are those at the heart of tradition- and group-dependent projects 
(Scheffler, 36).  In a state characterized by the sort of despair about the human future that James 
describes, therefore, our social- and tradition-dependent being as persons, which is at the heart of 
our lives when things are going well, is diminished and we come to identify ourselves in more 
limitedly social or robustly asocial ways.  One of the things that this fact flags is the fact that 
valuing best admits of a non-experientialist construal (Scheffler, 20)—i.e. that our valuing things 
is not essentially tied to our ability to experience them--and the fact that it seems often to possess 
a deeply non-egoistic and non-individualist character (ibid, 69).  Valuing turns out to be much 
more robustly and constitutively social than many philosophers are inclined to think.  He also takes 
it to indicate a robust conservative dimension in our attitudes towards what we value, claiming that 
there is an almost constitutive connection between valuing something and wanting it to be 
sustained and preserved indefinitely (ibid, 22).  If one takes something to be of overwhelming 
value one thereby tends to aspire to its continuing to exist forever. One might think that this is an 
inherently doomed, or even paradoxical wish, but it’s important to note that, if that is the case, we 
shouldn’t be surprised that reference to eternity has played such a central role in human being’s 
ethical and religious lives.  For mortal living persons who aspire to participate in and realize things 
of enduring value, eternity is a kind of guiding star or regulative ideal towards which we strive, 
even if ultimately we must inevitably fall short.  Finally, and relatedly, it indicates that valuing 
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something is a way of projecting ourselves into the future that involves a form of connecting our 
being up with that of the thing that is valued that makes us fundamentally vulnerable to how that 
thing fares (ibid. 60).  Interestingly, this underlines the fact that the relevant concern with the 
collective afterlife is not a matter of our compassion for those in the future, but rather our concern 
about our lives having value, which depends in a fundamental way on the ways in which our lives 
are related to those of others who live after we have died (ibid, 9).  If we share Scheffler’s intuitions 
about this case, and if his interpretation of their significance is accurate, it reveals that the fact that 
we will eventually die is a matter of less urgent concern, and a less potent threat to our existential 
fortitude and central projects, than is the fate of anonymous unborn persons whom we will never 
meet.  
 Scheffler’s account fits nicely with what Durkheim said above about our social world’s 
godlike power and endurance relative to our individual mortal selves, as well as the related claims 
he makes concerning the kind of impersonal social afterlife with which he takes aboriginal 
Australian cultures to be solely concerned:  
First of all, the need for personal survival is far from having been very strong from the 
beginning.  The primitive generally accepts the idea of death with a sort of 
indifference...the survival of the dead was accepted in order to make sense of the birth of 
the living…In sum, belief in the immortality of the soul is the only way man is able to 
comprehend a fact that cannot fail to attract its intention: the perpetuity of the group’s 
life.  (Durkheim 1995, 270-271). 
 
This claim should not surprise us given all that we’ve said about the modes of transcendence 
constitutive of personhood and the ways in which our being fundamentally hangs upon the extent 
and character of our participation in our social worlds.  It also gives us a means of understanding 
the vitality of persons as a function of the relations in which they stand to the social worlds that 
grant them their being.  Durkheim says that our personal vitality depends not only on our belonging 
to a society to which we are in some robust sense devoted, but also the vitality of that society itself, 
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the two being essentially intertwined with one another and the enhancement of each being one of 
the central concerns of religious rites.  We depend upon the “we” relations that constitute our social 
worlds, but those “we” relations are constituted by us, and our behavior in the light of them helps 
determine their relative strength and stability. 
 In Kierkegaardian terms, the situation described in The Children of Men is one of despair 
born of a widespread breakdown in people’s ability to stand secure in their relation to the human 
future.  The relation of persons to the power which established them has broken down insofar as 
they have lost their matter-of-course ability to be confident about its indefinite persistence into the 
future.  This breakdown is distinctive in that it is a function of the fact that the metaphorical deity 
here, the enduring human community, has been eclipsed and seems to be threatened with imminent 
death.  The enduring human community constituted the practices in terms of which persons 
understand themselves but insofar as it is no longer something to which they can actively relate, 
their ability to maintain their full personhood has started to break down.  As a result, many have 
in some sense lost their former selves, centering their lives increasingly on the rather narrow scope 
of goods that can still be affirmed in the absence of a human future. 
That being said, some are able to maintain fuller personhood in virtue of their faith that 
somehow the human community will survive. Some, members of the underground resistance group 
the Five Fishes, resist this trend by insisting on resisting the despair-induced tendencies within 
their world and trying to relate in a definitive manner to the possibility of bringing about a renewal 
of human fertility.  The novel ends with the birth and baptism of a child and in it an answer to their 
abiding faith and the prospect of a return of the eclipsed possibility of living lives centered on the 
sort of more robustly self-transcendent and temporally extended values that had hitherto been put 
under fundamental threat.   Fully human life, in other words, is enabled to reawaken as the 
109 
 
possibility of constitutive relation to an open-ended human future is re-opened.  James’s book is 
deeply theological in character, as the title itself indicates (cf. Psalm 90, 89:3: “Thou turnest man 
to destruction, and sayest, Return, ye children of men” (KJV)) and her claim that the proper way 
to respond to such an existential threat as she describes is to cultivate and maintain religious faith 
is one which points towards the themes we will be discussing in the next chapter. 
 All of this points to the ways in which we depend, in order to achieve full existential 
vitality, on our ability to stand in fundamental and open-endedly futural forms of constitutive self-
transcendence and -formative relation to others upon whom we in some sense depend for and in 
our being.  If those relations are broken down or threatened, we too face the threat of becoming 
sick and perhaps even dying as the persons we are.  If the other to whom we must relate is not an 
eternal God but rather more fragile, particular others, we are also threatened by the prospect that 
they will die, prove not to have been what we took them to be, or disconnect themselves from 
us.  We will be sticking to the broadly Durkheimian account of the relevant self-establishing other 
as that which is incarnated in the members of our social world as they show up in the light of the 
fundamental world-disclosing attitudes of constitutive care.  But whatever one takes the relata to 
be, the important point is that existential vitality depends upon the integrity, health, and endurance 
of the relevant self-constituting relational networks, whatever their character. 
 There are ways in which this existential need to relate ourselves in a constitutive manner 
to the human future arguably is paralleled by a desire and perhaps even need to relate ourselves in 
such a constitutive manner to the human past.  We are, as Durkheim and Heidegger both 
emphasize, granted our fundamental being by the human past.  Our basic orientation to the world 
is one which we inherit through a process of acculturation into the social worlds to which we 
belong.  Given this, our ability to see our lives as embodying responsiveness to constitutive values 
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that were constitutive values in the lives of the dead, which we also have faith will be constitutive 
values in the lives of those who live after us, allows us to understand ourselves as preservers and 
sustainers of a world of greater temporal scope and more robust and enduring reality.  Doing so 
grants us the sense that the values around which our lives are centered are in fact truly enduring 
ones, insofar as they extend out of the deep human past, which helps to undergird our faith that 
they will continue to endure indefinitely into the future.  It also allows us to enact the form of 
preservation of the substance of the lives of the dead that we hope will in turn be enacted by those 
who live after us.  The values upon which our lives center are therefore in some sense given 
enhanced substance, potency, and authority through their standing in this broader relational 
network.  Determining what in our cultural past ought to be affirmed and how it ought to be 
projected into the future is, of course, an interpretive task that will be taken up in a variety of 
different ways by different people, but the aspiration to find such strands of continuity is well-
grounded in the relational character of our existence as persons.    
Something similar can be said of cultural artifacts that have had enduring significance in 
human life over extensive periods of time.  Part of the reason why the 2019 fire at Notre Dame 
inspired so much distress all over the world was a function of the fact not simply that it is a 
beautiful work of architecture but that it had been intertwined in a deep way with the lives of 
millions of people over centuries.  This abiding position in an enduring human relational network 
confers upon such things a distinctive and radiant kind of aura and attendant formative power and 
though there are genuine ethical worries about whether and in what way to spend money to repair 
it, the simple dismissal of such distress as prioritizing things over people is inattentive to this 
fact.  Durkheim alludes to this process when he talks about how relational social “forces” become 
“congealed” in creations of human artifice in a manner which we cannot help but acknowledge 
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(Durkheim 1995, 214). Engagement, particularly of the I-You Buberian sort, with such things can 
be transformative, for good or bad, because we experience them as nodes through which we come 
into some sort of potentially constitutive relation with an expansive and powerful network of 
indefinitely many lives extending deep in the past and, insofar as this gathering power endures, far 
into the future.  One might in many instances rightly desire that these culturally inherited works 
cease to have the influence that they once did.  But there is no denying that we experience them as 
distinctive and that there is a case to be made, if such a translation is possible, for trying to find 
ways to channel that inherited power in new directions that enables potent continuity with the past 
while simultaneously allowing us to respond creatively to the ongoing revelations of new truths 
and priorities that is always ongoing in our particular lives.   
 This points us to the question of the tension between continuity and progress.  This is of 
course connected to the tensions between second-personal morality and collective intentional 
orders that we foregrounded in the last chapter. There are, after all, often deep problems in the 
forms of life characteristic of the traditions that we inherit, and changes, sometime radical in 
nature, are often called for.  This in some sense serves as a threat to the being of those who identify 
with that tradition, as we all to a greater or lesser extent do.  Insofar as we have been constituted 
by that tradition and understand ourselves as the heirs of the form of life of our deceased ancestors, 
we feel, ceteris paribus, that a true break with that tradition threatens to diminish us insofar as it 
involves a breach in the modes of formative self-transcendent relation on which we have hitherto 
depended.  On the other hand, insofar as those traditions have alienated us to ourselves and others 
(more on this below), such a breach opens up improved dynamics of interrelationship, between 
projects and components of the self as well as between us and our fellow human beings.  Such 
changes are often unambiguous improvements.  The active relation to a new and open future is, on 
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other words, a higher priority than that of sustaining a fixed relation to the world of the dead and 
to those aspects of our pragmatic orientation towards ourselves and the world that we experience 
as in some sense deadening.  That being said, and as Hans-Georg Gadamer, following Heidegger, 
argues forcefully in Truth and Method, the meaning of cultural tradition is not a fixed and 
determinate thing.  Rather, through relating to traditional texts in the light of our distinctive 
situation, the old can reveal itself to have vital significance that was partially or entirely concealed 
from view in the past.  
Given this fact, and given our existential aspiration to robust cross-temporal relationality, 
there are grounds for prioritizing efforts to redeploy cultural tradition where possible as a means 
of affirming the transformed future that one is trying to bring about.  If these two dimensions of 
one’s being can be brought into collaborative relation, more of the self can be deployed in the 
struggle for a better future, greater relationality can be generated between members of the culture, 
and possibilities of continuing to identify both with the human past and future through an 
interpretive lens that flags the ways in which ours is a living tradition, one will be able to counteract 
the despair induced both by the problems in the current world and the threat of disconnecting from 
that of the past.  We are better able, in other words, to affirm the value that animates our lives as 
something that has endured and will continue to endure if we can develop living connections 
between our past and future.  If we can affirm the in some important sense new future that we aim 
to make possible for ourselves and for the heirs of our way of life as the fuller flowering of seeds 
that were planted deep in human history, we are better able to see those meanings as in some sense 
robustly real in a trans-historical sense.  If we can see the truth of our existence as one that connects 
up fundamentally with the truth constitutive of the lives of the dead as well as those yet to be born, 
the confidence of our identification with it will be more robust and wholehearted and our actions 
113 
 
will take on a more confident and courageous cast.  The life and work of Gandhi and King provide 
a familiar and exemplary example of such creative traditionalist radicalism.  The powers that they 
were able to help summon were in part born of their ability to connect what was traditional to what 
was still to be accomplished in a manner that allowed them to communicate to and summon 
motivated commitment from a diverse cast of characters who experienced their call as enabling 
them to live in a more vital and affirmative manner.  And, as Michael Walzer argues in The 
Paradox of Liberation, the effort to bring about progressive revolutions articulated largely in terms 
of a (rational) break with tradition tend to be, in the long run, comparatively impotent in their 
transformative powers.  The repressed past tends to return with a vengeance. 
Let’s now turn to those constitutive relations of transcendence that sustain us in our relation 
to our contemporary social worlds.  We will start by discussing them in general and positive terms 
before turning to a discussion of the ways in which such relations can be undermined through 
social and political oppression and violence.  In outlining the basic relational dynamics of our 
social lives in the second section of this chapter, we drew a distinction between more and less 
mutual forms of interpersonal relation, highlighting the ways in which both our default das Man 
identities within our (sub)worlds and our more mutual forms of interpersonal relations, and most 
especially those characterized by love, play an essential role in sustaining us as persons in the 
world.  The ability to stand in and to actively cultivate the more or less full range of such relations 
is essential to our ability to cultivate our existential vitality within the worlds in which we live.   
 Durkheim himself highlights the ways in which the feeling of having our vitality and being 
as persons heightened through the relations in which we stand to others is, when things are going 
well, a near constant in human life.  Though he is centrally preoccupied with the ways in which 
religious practice can generate modes of peak relationality that give us a distinctively robust 
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experience of enhanced existential vitality at the level of our deepest modes of, in Heideggerian 
terminology, being-in-the-world, he makes a point of flagging the continuities between such 
experiences and those characteristic of everyday life:   
This stimulating action of society is not felt in exceptional circumstances alone.  There is 
virtually no instant of our lives in which a certain rush of energy fails to come to us from 
outside ourselves.  In all kinds of acts that express the understanding, esteem, and affection 
of his neighbor, there is a lift that the man who does his duty feels, usually without being 
aware of it.  But that lift sustains him; the feeling society has for him uplifts the feeling he 
has for himself.  Because he is in moral harmony with his neighbor, he gains new 
confidence, courage, and boldness in action--quite like the man of faith who believes he 
feels the eyes of his god turned benevolently toward him.  (Durkheim, 213). 
 
As the radically social creatures that we are, we depend on this more or less continual sense of 
uplift from the persons, practices, and cultural artefacts that give shape to our shared social 
worlds.  To the extent that we are able to regularly achieve such connectivity and experience the 
attendant forms of agential uplift we feel more alive, powerful, and confident in our actions.  To 
the extent that we are cut off from these external sources of support, on the other hand, we feel 
diminished, alienated, and comparatively powerless.   
 We are not always in a position, however, to enter into such uplifting social relations.  This 
might be a function of the sort of defiant, proud forms of agency that Kierkegaard focuses in his 
discussion of despair.  What I would like to focus on here, however, are the deformations in 
relational life experienced by those who are forced into positions of relative disconnection from 
the social worlds in which they live and the forms of existential diminishment that they tend to 
experience as a result.  I would like to conclude this chapter by discussing such modes of 
diminished existential vitality in connection with Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death: 
A Comparative Study, Lisa Guenther’s Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its Afterlives, and 
Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence from Domestic Abuse to 
Political Terrorism, all of which describe forms of existential death and/or diminished vitality that 
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result from a coercive, traumatizing disruption of our ability to engage in collaborative, mutually 
supportive relations with others.  I hope in concluding on this note to connect our discussion up 
with questions concerning social and political justice that are not the central focus of Heidegger 
and Buber’s discussions, or Elementary Forms, but are essential to understanding the abiding 
importance of religiosity in human life.   
 Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death is an attempt, through a comparative analysis 
of slave-holding societies throughout human history, to delineate the varieties of what he, 
following Claude Meillassoux and others, refers to as the social death constitutive of slavery 
(Patterson, 38).  This form of radical and officially institutionalized alienation of dominated others 
from the social worlds in which they lived is an extreme case, but in its extremity it illuminates a 
basic mode of actively imposed, alienating oppression that can and does take a variety of subtler 
forms in human life.   According to Patterson, the fundamental assault upon the personal being of 
slaves was instituted first and foremost through what he calls natal alienation, which was in turn 
deeply connected to an alienating process of individualization.  In order to place the slave outside 
of full membership in the relevant human community, their ties to kin and to their cultural and 
religious traditions were officially cut.  They had, in other words, no legitimate claim to standing 
as parents, siblings, or children, and were deprived of the proper personhood bestowed upon full-
fledged members of the social world.  Given the central, foundational role of familial belonging 
as a mode of entrance into the relational networks of the social world in which we live, this 
existential assault cut deeply.  Slaves were outside of the official “we” and their standing within 
the social world was entirely a function of and mediated by their subservient relation to their 
master.  Their near total submission to their master(s) was understood to be, in effect, a substitute 
for death. (ibid, 5).  Whether they were captives in war who were actively threatened with death if 
116 
 
they did not submit to enslavement or were deemed to have lost their fundamental social standing 
due to some fall from social grace, brought about through crime or the incursion of debt or some 
other breach in the official social and political code, they were taken to have opted for or been 
forced into slavery from a position in which they had surrendered their claim to be granted life by 
the given social order.  They were thereby assigned a position of position of comparative personal 
nonbeing (ibid, 38). 
 This position of social death and liminality is one which was typically solidified through 
basic rituals and myths.  In many societies there were rituals through which the position of slave 
is bestowed upon individuals (ibid, 52), and visible markers that imposed upon them as a means 
of signaling their status as slaves (ibid, 58).  They were also, importantly, excluded from the central 
rituals of the social world, particularly those that were understood to confer political power and 
full social belonging on their participants (ibid, 66).  This is all simply to say that there was a 
complex cultural symbolic and ritualistic apparatus in place in slaveholding societies that was used 
to establish and fortify the position of social death to which the slave was assigned.  This official 
status rarely achieved full hegemony over the life of the enslaved, it is worth noting.  I think that 
there are grounds for understanding this fact as a testament to the ultimately impotent and 
despairing violation of constitutive interpersonal relations that slavery constitutes.  But to the 
extent that slaves were able to resist this positioning through the cultivation of mutually affirming 
bonds of recognition amongst themselves, they were in a position of very vulnerable and typically 
furtive resistance to this potent, prevailing social order.   
 I do not have space to properly outline Patterson’s account in any other than this schematic 
way, but I hope that I have said enough to illustrate the ways in which this species of violent 
exclusion from full participation in one’s social world institutes a profound assault upon the 
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personal vitality and being of those who are subject to it.  If we understand our being and vitality 
as persons to be dependent on the constitutive self-transcendent relations in which we stand to 
others in our social worlds, the deadening effects of this variety of exclusion is an instance of the 
terrible destruction that can be wrought when those relations are systematically 
undermined.  Servility and the effacement of one’s personality, which one might or might not be 
able to defiantly affirm in relation to one’s fellow slaves, is some of the terrible fruit that this 
condition would yield.  There is a sense of being powerless, of being unseen and therefore less 
fully real as an individual human person, that deadens one at one’s very core.  The horror of slavery 
extends far beyond any material deprivation and violence that might or might not be inflicted upon 
slaves: it constituted an attack on the very substance of the slaves’ being as a person. 
 This basic idea is taken up and extended in Lisa Guenther’s Solitary Confinement: Social 
Death and Its Afterlives.  This work is an investigation of the destruction to human personhood 
wrought by solitary confinement.  This practice was originally propagated in the United States by 
Quakers who were concerned to treat prisoners in some sense more humanely.  The motivating 
thought, similar to the account of faith in Kierkegaard in its emphasis on the importance of the 
solitary individual’s standing alone before God, was that criminals would be better positioned to 
reform themselves if they were left alone with God to contemplate their misdeeds and cultivate an 
aspiration to live their lives on a new, reformed footing after their imprisonment was 
concluded.  This rather quickly proved to be an inaccurate construal of the effects of solitary 
confinement on human beings and though the practice endured the justifications were changed.  It 
was progressively transformed into a means of straightforwardly punishing prisoners for their 
wrongdoing and isolating them from their peers if and when they have been deemed to be 
problematic presences when left amidst the broader prison population.   
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 Guenther does a good job of connecting this development with the rise of racialized mass 
incarceration in the United States, which has function as a kind of new Jim Crow, as Michelle 
Alexander forcefully argues in her book The New Jim Crow.  The claim here is that even once the 
official social death imposed by slavery has been eliminated, there is often a form of relative 
unofficial (or, in the case of Jim Crow, while it was still in effect, emphatically official) social 
death that continues to be imposed by the practices that have grown out of the slaveholding 
past.  The criminalization of Black Americans was institutionalized across the board in the 
aftermath of emancipation and though the forms that it has taken have shifted and been to some 
extent diminished, it remains the case that Black Americans are much more vulnerable to the 
destructive, coercive practices like solitary confinement.   
 What is most interesting for my purposes is what Guenther has to say about the experience 
of solitary confinement itself, the effects that it has on people and the lessons we can take from 
those experiences concerning the profoundly social character of our being-in-the-world.  The fact 
that solitary confinement has globally destructive effects on persons’ ability to situate themselves 
as meaning-responsive agents in a more or less coherent and intelligible world points to the 
centrality of the relational dynamics to our being-in-the-world that I have been trying to describe 
throughout this chapter: 
There are many ways to destroy a person, but one of the simplest and most devastating 
is through prolonged solitary confinement.  Deprived of meaningful human interaction, 
otherwise healthy prisoners become unhinged.  They see things that do not exist, and they 
fail to see things that do.  Their sense of their own bodies--even the fundamental capacity 
to feel pain and to distinguish their own pain from that of others--erodes to the point where 
they are no longer sure if they are being harmed or are harming themselves.  Not only 
psychological or social identity but the most basic sense of identity is threatened by 
prolonged solitary confinement. As Jack Henry Abott wrote in his memoir In the Belly of 
the Beast: Letters from Prison, “Solitary confinement can alter the ontological makeup of 
a stone” (1991, 45) ...  
 Many prisoners describe their experience in solitary confinement as a form of living 
death.  Harry Hawser, a poet and inmate at Eastern State Penitentiary in the 1840s, called 
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his cell “a living tomb” (quoted in C. Smith 2009, 5).  Angela Tucker, an African American 
woman held at California’s Valley State Prison for Women in the 1980s, said, “It’s like 
living in a black hole” (quoted in Shaylor 1998, 386). (Guenther, xi-xii). 
 
There are a few points worth underlining here.  The first is that the breakdown in our relations with 
others that is forced upon prisoners who are subjected to extensive solitary confinement is one that 
has very widespread and terrible effects on our being-in-the-world.  Prisoners often experience a 
breakdown in their ability to grasp time and space in coherent, intelligible ways, and experience a 
coordinate loss in their ability to maintain a steady grip on the distinction between themselves and 
their environment.  This kind of breakdown experience points, in a way that echoes Heidegger and 
Tomasello as well as Durkheim, to the full depth of our dependence the minimal vitality of our 
social relations to maintain a grip on our place as meaning-responsive and -making individuals in 
an intelligible world. 
 The second concerns the quoted prisoners’ descriptions of the experience as a matter of 
“living in a tomb” and “living in a black hole.”  These two descriptions speak, respectively, to the 
ways in which a comprehensive disruption of our relational lives is often experienced as an act of 
extreme violence against our vitality as personhood--a living death, as Guenther puts it--and a 
radically diminished mode of being.  Tucker’s likening the experience to living in a black hole, in 
which one would be ripped apart and compressed to a vanishing point, flags the ways in which an 
attack on one’s vitality as a person is an attack on one’s fundamental personal existence.   
It is worth noting that solitary confinement need not always be experienced in such a 
globally destructive manner.  I facilitate philosophy discussions with incarcerated and formerly 
incarcerated people and a couple of them have described the way in which a—and this point is 
crucial—comparatively brief experience of being in solitary confinement helped them to reorient 
themselves in their relationships in a positive way, breaking with certain relationships and 
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identities that had been destructive and/or allowing them more fully to recognize the importance 
of those they cherished.  It seems that this more positive experience is one that is best understood 
as a matter of her having been able to get some sort of outside perspective on relationships that 
had, for better and worse, been central to their sense of themselves and their place in the 
world.  Such experiences affirm the general point about the crucial role that relationships play in 
constituting our sense of ourselves, what we’re about, and what we value in and how we ought to 
relate to the world without undermining the more general claim that sustained subjection to such 
isolation will tend to have terrible effects on the personhood of those who are subjected to it.  It is 
also worth noting that this kind of stepping outside of one’s quotidian, habitual relational situation 
into a realm apart from which one can assess and evaluative it is characteristic at some level, at 
least potentially, of participation in sacred religious rituals that partially suspend and relativize our 
ordinary quotidian relations with others are oriented towards generating a similar sort of improved 
perspective on what is and isn’t valuable in those relations.     
 Finally, I would like to bring in one final account of diminished existential vitality, this 
time that of Judith Herman in her book Trauma and Recovery.  Being a slave is always and being 
put in solitary confinement is often experienced as profoundly traumatizing.  Herman’s brilliant 
and profoundly moving account of the basic relational dynamics of trauma therefore helps to tie 
the various threads of this discussion together.  It is also very helpful and illuminating, and echoes 
claims made earlier in the chapter as well as looking ahead to those with which we will be 
concerned in our discussion of religion in the following chapter, in highlighting the deep 
interconnection between our experience of societal, romantic, familial, and religious belonging in 
constituting the basic shape of our being-in-the-world: 
Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships.  They breach the 
attachments of family, friendship, love, and community.  They shatter the construction of 
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self that is formed and sustained in relation to others.  They undermine the belief systems 
that give meaning to human experience.  They violate the victim’s faith in a natural or 
divine order and cast the victim into a state of existential crisis.  
The damage to relational life is not a secondary effect of trauma, as originally 
thought.  Traumatic events have primary effects not only on the psychological structures 
of the self but also on the systems of attachment and meaning that link individual and 
community.  Mardi Horowitz defines traumatic life events as those that cannot be 
assimilated with the victim’s “inner schemata” of self in relation to the world…  
The sense of safety in the world, or basic trust, is acquired in earliest life in the 
relationship with the first caretaker.  Originating with life itself, this sense of trust sustains 
a person throughout the lifecycle.  It forms the basis of all systems of relationship and 
faith.  This original experience of care makes it possible for human beings to envisage a 
world in which they belong, a world hospitable to human life.  Basic trust is the foundation 
of belief in the continuity of life, the order of nature, and the transcendent order of the 
divine. 
In situations of terror, people spontaneously seek their first source of comfort and 
protection.  Wounded soldiers and raped women cry for their mothers, or for God.  When 
this cry is not answered, the sense of basic trust is shattered…. When trust is lost, 
traumatized people feel that they belong more to the dead than to the living.  (Herman, 51-
2).  
 
Traumatic events often involve some form of physical trauma.  A soldier who has had a limb blown 
off in battle and a child who has been beaten and/or malnourished by an abusive parent both suffer 
profound physical damage that might be of a lasting sort.  That being said, and though there is an 
important metaphorical as well as literal connection between physical and existential trauma, the 
real harm suffered here is a violent breakdown in the traumatized person’s relational life with 
others.  This is the wound that is hardest to heal, one which can exist in the absence of physical 
affliction and which can persist long after physical wounds have healed.   
 As I said above, I take this passage to tie together the various strands of the account of 
existential vitality that I have been trying to develop in this chapter.  It connects the various 
instances of coercive assault on the relations constitutive of full-fledged personhood that I’ve 
discussed insofar as these all tend to be experienced as traumatizing, but it also does a great job of 
showing the deeply intertwined character of the various levels of our relational life.  As Herman 
flags towards the end of the passage, our most basic way of relating to the world is one that is 
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cultivated in childhood and often though of course not always given more global shape in forms 
of religious faith.  It is important, as Durkheim makes clear, that such faith needn’t, though it often 
does, involve belief in any personal deities.  It often involves reference to personal deities or sacred 
figures because our most basic way of relating to the world, as I’ve tried to argue above, is 
interpersonal.  What matters most, however, is a basic faith in the at least potential goodness of 
the people with whom we interact and on whom we essentially depend and the basic friendliness 
of the world on which we depend for our most fundamental aspirations.  The truths we take to be 
definitive of our existence must be ones that we feel our relations to others and the world at large 
can sustain and support in an enduring manner.  Important to all of us, therefore, is, if not a 
theodicy than at the very least a cosmodicy--a faith that our world’s deep structure is at some 
fundamental level one which will enable us, if we act in the right way, to realize what is of ultimate 
value in our lives.   
Before turning to her account of how such trauma can be healed, it is worth briefly 
mentioning Viktor Frankl’s account in Man’s Search for Meaning of what in his experience was 
required to simply survive the extended, radically traumatizing experience of being detained in a 
Nazi concentration camp.  The book opens with a description, which echoes those that we’ve been 
discussing, of the ways in which life in a concentration camp generated a kind of “emotional death” 
and protective apathetic shell (Frankl 2006, 20-3), an overall global sense of diminished reality 
(ibid., 28), and a felt “loss of values” and meaningful relation to the future (ibid., 50, 70).   
Interestingly, despite the general loss of interest in much of what had been of value to inmates in 
their previous lives, religion and politics—both of which of course bear on our deep social 
relationality—retained for most everyone an abiding interest (ibid., 34).  That being said, the 
hostility of the environment led many to despair and surrender to the dehumanizing situation in 
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which they found themselves. One of the essential means of preserving a sense of one’s 
personhood and the meaningfulness of one’s action and fight off the temptation to succumb to 
despair was, to paraphrase his general point in the language of this chapter, to retain some sense 
of membership in a “we” relation that rendered their act of resistance to the dehumanizing 
environment in which they find themselves meaningful, they can fend off the despair that would 
otherwise eliminate their ability to keep living (ibid., 67-74).  For Frankl this was a felt obligation 
to survive so that he could write and publish the book he’d been working on as well as his love for 
and desire not to disappoint his dead wife.  The religious had their relationship to God.  Whatever 
the relationship and attendant responsibility was, Frankl’s claim is that it was only through active 
maintenance of a sense of such relationships and one’s responsibility to them that one was able to 
continue to affirm one’s personhood in the face of all of the relational trauma to which it was 
subject.  That being said, it was only after liberation an extensive healing process was necessary—
and for many not entirely possible—in order to fully regain and firmly re-establish one’s 
personhood (ibid., 89).   
 When it comes to recovering from such trauma, Herman writes the following, making a 
very similar point:  
The core experiences of psychological trauma are disempowerment and disconnection 
from others.  Recovery, therefore, is based upon the empowerment of the survivor and the 
creation of new connections.  Recovery can only take place in the context of relationships; 
it cannot occur in isolation.  In her renewed connections with other people, the survivor re-
creates the psychological faculties that were damaged or deformed by the traumatic 
experience.  These faculties include the basic capacities for trust, autonomy, initiative, 
competence, identity, and intimacy… 
 The first principle of recovery is the empowerment of the survivor… (ibid, 133). 
 
In the passage from Elementary Forms that we quoted at the outset of this chapter, Durkheim 
speaks of the ways in which religious communion makes the faithful stronger.  The way in which 
it does this is by, among other things, revitalizing the sense of fundamental, affirmative relatedness 
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that people have a very urgent and fundamental existential need to develop. Religious practices 
oriented towards the cultivation of an affirmative relational attitude towards the world can 
therefore, in ways that should become clearer over the course of the next chapter, be an 
empowering means of healing the wounds of trauma or, in cases of less dramatic existential illness, 
of alienation, isolation, and disempowerment.  Though thinkers like Marx are right to point to the 
ways in which religious practices can serve as an opiate that replaces imaginary existential goods 
with the real item, the claim that this is the final or basic truth about religiosity is too quick.   On 
the one hand, in situations of extreme dehumanization any means of sustaining one’s sense of 
membership in a meaningful relation world is better than no such sense, however deluded and 
imaginary it might be.  But beyond that, religious practices have the power to genuinely transform 
our relational lives for the better, to make us genuinely stronger and more securely realize our 
existential vitality.   
One can see such transformative power at work in the religious communities of those who 
have been systematically oppressed by the larger societies to which they belong.    In The Souls of 
Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois speaks of the characteristically intense religious life of Black 
Americans and the ways in which the Black church helped to “reproduce in microcosm, all that 
great world from which the Negro is cut off color-prejudice and social condition” (DuBois, 130).  
Though some such forms of religiosity could no doubt be fairly understood as a kind of opiate, 
American history abounds with examples, to again cite King and the fight against racial 
segregation that he helped to lead, of the ways in which the alternative relational world generated 
in the Black church enabled those who belonged to it to transform their relations to one another 
and the society in which they lived in a manner that helped facilitate its transformation and to heal 
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some of the existential wounds that had been done by slavery, Jim Crow, and white supremacy 
more generally.   
* * * 
 
 I would like to conclude this rather general discussion by clarifying the relationship 
between what might seem to be two importantly different dimensions of relationality that bear 
upon our existential vitality and which might seem to be either not clearly related to one another 
or, at the very least, in deep tension with one another.  These two dimensions relate, roughly 
speaking, to the kinds of relational tensions that were discussed in relation to Tomasello’s account 
of the tension between collective and second-personal normativity, and between Buber and 
Heidegger’s account of authenticity and inauthenticity.  The former centered upon the claim that 
we have basic obligations to others as well as ourselves that are best captured in the egalitarian, 
second-personal “natural morality” that are often in tension with or overridden by the collective 
normative orders in which we live.  The latter was concerned centrally with those deformations in 
our relational life that are born of a kind of disconnect between the collective social categories, 
norms, and practices in terms of which we live our lives and the concrete, mortal specificity of our 
lives in their full concreteness.  I would like now to say something about how the ways in which 
these two forms of relation generate and threaten modes of better and worse, more and less 
authentic, existential vitality, and say a few things about the ways—better and worse—in which 
people can respond to threats to it.  
 I would like to start by discussing more general threats to our existential vitality—i.e. those 
that are generally speaking simply parts of human life—and then turn to those forms that are more 
specific and generated by particular forms of relational pathologies as opposed to more 
fundamental structural features of human life.  The most salient, of course, is that of death—which 
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we discussed in its generality in connection with Scheffler in this chapter and with Heidegger and 
Fromm in the previous chapter. Scheffler highlights the ways in which certain kind of relations of 
positive identification with and affirmation of the lives of successor generations are crucial to our 
ability to affirm our lives.  Heidegger discusses the ways in which awareness of our mortality and 
the finitude of our lives can, if we authentically relate ourselves to it, awaken us to more 
responsibly and courageously live our fundamental commitments as the concrete, mortal beings 
we are.  These philosophers are radically different from one another in a whole host of ways and 
for that reason I will simply sketch out some general considerations that I think we can discern 
following our engagement with them that are relevant to this existential vitality question.9 
 Our mortality and our concrete situatedness both present us with threats to our existential 
vitality insofar as the former confronts us with the fact that our lives will end and with them many 
of the more purely self-referential goods that we have sought and cultivated in our lives, whereas 
the latter presents us with the recurrent possibility of feeling alienated in our adoption of and 
responsiveness to the socially-disclosed meanings that give basic structure to our lives as persons. 
One of the crucial points that Scheffler calls to our attention is the ways in which we can develop 
the ability to affirm our lives as meaningful and worthy of active agential commitment so long as 
we have well-grounded faith that their substance will be taken up in the lives of those who will 
survive us as well as, even more crucially, those who will be born after our death.   If this 
relationality to the unborn and in some sense unknown persons of the future is as crucial as 
Scheffler claims to our sense of the meaning and value of our lives, it makes sense to think that it 
                                                 
9 I would like to acknowledge that much of what follows—and precedes—has been in certain respects influenced by 
Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be and that a more sustained engagement with that text would be helpful, but time and 
space have not permitted me to develop it here.    
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is something we ought actively to cultivate—for our own sake.  And there are, I think, some general 
things that one can say about how to pursue it.   
This ontological aspiration, as we I think have grounds at this point to put it, is one for 
which there are certain conditions of success.  The one with which Scheffler is most centrally 
concerned is that of the survival, of the literal afterlife of the social worlds to which we belong.  
That is to say that finding ways to ensure their indefinite survival is crucial—and recognition of 
this fact can perhaps motivate us to cultivate a kind of ontological personal interest in actively 
helping to combat existential threats like climate change, nuclear war, various technological 
dystopias, and so forth.  But there is another upshot that I think is also quite crucial.  It is a version 
of a kind of claim that Mark Johnston makes in Saving God and Surviving Death.  In those works—
especially, of course, but not exclusively the latter—Johnston makes the claim that insofar as we 
lead selfish, essentially self-centered lives death constitutes a fundamental threat to us in a manner 
it does not if we lead lives that are centered on goods that are properly common goods, the 
goodness of which bears no essential reference to my person and which can, for that reason, be 
more fully embodied in the lives of others.  If my life has been centered on keeping up with the 
Joneses concerns and purely selfish ends, death is a fundamental, direct existential threat to me 
insofar as I have every reason to believe that within very little time after my death there will be a 
new set of Joneses who have no idea or concern with the status that I achieved for myself in my 
life and there my more purely selfish projects and the values upon which they centered will be 
destroyed.  A perhaps more viable aspiration for reconciling oneself to death might be found in 
achieving something like the kind of this-worldly immortality with which Homeric heroes and the 
likes of Machiavelli were concerned, which could leave our names etched on the historical record 
and ensure that something of the substance of our lives continues to be affirmed and valued long 
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after our deaths.  But there too the time horizon is limited to the duration of time in which our story 
and accomplishments continue to be an object of regard and concern, and even if we become an 
Alexander the Great—or Machiavelli for that matter—there are grounds form of confronting death 
remains somewhat superficial, inadequate, and, in Kierkegaardian terms, despairing. 
Johnston’s claim is that the only way in which we can fully reconcile ourselves to our 
mortality—and, in so doing, he argues, in some sense survive death—is through a process of 
radical existential transformation, which he refers to using the language of conversion and 
salvation, such that our lives are centered on objective values that are not merely goods for us.  
Though I am not going to wade into the relevant personal identity waters, I do want to affirm the 
basic claim, which he takes to be the kernel of truth embedded in the recurrent, widespread claim 
in the so-called “world religions” that death is a threat to the selfish and immoral in a way it isn’t 
to those who are morally good, and that there is an alignment between the need to cultivate 
existential vitality in face of the relational breakdown with which death presents us, properly 
understood, warrants a cultivation of moral goodness.  I want now to say, as a means of building 
a bridge between the last and the next chapter, that so doing involves cultivating the right kind of 
active, affirmative, embodied relation to the objectively sacred. 
I said in the last chapter that there are grounds for thinking, in the light of the deep tension 
in our personhood-constituting relational lives, it seems that there is a kind of “natural” normative 
ideal which would allow us to maximally integrate our various identities and normatively affirm 
our lives. The claim was that participation in a collective intentional order that was fully and open-
endedly accountable to second-personal natural morality—such that we could and did regularly 
test it through such committedly egalitarian second-personal relations—would allow us to bring 
the in-built tension between these two normative orientations to its fullest, most person-affirming 
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flowering.  Defining ourselves in relation to such a normative order, and attempting to both 
embody and actively realize it in our persons and the worlds in which we live, is I want to claim a 
crucial means of cultivating a non-despairing, genuine form of existential vitality.  Given that 
existential vitality was defined above as a means of contending with despair, it’s perhaps best 
simply to say “genuine” but I want to acknowledge that there are forms of what might seem to be 
acute instances of existential vitality that are anything but responsive to genuinely sacred 
normative order(s)—which I will be discussing towards the end of this chapter.   
Our existential vitality as persons is in some direct sense a function of the character and 
quality of our relations to others.  The ways in which a failure to attempt to orient ourselves towards 
the genuinely sacred shows up both in deformations to our contemporaries and in deformations to 
those future persons who will carry on—or fail to carry on—the substantial, central projects of our 
lives.  One can imagine here the two dimensions of such a deformation of one’s existential vitality 
in relation to a Confederate slaveholder.  Such a person stands in radically deformed relation to 
the slaves whom they take themselves—no doubt with some anxiety and repressed awareness that 
they attempt to dispel through rationalizations, mutual reassurance and confirmation from other 
slaveholders, etc.—to own in ways that do violence to their own self-relation.  Furthermore, they—
and here it helps that we can look back on the example from some historical distance—have staked 
their lives on a set of practices and a self-understanding and set of projects that have come to be 
repudiated with horror by later generations.  Though we remain far from having realized the sacred 
ideal, in the relevant respects we are closer than we once were and we could say that insofar as 
this is the case that sacred relational structure has wreaked ontological revenge on such persons 
for their despairing defiance of the natural moral ties in which they stood to one another.  If we 
share the confidence of Durkheim that there is a kind of moral arc to history, one’s existential 
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vitality will to a great extent depend upon the extent to which one has succeeded in aligning oneself 
with the sacred relational order towards which we ought to see our lives and history as the bending.  
That is to say that I think we should think of existential vitality in a manner analogous to the ways 
in which Aristotle thought about happiness/flourishing (eudaimonia) when he affirms the truth of 
the claim attributed to Solon that we shouldn’t consider a man happy until after he’s dead.  In both 
instances the notion is properly taken to involve conditions of success that bear upon the relations 
in which our lives stand to those which come after us.  
This in turn points towards a properly moralized version of the Heideggerian account of 
the authentic relation towards our mortality that we sketched in the last chapter.  Though an 
awareness that our contemporary social world and many of the practices in which our lives are 
entangled fall short of fully realizing the sacred relational ideal is quite pervasive and familiar, if 
we are honest with ourselves it is far from being the case that we always have a clear sense of what 
sort of changes are or will be required in order better to realize it.  Determining what is required 
of us so as better to realize it is a matter requires both commitment to the ideal and to some 
determinate active stance aimed at better realizing it, along with a perpetual willingness to re-
examine our understanding of what such better realization involves.  In part, particularly where 
the question does not concern there being a determinate wrong but rather what to do about it, the 
uncertainty is a function simply of possessing inadequate or conflicting information about the 
character of the societies in which we live and the feasibility and desirability of the various 
proposed means of improving upon them.  It also, however, requires that we maintain an openness 
to the kind of Buberian transformative encounters with others that would help to give more 
determinate content to the aspiration and help orient us better to the ways in which the normative 
orders within which we live fall short of full accountability to second-personal morality of the right 
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sort.  It is here that we can begin to see some of the interconnections between the two measures of 
relational health that we outlined in the first chapter. 
In our discussion of Heidegger and Buber we discussed the tension between the general 
categories, meanings, and norms that structure our social lives and the concrete, individual 
specificity of the persons whose lives are given fundamental shape by them.  This tension was 
described as having several dimensions or aspects.  We can be torn between different kinds of 
practices and understandings of our predicament in which we are caught up and might be presented 
with a genuine dilemma without clear solution in attempting to properly interpret and weigh their 
relative claims on us.  We might also find in the (relative) absence of such explicit conflict that 
our practices, categories, and so forth are in some way fall short of capturing some salient, 
important feature of our experiences/persons/situations.  Without wading too deeply into the 
waters here, I would like to discuss a pair of examples that I think shed light on this latter 
phenomenon and the ways in which it connects up with the more standard moral preoccupations 
that we have been discussing so far.  Though there is a clear and important distinction to be drawn 
between these different modes of relational integrity/breakdown that we need to be mindful of, 
understanding the ways in and extent to which they are or can be intertwined with one another 
sheds light on the important and power of the kind of robust normative integration to which good 
forms of religiosity properly aspire.   
In “The Roots of Existentialism,” Hubert Dreyfus discusses Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling and attempts to provide an account of the kind of tension that Kierkegaard claims 
Abraham is presented with in being called to sacrifice Isaac to God.  Kierkegaard—or, rather, 
Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonym to whom the work is attributed—claims that Abraham is 
engaged in a “teleological suspension of the ethical” in undertaking to make the sacrifice, 
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abandoning his socially-disclosed ethical obligations to his child for the sake of some higher, more 
existentially central calling.  There are issues with this account as an interpretation of the narrative 
itself, in part but not exclusively because child sacrifice would have been understood as a 
legitimate religious undertaking in the Near East at the time, and thus part of the aim of the story 
seems to be to revise that prevailing ethical understanding and show that the God of the Israelites 
is different in that he does not require such sacrifices.  That being said, there is a grain of truth in 
the story that Dreyfus tries to illustrate with the following example.  As a bit of background, it is 
crucial to mention that Dreyfus plausibly argues that in speaking of the “ethical” de Silentio is 
referring not to objective moral truths about what is required of all human beings at all time, but 
rather the more culturally relative understandings of our ethical obligations that Hegel refers to in 
speaking of Sittlichkeit.  To the extent that this is true, one can understand the imperative to greater 
individual authenticity as potentially harmonizing with, even furthering, improved responsiveness 
to our actual normative obligations to others.  The revised understanding of the meaning of the 
story in its historical context, of course, adds grist to this interpretive mill.  Dreyfus draws the 
relevant analogy as follows:  
To see that this dramatic talk of the anguish of suspending the ethical is not just 
psychological science fiction, we need an example.  Consider a homosexual “lad” in Denmark 
in 1850 who loved a “prince” rather than a “princess.”  The ethical at that time would consider 
this defining commitment terribly immoral.  And so would the lover himself.  Given the ethics 
of the time, he could only think of his love as perverted, unnatural, depraved, and disgusting.  
For him the ethical would be a temptation for, if he does not go straight, he would have to live 
with the anguished and paradoxical sense that his love is the best thing he ever did, while being 
at the same time the worst. (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 149). 
 
A similar example that comes to mind is that of Huckleberry Finn’s friendship with the escaped 
slave Jim in Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, which involves a similar felt need to commit to a 
relationship despite the fact that, in terms of the prevailing collective intentional normative orders 
in which both men live, befriending and assisting an escaped slave is manifestly wrong.  Both 
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examples point to the kinds of relational violence that can be done to our persons by collective 
intentional orders that are insufficiently accountable to the imperatives of second-personal 
morality, and the ways in which the pursuit of authentic individual stances towards others can help 
to break the spell of such orders and help to positively transform them from within in a manner 
that starts rather reticent and inarticulate and only achieves full ethical expression over the course 
of time.  
 There are good grounds for thinking that in practice the two aspirations will often tend to 
conflict with one another.  Often our moral obligations will require that we abandon or compromise 
certain relationships and projects that might provide us with the kind of ekstatic, authentic 
relationality that we aspire to achieve in our relationships.  That being said, they can at least at 
times be mutually supportive and there are good grounds for thinking that we cannot fully achieve 
the one without the other.  The thought here would be that being fully responsive to the second-
personal demands that others make upon us is one component of full existential vitality and one 
which requires achieving and helping to realize a world in which the kinds of relationship that are 
central to realizing the other dimension of existential vitality that were highlighted by our 
reflections in the last chapter on Heidegger and Buber.  The two dimensions are mutually 
supportive in in crucial ways.  Second-personal morality prods us to help others and ourselves 
realize more authentic and robust forms of relationality with others, while the latter provides us 
with the motivational resources we need to better strive for achieving the former.10 
                                                 
10 These reflections were inspired in part by Elizabeth Ashford’s essay “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality,” in 
which she responds to the integrity objection to utilitarianism that Bernard Williams presents in “A Critique of 
Utilitarianism” in Utilitarianism: For & Against.  Ashford argues that personal integrity does matter but that the 
kind of integrity we actually aspire to is on that involves acting in accordance with our moral obligations and 
realizing personally fulfilling projects.  She calls such integrity objective integrity and though she concedes that in 
our current world, riven as it is by serious moral wrongs that demand our concerted efforts to address them, there is 
a practically realizable world in which the two would harmonize and, furthermore, mutually amplify one another.    
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 If these two mutually supportive dimensions are both essential and we can imagine and 
seek to bring about a world in which they are not only compatible but mutually amplifying, there 
are grounds for thinking that the task of cultivating our existential vitality requires that we orient 
ourselves towards and try to realize the possibility of their standing in such mutually supportive 
and amplifying relation.  Looking ahead to our discussion of religion and that which we ought to 
consider the objectively sacred—namely the call to cultivate and integrate our relationships in the 
light of the call to achieve a relational live involving fully authentic relationality informed and 
constrained by second-personal normativity—there are some practicable upshots about how we 
ought to cultivate our existential vitality.  To focus too single-mindedly on one dimension to the 
detriment of the other is to bring about a kind of deadening relational breakdown.  To focus single-
mindedly on responding to our moral obligations without cultivating the kind of sustaining 
interpersonal relationships that can bolster and strengthen our standing as persons can undermine 
our ability to respond to them and make our responses themselves alienating in ways that are self-
undermining.  We can go wrong and land in a despairing stance not only through such despair-
inducing cold critique-centered moralism, but also through an amoral pursuit of passionately 
intense relationships that similarly neglect one dimension of existential vitality at the cost of the 
other.  One can think here of both those who pursue lives of intense, individualistic passionate 
intensity unconstrained by moral obligations and those who seek to identify themselves with 
collective entities that are similarly intense and unaccountable to morality.  Both of these responses 
to the desire to strengthen ourselves through intense personal relationships constitute modes of 
despair—even if ones of an often-feverish intensity—insofar as they breach the essential moral 
relationships that are essential to solidly and fully integrating our lives with others.  Such projects 
and identities tend to fall apart and fizzle out and leave us in no positive, abiding relationship to 
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our contemporaries or successors.  And as with all forms of despair, there are grounds for knowing 
that the anxious intensity with which we throw ourselves into these deformed modes of 
relationship are a function of our awareness that they do not in fact provide us with the stable 
relational grounding that we at bottom aspire and are called to realize. 
 I have said all of this to make two points.  First of all, given the centrality of “vitality” talk 
to pseudo-Nietzschean amoral collectivism a la that of National Socialism and Nietzschean 
individualism, it is important to emphasize that the kind of vitality that I am concerned with here 
has an essential moral dimension to it that cannot be ignored.  At the same time, and perhaps as a 
means of responding in a more morally responsible manner to the kinds of cravings for relational 
intensity that underlie such deformed existential stances, I want to highlight the ways in which 
moral critique is inadequate as a means of rectifying some of the deep relational wounds 
characteristic of our lives and societies.  For our moral critique to have genuine relational power 
we must try simultaneously to realize more authentically intense and mutually sustaining 
relationships with others that are informed by our moral obligations while also showing the ways 
in which fidelity to them can yield greater relational fruit and existential vitality across the board.  
That is to say that we must aspire to create sub-worlds in which the two goods are harmoniously 
realized so as to demonstrate that harmony and to provide a welcoming, appealing instantiation of 
the alternative world that we are trying to make real.  When King, following Gandhi, speaks of the 
need for activists to create the “beloved community” in order to embody, be sustained by, and 
demonstrate the realizability of a transformed mode of relating to one another constituted by 
heightened moral responsiveness and interpersonal care and connection, he is highlighting the 
central importance of and power of such attempts to integrate these two dimensions of existential 
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vitality. This involves an inescapable tension for which there is no neat and tidy solution, and it is 
one we must simply try to live and deal with as best as we can.11 
  
                                                 
11 Many thanks to Akeel Bilgrami and Axel Honneth for pushing me to clarify the connection between these two 
dimensions of existential vitality.   
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When the Australians hunt or fish in scattered groups, they lose sight of what concerns 
their clan or tribe.  They think only of taking as much game as possible.  On feast days, 
however, these concerns are overshadowed obligatorily; since they are in essence profane, 
they are shut out of sacred periods.  What then occupies the mind are the beliefs held in 
common: the memories of great ancestors, the collective ideal the ancestors embody--in 
short, social things.  Even the material interests that the great ceremonies aim to satisfy are 
public and hence social...Hence it is society that is foremost in every consciousness and 
that dominates and directs conduct, which amounts to saying that at such times it is even 
more alive, more active, and thus more real than at profane times.  And so, when men feel 
there is something outside themselves that is reborn, forces that are reanimated, and a life 
that reawakens, they are not deluded.  This renewal is in no way imaginary, and the 
individuals themselves benefit from it, for the particle of social being that each individual 
bears within himself necessarily participates in this collective remaking.  The individual 
soul itself is also regenerated, by immersing itself once more in the very wellspring of its 
life.  As a result, that soul feels stronger, more mistress of itself, and less dependent upon 
physical necessities.  (Durkheim 1995, 352-3) 
 
- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life  
 
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing.  It simply stands there in the middle of the 
rock-cleft valley.  The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets 
it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico.  By means of the temple, the 
god is present in the temple.  This presence of the god is in itself the extension and 
delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct.  The temple and its precinct, however, do 
not fade away into the indefinite.  It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the 
same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and 
death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape 
of destiny for human being.  The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is 
the world of this historical people.  Only from and in this expanse does the nation first 
return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation.  (Heidegger 2013, 40-41) 
 
 
- Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”  
 
The bridge gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and 
mortals.  Gathering or assembly, by an ancient word of our language, is called 
“thing.” (ibid., 151) 
 




 All three of these passages speak to a kind of existential gathering that, I will be arguing, 
is central to religious life, and they will be discussed in the second and third sections of his essay. 
In the first two passages this existential gathering is accompanied by and in part a function of a 
literal gathering of people who assemble to celebrate and reanimate something crucial they have 
in common and which they hold to be sacred and in some sense world-disclosive.  In the third 
instance, there is no such explicit, discrete gathering but there is nevertheless a similar 
phenomenon: a work of architecture is encountered by those whose lives are meaningfully and 
commonly intertwined with it as a site of the gathering of the essential components of the being of 
their world.  The world that is disclosed in and through such gathering is not the physical world 
but rather the humanly meaningful world that is structured by sacred things and which gives to 
those who participate in it the essential substance of their meaning-responsive.  personhood.  That 
is to say that for Durkheim, as well as for Heidegger, the kind of world-attunement and -gathering 
that is at the center of religious life is of a fundamentally different, and deeply incommensurable, 
sort than that involved in attuning ourselves to our physical worlds through the formation of 
accurate, empirical beliefs about them.  Insofar as we take meaningful action as opposed to mere 
accurate cognition to be the substance of human life, it is the religious attunement that is and must 
be most fundamental and essential in human life.  
 The aim of this chapter is to outline, against the background of our account of the 
constitutive modes of human transcendence and the modes of existential vitality that they make 
possible for (human) persons, the central argument concerning the character and importance of 
religious practices that Durkheim lays out in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.   We will 
transition over the course of the chapter from claims that should be familiar at this point, though 
their more directly religious significance will be further revealed and unpacked, to claims 
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concerning more explicitly religious practices and dynamics.  In the first section I will discuss 
Durkheim’s claim that societies are constituted by their constitutive ideals, which is elaborated 
upon in his claim that these ideals are distinctive in that they are held to be sacred, which taking 
up a distinctively ascetic attitude towards them and committing ourselves to their sovereignty over 
the more profane and self-centered goods upon which our profane activities tend to center.  After 
getting these basic structural claims on the table I will turn in the second section to a discussion of 
Durkheim’s account of the way that religious rituals work.  Having done this, I will attempt, with 
Heidegger’s help, to unpack the ways in which we can affirm Durkheim’s claim that, in 
Heideggerian terminology, truth happens in religious rituals.  In the third and final section I will 
turn to his account of the ways in which persons attempt to maintain fidelity to the ritualistically-
disclosed sacred when they return to their lives in the profane world.   
3.1 The Sacred Constitution of Our Social Worlds 
...Where, then, does this remarkable distinction [between sacred and profane] come 
from?...  
 My proposed explanation of religion has the specific advantage of providing an answer 
to this question, since what defines the sacred is that the sacred is added to the real.  And 
since the ideal is defined in the same way, we cannot explain the one without explaining 
the other.  We have seen, in fact, that if collective life awakens religious thought when it 
rises to a certain intensity, this is so because it brings about a state of effervescence that 
alters the conditions of psychic activity. … In short, upon the real world where profane life 
is lived, he superimposes another that, in a sense, exists only in his thought, but one to 
which he ascribes a higher kind of dignity than he ascribes to the real world.  In two 
respects, then, this other world is an ideal one. 
 … [The formation of an ideal] is a natural product of social life.  If society is to be able 
to become conscious of itself and keep the sense it has of itself at the required intensity, it 
must assemble and concentrate. …A society can neither create nor recreate itself without 
creating some kind of ideal by the same stroke.  This creation is not a sort of optional extra 
step by which society, being already made, merely adds finishing touches; it is the act by 
which society makes itself, and remakes itself, periodically.  Thus, when we set the ideal 
society in opposition to the real society, like two antagonists supposedly leading us in 
opposite directions, we are reifying and opposing abstractions.  The ideal society is not 
outside the real one but is part of it.  Far from our being divided between them as thought 
between two poles that repel one another, we cannot hold to the one without holding to the 




- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
 
 The aim of this section is to unpack and explain the claims that Durkheim is making here. 
In order to lay the groundwork for his interpretation of religious practices.  The basic claim, which 
we discussed and developed in the last two chapters, is that when human beings gather together, 
which is to say when they form or activate “we” relations, they, almost as a matter of course, form 
what he terms “ideals” that give substance to the “we” in question.  Without such shared normative 
commitments, there cannot, for reasons discussed in the first chapter, be any such “we” relations 
insofar as it is normative commitments that constitute them, and their members as members, as 
such.  Once formed, those “we” relations must be episodically reanimated through actively 
reconvening the “we” in question.  The “we” relation which Durkheim, as a sociologist, has in 
mind is that of society in the broadest sense.  But his focus on society as the largest and most 
fundamental “we” in question is not simply a function of his being a sociologist.  Religions are as 
such, according to Durkheim, oriented towards putting us in contact with the fundamental truths 
that do and ought to structure the most capacious communities to which we belong.  Durkheim’s 
account focuses on the religious practices of aboriginal Australians as described in the 
anthropological literature of his day, and it’s important to note that in this instance the societies in 
question were small enough that they could in fact gather as a whole and the question of how such 
gathering takes place when the society in question is too large to literally gather as such is another 
important question to which we’ll be returning.  Our starting off point, however, is the relatively 
simple claim that human beings spontaneously form “we” relations when assembled that are 
structured normative ideals and that in order for participants’ awareness of and commitment to 
those normative ideals to persist they need in some way to engage in forms of literal or 
metaphorical or virtual gathering in which those normative ideals are rendered salient and in some 
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sense practiced so as to demonstrate, practice, and strengthen members’ active commitment to 
them.   
 Such gathering is important to “we” relations writ large, and not simply to those that are as 
fundamental and most all-encompassing as the ones with which we will be centrally concerned in 
this chapter.  I think this point is important because it helps to underline the continuities between 
human life more generally and religious life in particular, against the background of which we can 
better understand what is distinctive about religious life.  , quite plausibly, makes essentially this 
claim about friendship in VIII.5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he writes that “for those who 
live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but those [friends] who are 
asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of 
friendship; distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it.  But if 
the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their relationship; hence the saying 
‘Many a friendship has lack of conversation broken.’” (Aristotle 2009, 1157b, 7-13).  The Greek 
term translated “friendship” is philia, which has a capacious sense including all feelings of 
reciprocal regard between persons, and the basic point is one with relatively universal scope.  All 
“we” relationships are grounded in and sustained by some species of collaborative activity 
structured by some shared normative commitments and ideals, and when such relationships are 
not in some way actively put into practice through some kind of collaborative action, they tend to 
atrophy.  This is true of relationships between members of societies as much as it is true of 
friendships and romantic relationships.  The kinds of rituals with which Durkheim is concerned 
involved, in the aboriginal Australian case, literally gathering everyone together to engage in ritual 
action together.  In larger-scale societies with more global religious attitudes, these rituals will 
involve a more virtual and imagined active gathering as opposed to a literal one, though literal 
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gatherings of some sort will, if Durkheim’s account of the dynamics of religious life is correct, 
remain essential.  
 The continuity between the kinds of religious gathering that we will be focusing on and 
more mundane active gatherings between individuals in everyday profane life is one which 
Durkheim flags.  Though we will be speaking soon of some of the distinctive characteristics of 
religious communing, the continuities are also important to keep in mind and it’s worth attending 
to a passage part of which we quoted in the last chapter: 
This stimulating action of society [which is found in religious rituals] is not felt in 
exceptional circumstances alone.  There is virtually no instant of our lives in which a 
certain rush of energy fails to come to us from outside ourselves.  In all kinds of acts that 
express the understanding, esteem, and affection of his neighbor, there is a lift that the man 
who does his duty feels, usually without being aware of it.  But that lift sustains him; the 
feeling society has for him uplifts the feeling he has for himself.  Because he is in moral 
harmony with his neighbor, he gains new confidence, courage, and boldness in action--
quite like the man of faith who believes he feels the eyes of his god turned benevolently 
toward him...we cannot but help feeling that this moral toning up has an external cause, 
though we do not see where that cause is or what it is.  So, we readily conceive of it in the 
form of a moral power that, while immanent in us, also represents something in us that is 
other than ourselves.  This is man’s moral consciousness and his conscience.  And it is only 
with the aid of religious symbols that most have ever managed to conceive of it with any 
clarity at all.  (ibid., 214). 
  
What Durkheim describes here is a rush of energy that we feel in response to some realization 
and/or affirmation of our normative alignment with other members of our social worlds.  The kind 
of alignment that he describes is born out of the moral harmony with others that we experience 
when we experience the “understanding, esteem, and affection” of our neighbors on account of 
our morally dutiful action.  Such experiences accomplish several things simultaneously.  They 
affirm our good standing in the relevant collectivity that affirms the normative ideals in question, 
they affirm the authority and power of the collectivity itself, which depends on the fidelity that its 
members show to it, and it gives us strength and courage and energy to act in the light of those 
ideals insofar as their value has been affirmed and confirmed both generally and as they are 
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reflected in our actions and life.  We experience such moments of uplift as having an external 
source on account of both their content and causal source.  The energy and self-affirmation that 
they generate are of ourselves qua members of the relevant “we” and thus in terms of their content 
bear essential reference to others.  They are also made possible only through some sort of 
meaningful contact with literal others who affirm our worth and the normative ties that bind us to 
them.  The claim about religious symbols as an indirect means of speaking about such experiences 
is important and one to which we will be returning in our direct discussion of religiosity below.   
 Not all such experiences will qualify, of course, as religious in character, though there is 
no such interaction, however seemingly mundane, that cannot take on or reveal itself to possess 
religious significance.  What sets the religious gathering apart from other meaningful and morally 
inflected phenomena is that it is centered on and involves a distinctively intense and absorbing 
communion with that which is most sacred--defined and contrasted with the profane precisely in 
terms of its being set apart from the profane realm.  What that setting apart involves needs to be 
clarified before we can proceed to the discussion of religious ritual in the next section.   
 Durkheim claims that what distinguishes religious beliefs is their being fundamentally 
concerned with things that are held to be sacred in the following passage: 
Whether simple or complex, all known religious beliefs display a common 
feature.  They presuppose a classification of the real or ideal things that men conceive of 
into two classes--two opposite genera--that are widely designated by two distinct terms, 
which the words profane and sacred translate fairly well...Sacred things are not simply 
those personal beings that are called gods or spirits.  A rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a 
piece of wood, a house, in a word anything, can be sacred.  A rite can have sacredness; 
indeed, there is no rite that does not have it in some degree...What makes Buddhism a 
religion is that, in the absence of gods, it accepts the existence of sacred things, namely, 
the Four Noble Truths and the practices that are derived from them. (ibid., 34-5). 
 
The terms “sacred” and “profane” derive from the Latin terms sacrum and profanum.  The former 
referred to what belonged to or was controlled by the gods, while the latter referred to what was 
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“in front of the temple precinct.”  The term profanum originally meant “to bring out” the offering 
“before the temple precinct” in which a sacrifice had been performed.  This points to the ways in 
which the transformative contact with the sacred is supposed to spill out into the realm of the 
profane, a topic we will be returning to in the third and final section.  Places referred to as sacer, 
like temples, were set apart by walls or some other sort of more or less explicit boundary (Lindsay, 
7964).  It is this distinction that Durkheim claims is a religious universal.  As he underlines, it is 
this setting apart that is decisive: what is set apart need not be a deity or other supernatural entity, 
as the example of Buddhism makes clear.   
 Before providing a fuller characterization of the meaning that he ascribes to this distinction, 
Durkheim addresses some common or at least tempting ways of understanding this distinction that 
he wants to reject.  On the one hand, he wants to claim that we can’t understand the distinction 
merely in hierarchical terms, with the sacred being the authoritative and the profane that which is 
subject to authority.  On the other hand, he wants to claim that the sacred needn’t be something 
that the pious person feels compelled to relate to in an attitude of awe-full reverence.  In making 
the first point, he claims that the slave’s subordination to her master, or the miser’s subordination 
to her gold, do not involve holding those persons/things sacred--in the strict sense, though he thinks 
metaphorical talk of these relations as involving sacralization is legitimate (ibid., 35).  He also 
flags the fact, against understandings of the sacred as necessarily being aligned with that which is 
most authoritative and ontologically secure, that human beings and gods are in some sense 
mutually dependent, and that without the right kind of human attention gods can die (ibid., 36).   To 
the second, related point, he calls attention to examples in which religious persons relate to objects 
which they take to be sacred in familiar or even violent and coercive ways.  An amulet, he points 
out, can be held to be sacred while simultaneously be related to as something very familiar and in 
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some sense unremarkable.  This deep familiarity and horizontality can be found as well in religious 
communities in which fetishes of the gods are beaten or otherwise punished when the religious 
devotees feel that the god is not behaving in the way in which they ought to behave.  (ibid., 35-6).   
 Having cleared away these misconceptions, Durkheim provides his definition of what 
constitutes the true essence of the sacred/profane distinction in the following passage:  
[If] the criterion of a purely hierarchical distinction is at once too general and too imprecise, 
nothing but the heterogeneity is left to define the relation between the sacred and the 
profane...It is absolute.  In the history of human thought, there is no other example of two 
categories of things as profoundly differentiated or as radically opposed to one 
another.  The traditional opposition between good and evil is nothing beside this one: Good 
and evil are two opposed species of the same genus namely morals, just as health and illness 
are nothing more than two different aspects of the same order of facts, life; by contrast the 
sacred and the profane are always and everywhere conceived by the human intellect as 
separate genera, as two worlds with nothing in common.  The energies at play in one are 
not merely those encountered in another, but raised to a higher degree; they are different 
in kind… 
 This is not to say that a being can never pass from one of these worlds to the other.  But 
when this passage occurs, the manner in which it occurs demonstrates the fundamental 
duality of the two realms, for it implies a true metamorphosis.  Rites of initiation, which 
are practiced by a great many peoples, demonstrate this especially well...At [the moment 
of initiation], the young man is said to die, and the existing particular person he was, to 
cease--instantaneously to be replaced by another.  He is born again in a new form.  (ibid., 
36-7). 
 
In the passage with which this section opened, Durkheim describes the sacred realm as another 
world projected upon what he refers to as the real world—a doubling essentially connected to the 
“man is double” claim that we discussed in the first chapter.  It is a world with a distinctive dignity 
and it is one which has an ontological status of a distinctive sort.  The contrast between the sacred 
and profane is a different kind of contrast than the contrast between, say, what is higher and lower 
in a hierarchical relation or that between good and evil.  The latter such contrasts are made along 
a continuum to which the opposite poles both belong.  The contrast between the sacred and 
profane, on the other hand, is characterized by a deep antagonism and incommensurability. This 
radical difference is in part a function of their different ontological status.  But plenty of things 
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with different ontologies can be incommensurable without being antagonistic.  The antagonism is 
a function of the fact that the sacred world is one that we are called upon, so long as we are 
committed to holding it sacred and relating to it as such, to realize in the “real” world.  Though 
human beings are incapable of ever fully achieving this realization--it is the role of G/god(s) to do 
such a thing--it is a task which the holding sacred relation commits us to attempting to realize to 
the extent that we can.  The sacred realm opens up, in other words, certain forms of possibility that 
wouldn’t be there without it and which have a distinctive compelling power and authority.  In some 
sense the transformation of the real that the sacred calls us to and makes possible begins at home-
-in the kind of rites of passage to which Durkheim alludes towards the end of the passage.  Proper 
initiation into the sacred realm is understood to generate a kind of rebirth.   This rebirth is repeated 
and renewed in less dramatic form in the religious ritual.  To the extent that we have achieved such 
transformation we are in a position to relate to the sacred on more intimate terms, as in the case of 
amulets that Durkheim describes.  That being said, the intimate relation at least to that which is 
most fundamental and decisive in the sacred realm inevitably requires a degree of asceticism and 
heightened, receptive care that sets it apart from more mundane forms of intimacy. 
 The etymological meaning of sacred as “setting apart” points to the ways in which what is 
sacred is essentially distinguished by the attitude that we take towards it.  In asserting that 
something is sacred we assert that at a fundamental level our being as persons, and the character 
of our lives, depends upon the way in which we do or do not relate to it in the appropriately ascetic 
and comprehensively committed way.  It is for this reason that we speak of profaning sacred things 
when we illegitimately lay hands upon them, in an attitude ill-befitting the distinctive dignity 
sacred things are held to possess.  This violation is understood to have destructive effects upon us 
to the extent that our essential being as persons is fundamentally caught up with the relation in 
147 
 
which we stand to it, as in Leviticus: “Then Nadab and Abihu, the sons of Aaron, each took his 
censer and put fire in it, put incense on it, and offered profane fire before the LORD, which He 
had not commanded them.  So, fire went out from the LORD and devoured them, and they died 
before the LORD” (Leviticus 10:1-2 KJV).  It is important for our purposes that we can be 
mistaken about this—we can hold certain things sacred that in fact are not sacred at all, or not as 
sacred as we take them to be.   
Where that is the case, progress towards improved attunement to what is in fact sacred can 
take place by way of profanation of what turn out to be, to use the language of the Abrahamic 
tradition, mere idols.  Iconoclasts in the Byzantine Empire took themselves to be acting in the light 
of the sacred that had been betrayed and occluded from view in their destruction of icons that they 
took to involve a false worship of things as opposed to a God who could not be captured in human-
made images.  Protesters who burn American flags or effigies of political leaders or Jacobins who 
shattered religious statues, are all examples of similar efforts to profane one thing held to be sacred 
for the sake of something else held to be more authentically sacred.  Regardless of the legitimacy 
of any of these deliberate profanation efforts, it’s clear that it involves a different kind of breach 
of fidelity to that which is held to be sacred than is found in excessive immersion in the realm of 
the profane, and that it is informed in all these cases by a general understanding that we can err 
egregiously in our efforts to relate ourselves to that which is genuinely sacred and that ersatz sacred 
things are distinctively pernicious in that they mislead us concerning that which is most essential 
in our lives.  That is simply to say that there is always the possibility the what is held to be sacred 
is in fact not sacred and that there is—for the religious person and for us in the context of this 
dissertation—a built-in awareness that we both can get it wrong and that it is particularly urgent 
task, given how fundamental a role our relation to the genuinely sacred plays in shaping and 
148 
 
determining the character of our lives, to make sure we get it right.  We can therefore err in two 
general ways.  First, we can err by getting to fully absorbed in the profane and losing sight of the 
sacred, which is why we must re-engage in sacred-attuning religious practices regularly.  Second, 
we can err in our way of attempting to attune ourselves to the sacred, which is why we must always 
maintain a basic openness to new forms and experiences of revelation and remain mindful of the 
ways in which the sacred cannot be fully, finally captured in any particular religious understanding 
of the world.   
We can succeed, through profanation, in illustrating the falsity of an understanding of the 
content and site of the sacred in the name of something more genuinely sacred, or we can try to 
violate something that is in fact sacred either in the name of the sovereignty of the profane or in 
the name of a false, idolatrous alternative conception of the sacred.  The righteous indignation with 
which the likes of Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr. called out the ersatz Christianity 
of white supporters of slavery and segregationists, respectively, and of those Christians only 
tepidly committed to the dignity and rights of Black Americans are instances of the former.  Ayn 
Rand and Adolf Hitler would be instances, respectively, of the latter.  The reconstructed, 
naturalism-friendly, socialized version of Kierkegaard’s account of despair as the sickness unto 
death developed in the last chapter was aimed at capturing the intuition that such efforts involve a 
kind of violence to our relational lives that does violence to our own persons in a manner that 
renders our projects essentially futile and despair-inducing.  Something like this kind of despair-
inducing challenge to sacrality through profanation was at work in the degradation of human 
dignity systematically enacted in the examples of existential violence that we discussed in the last 
chapter.  Finally, it’s worth saying something about the significance of the fact that most 
understandings of the sacred that have been operative in human history have deteriorated and been 
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replaced by others.  What’s important to note is that as we can speak of different paradigmatic 
understandings of the sacred—e.g. that of a Buddhist, a Sikh, and a Mormon—as potentially 
bearing upon and disclosing similar sacred realities, albeit in very different ways, so too the death 
of a certain mode of religious understanding and practice doesn’t entail that some of the sacred 
substance at its heart has not been reincarnated/resurrected in different form in subsequent modes 
of religiosity.   The extent to which this is the case will, of course, vary and at times be a very 
vexed and difficult interpretive matter.  Often belief in robust continuity—e.g. between the religion 
of the Israelites and Christian or Muslim or contemporary Jewish religiosity—will be a matter of 
a robust faith stance that, while capable of invoking certain forms of evidence in its favor, 
inevitably leaps beyond what the evidence itself, such as it is, suggests.  Such faith is I think 
legitimate where no serious interpretive violence is involved and where it is taken up out of an 
aspiration to stand in meaningful, life-giving relation to one’s remoter ancestors, in the hope that 
one’s life can be understood as better realizing that to which they were, perhaps in very inadequate 
confused and inconsistent ways, responding to in their religious lives.  Such faith will be connected 
to the faith that one’s contemporaries and those who will be born in subsequent generations are 
also capable of attunement to that which one holds to be sacred.  If one is in fact comparatively 
well-attuned to the genuinely sacred, this is a good faith stance to have if our qualified realism 
about the sacred is appropriate.  Relating to others as always already attuned to what is of ultimate, 
overriding significance is a means of better, more courageously inviting them to share in such 
attunement that will often be crucial to transform our relations to one another in the ways in which 
the sacred calls us to transform them.   
 The attitude proper to the sacred is an ascetic one.  The forms of asceticism characteristic 
of religious life are comparable to those which are required by our social lives across the board.  As 
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Durkheim puts it: “There is an inherent asceticism in all social life that is destined to outlive all 
mythologies and all dogmas; it is an integral part of all human culture.  And, fundamentally, that 
asceticism is the rationale and justification of the asceticism that religions have taught since the 
beginning of time.” (ibid. 321).  This asceticism is one which we have to exercise towards the 
ideals constitutive of our societies, and which the dutiful person energized and empowered by the 
regard of her neighbors in the above-cited passages is well-regarded for having managed to pull 
off.  The asceticism involves disciplining our often unruly, self-regarding, and in social life 
destructive and/or disrespectful animal inclinations in the light of the higher, meaningful 
commitments we have undertaken as members of the social groups that give us our essential 
personal identities.  It involves both strict duties that are imposed on us from without, in broadly 
Kantian fashion, and a positive desire to live in the ascetic manner demanded, in more Aristotelian 
fashion.  Crudely, it is qua norm-responsive person that we have this positive desire to live in 
ascetic accordance with the demands, persons, and entities in question, and it is qua animal that 
we experience ourselves as subject to externally imposed, quasi-Kantian duties that we must 
submit to despite our often not wanting to.  It is in the context of this asceticism of social life that 
Durkheim understands that which we find in religious life.   
 Durkheim describes the asceticism characteristic of religious life in the following passages: 
Sacrifices and offerings do not go unaccompanied by privations that exact a price from the 
worshipper.  Even if the rights do not require tangible things of him, they take his time and 
strength.  To serve his gods, he must forget himself.  To create for them a place in his life 
to which they are entitled, he must sacrifice some of his profane interests.  The positive 
cult is possible, then, only if man is trained to renunciation, abnegation, and detachment 
from self--hence to suffering.  He must not dread suffering, for he can carry out his duties 
joyfully only if he in some measure loves it… The sufferings [such practices] impose are 
not arbitrary and sterile cruelties, then, but a necessary school in which man shapes and 
steels himself, and in which he gains the qualities of disinterestedness and endurance 
without which there is no religion.  In fact, if this result is to be achieved, it helps if the 
ascetic ideal is eminently incarnated in certain individuals who are specialized, as it were, 
in that aspect of ritual life, almost to excess.  Those certain individuals amount to so many 
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living models that encourage striving.  Such is the historical role of the great 
ascetics.  (ibid., 320). 
 
Everything that is sacred is the object of respect, and every feeling of respect is translated 
into stirrings of inhibition in the person who has that feeling.  Because of the emotion it 
inspires, a respected being is always expressed in consciousness by a representation that is 
highly charged with mental energy.  Hence, it is armed in such a way as to throw any 
representation that wholly or partly contradicts it far away from itself.  Antagonism 
characterizes the relationship the sacred world has with the profane one.  The two 
correspond to two forms of life that are mutually exclusive, or at least that cannot be lived 
at the same time with the same intensity… (ibid., 321). 
 
The respect that we feel towards the sacred motivates us to engage in ascetic practices that involve 
suffering and self-denial but which we actively pursue out of an active desire to place ourselves in 
more intimate and transformative relation to the sacred.   Our respect for ourselves is in large part 
a function of the quality and character of the relation in which we stand to the sacred that we 
respect most highly of all.  The sacred is necessarily in conflict with the profane, where that is 
understood in terms of meanings, values, and so forth that show up in partial autonomy and 
abstraction from our most fundamental existential commitments. The attitude of disciplined 
responsiveness to the sacred, being made possible by and bearing essential reference to our radical 
sociality, is in some sense catching, which is why those who are exemplary in their ascetic devotion 
to the sacred are models for others who can directly and indirectly, through their comportment 
more than any particular declarations they make, serve as sources of inspiration and courage.  As 
spending time with our friends reanimates and strengthens our commitments to the values and 
commitments that give basic structure to our relationship, so too does spending time with persons 
whose commitment to the sacred is exceptional and radiantly on display help to reanimate our 
responsiveness to it.  
 Having said something to clarify the character of the relationship between the sacred and 
profane and the attitudes that are essential to holding something sacred, it’s important to say 
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something more about the substance of the contrast.  What sort of things are candidates for being 
sacred and how do they achieve that status?  And what sort of things tend to fall on the profane 
side and why?  And, relatedly, why can’t we reduce or align the sacred/profane contrast with that 
between good and evil?  After all, Durkheim claims that religious practices center on holding 
things sacred and that they serve to found a moral community:  
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite into one single 
moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them.  The second element thus 
holds a place in my definition that is no less essential than the first: In showing that the 
idea of religion is inseparable from the idea of a Church, it conveys the notion that religion 
must be an eminently collective thing.  (ibid, 44).  
 
The sacred serves, in effect, as the somewhat opaque and mysterious ground upon which the moral 
community constituted by a religion is founded.  Part of the asceticism surrounding the sacred 
involves treating it as something unquestionable and utterly foundational.  It is the ground of 
intelligible evaluative distinctions, and as such it cannot be itself subject to evaluative interrogation 
as if from without.  It is an unquestioned something the regard for and devotion to which enables 
the deep, mutually affirmative collaboration of the members of the moral community in question.   
To unpack this notion, it is helpful to return to the example of the sacredness of the 
individual that Durkheim discusses in relation to the contemporary world.  In his essay 
“Individualism and the intellectuals” (1898), Durkheim tries to defend a certain form or moral 
individualism against the attacks of religious conservatives who argued that it was a form of 
anomic, asocial hedonism.  Though he acknowledges that such a species of corrosive and amoral 
individualism exists, he argues that there is another strand of individualism that is deeply moral 
and religious in character that he thinks demands our respect and affirmation.  He construes this 
form of individualism in the following terms: 
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[A]ccording to these [non-egoistic, non-utilitarian] moralists, duty consists in averting our 
attention from what concerns us personally, from all that relates to empirical individuality, 
so as uniquely to seek that which our human condition demands, that which we hold in 
common with all our fellow men.  This ideal goes so far beyond the limit of utilitarian ends 
that it appears to those who aspire to it as marked with a religious character.  The human 
person, whose definition serves as the touchstone according to which good must be 
distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred, in what might be called the ritual sense of 
the word.  It has something of that transcendent majesty which the churches of all times 
have given to their Gods.  It is conceived as being invested with that mysterious property 
which creates an empty space around holy objects, which keeps them away from profane 
contacts and which draws them away from ordinary life.  And it is exactly this feature 
which induces the respect of which it is the object.  Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s 
life, on a man’s honour inspires us with a feeling of horror, in every way analogous to that 
which the believer experiences when he sees his idol profaned.  Such a morality is therefore 
not simply a hygienic discipline or a wise principle of economy.  It is a religion of which 
man is, at the same time, both believer and God.  (Durkheim 1994, 61-2). 
 
By and large, the default affirmation of the equal dignity of all human beings is held to be 
obligatory.  This is not to say that we often fail to properly respect persons’ dignity, as we saw in 
the last chapter.  That we do fail to do so is obvious and reflects the fact that there remains a 
manifest tension between our society’s ideal commitments and the reality of the ways we actually 
act towards one another.  That being said, in a certain range of encounters with a certain range of 
people, profaning that dignity by actively disregarding it or explicitly calling it into question will 
tend to generate passionate and emphatic condemnation.  That intense and emphatic condemnation 
will not as a rule be accompanied by arguments as to why the profaner ought not to do what they’re 
doing--it will be treated simply as a taboo and utterly unacceptable action that threatens to radically 
undermine the standing of the bad actor in the community.  To infringe upon these assumptions is 
to violate a taboo.  And unless one is part of a community committed to such profanation, or is 
able to invoke some category that justifies placing the victim in some sort of subordinate outsider 
role that renders them properly subject to such degrading treatment, one will be very strongly 
inclined to make right and re-establish oneself in a right relation to the sacred human dignity that 
one has illegitimately laid hands upon. 
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 Much more could be said on this topic--and we will be returning to it in our discussion of 
contemporary disenchantment and religiosity in the next chapter--but what is most important for 
our purposes here is that the dignity of persons has this sacred status and that when it is violated, 
our default response is not to provide reasons why it ought not to be.  Frederick Douglass 
demonstrates his awareness of this fact when he refuses to argue for his equal dignity as a man in 
“What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?”  To do so would be to treat as an open question what 
must instead be treated as an unquestioned, sacred fact--one of which white Americans, he claims, 
are deeply aware even if they refuse to acknowledge it.  This unquestionableness of the sacred 
points to a few important features of it.  First of all, awareness of its dignity is tied to a certain kind 
of deep, powerful, and undeniable affective attunement to a feature of one’s reality.  Notions of 
what is sacred are rooted at this deep level--one deeper than rational argument can effectively 
penetrate--and can only be modified or uprooted by experiences which have a similarly deep 
experiential grounding.  These intuitions carry with them a kind of confidence that cannot be 
communicated by a chain of reasoning insofar as they are the intuited premises upon which all 
arguments about particular moral and religious matters are founded.   
 This feature of the sacred is an important one to highlight, insofar as it can help us to see 
why it is religious—as opposed to scientific or philosophical, for instance—practices that are 
essential to attuning us to what is existentially most important in our lives.  Being rightly in tune 
with that which our social worlds hold sacred is a matter of feeling, perceiving, and being inclined 
to act in the right sort of way.  A mere readjustment of our beliefs can never get us in true relation 
to the sacred, which is why accounts of religiosity that center simply on beliefs, particularly when 
they are understood on analogy with scientific and/or philosophical beliefs, are for Durkheim 
necessarily inadequate.  Rather, what is at the heart of religious life is ritual practices that help us 
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to feel, act, imagine, and perceive in such a way that we can respond appropriately to sacred 
things.   
It is also why we must understand Durkheim’s account of the task of living well along 
broadly Aristotelian lines.  Aristotle famously claims in the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue cannot 
be taught--that one must be habituated in the right sort of way in order to be halfway competent at 
responding in the right way to the decisive evaluative features of the situations in which one finds 
oneself.  No argument will allow one to see and appropriately respond to the things that are most 
decisive in our lives.  Where Durkheim and Aristotle seem to part ways here is in regard to the 
question of realism--for Aristotle there is a natural, universal fact of the mater as to what it is to 
respond appropriately to the situation(s) in which one finds oneself, whereas for Durkheim it seems 
that this question is in part culturally relative.  Before moving on to Durkheim’s discussion of the 
central existential, institutional, and psychological dynamics of religious life, it is important to 
address this question. 
When it comes to things held sacred, the range of available positions extends from a 
Aristotle- or Aquinas-style realism and a globally irrealist, debunking attitude like that which we 
find in Karl Marx.  I will be arguing that Durkheim’s position is somewhere in between.  The 
following claim in the “Introduction” to Elementary Forms can help us to unpack Durkheim’s 
views on this question:  
[W]hen I approach the study of primitive religions, it is with the certainty that they are 
grounded in and express the real. …  
 Fundamentally, then, there are no religions that are false.  All are true after their own 
fashion: All fulfill given conditions of human existence, though in different ways.  Granted, 
it is not impossible to rank them hierarchically.  Some can be said to be superior to others, 
in the sense that they bring higher mental faculties into play, that they are richer in ideas 
and feelings, that they contain proportionately more concepts than sensations and images, 
and that they are more elaborately systematized.  But the greater complexity and higher 
ideal content, however real, are not sufficient to place the corresponding religions into 
separate genera.  All are equally religious, just as all living beings are equally living beings, 
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from the humblest plastid to man…. They fulfill the same needs, play the same role, and 
proceed from the same causes… (ibid., 2-3)   
 
The best way to unpack Durkheim’s claim here is to distinguish two senses in which we can say 
that religions are true in their sense of what is sacred and modes of attunement to the sacred.   The 
sense in which no religions are false and all are grounded in and express the real is the 
following.  Each religion grows out of genuine religious impulses and insofar as it persists is true 
to and gives expression to them.  And in terms of the particular shape that expression takes, viable 
religions must be responsive to certain truths about the social worlds in which they emerge and 
take shape.  This is the first sense in which we can see all religious phenomena as in some broad 
sense truth-responsive.  
 The second sense is murkier and not clearly articulated by Durkheim, but we see glimmers 
of it when he speaks of the variation in religions’ ability to bring different human capacities into 
play, and the degree to which they achieve some “higher ideal.”  It is in this respect that he says 
they are susceptible to some, perhaps several, sorts of ranking.  While in the first sense Durkheim’s 
position is more a culturally relativist one, it is at this point that we see the more realist dimension 
of his thought and the respects in which his position comes closer to an Aristotelian 
one.  Throughout Durkheim’s work there is a sense that for each social organism, there is a normal 
state that is normative for it.  In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim characterizes our 
society as one that is in an abnormal state due to the fact that we’re in the midst of a transition 
from one mode of social organization to another.  But he believes that through a quasi-organic 
learning process, a state of normalcy will emerge as the persons composing the emerging social 
order adapt to their transformed predicament and form new norms and practices that allow them 
to achieve a more stable social order that better allows for human flourishing in our altered social 
predicament.  There is, in other words, a truth about how we ought to relate to one another that 
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will, other things being equal, progressively emerge and give new shape to our sense of ourselves 
and our relationships to one another.  Recalling the view developed in the first chapter, one could 
think of the moderate realist position as in general involving the claim that there is a kind of general 
second-personal “natural” morality that provides basic constraints one what a legitimate collective 
intentional normative order looks like, while leaving open the possibility that there are a quite 
diverse range of such orders that are legitimate and acknowledging that what makes them 
legitimate will depend on a lot of concrete, situational, historical factors.  Some normative orders 
will be straightforwardly bad in certain respects and, the claim goes, will tend progressively either 
to improve through some kind of learning process or break down.   
 But it seems that Durkheim might also have a more robustly realist view that would involve 
some more radical commitment to a kind of metaphysical grounding of the basic normativity that 
underlies human life in nature itself, more broadly construed.  This realist dimension of his earlier 
thought is also on display at various points in Elementary Forms.  In the following passage, 
following a discussion of the social formation of the basic categories of human thought, we see 
him gesture towards such a view:  
[Society] is part of nature and nature’s highest expression.  The social realm is a natural 
realm that differs from others only in its greater complexity.  It is impossible that nature, 
in that which is most fundamental in itself, should be radically different between one part 
and another of itself.  It is impossible that the fundamental relations that exist between 
things--precisely those relations that the categories [of thought--religious and otherwise] 
serve to express--should be fundamentally dissimilar in one realm and another. … Society 
makes them more manifest but has no monopoly on them.  This is why notions worked out 
on the model of social things can help us think about other sorts of things.  At the very 
least, if, when they deviate from their initial meaning, those notions play in a sense the role 
of symbols, it is the role of well-founded symbols.  If artifice enters in, through the very 
fact that these are constructed concepts, it is an artifice that closely follows nature and 
strives to come ever closer to nature… [When it comes to the basic, socially-constituted 
categories of thought] their social origin leads on indeed to suppose that they are not 




Here there is a higher--or deeper--sense of truth-responsiveness at work, and a strong claim 
concerning the integrity and truth-responsiveness of human thought, as well as its tendency to 
evolve in a matter that is responsive to the imperatives of nature.  Given the radically normative 
character of human thought and action, as well as the clearly normative dimension of the claims 
about normalcy that I flagged in Division of Labor, it indicates a robust commitment to normative 
realism.  For this reason, tendencies like the rise of “international gods” in response to greater 
interpenetration of and collaboration between formerly isolated societies that he discusses later in 
Elementary Forms (ibid., 428), can be understood as learning processes that give rise to more 
adequate understandings of human beings’ position with respect to one another and the natural 
world at large.  In good Aristotelian fashion, this process will not be purely cognitive but rather 
involve shifting feelings and intuitions that disclose hitherto overlooked features of normative 
reality--features like the equal dignity of all human beings that he describes in the passage from 
“Individualism and the intellectuals” cited above.   
 It is important to note something else about the sacred, which is perhaps best understood 
from something like the first-personal perspective.  The sacred is experienced as something that is 
in crucial respects other and stands over and apart from our individual selves.  It is experienced 
not only as other but also as more powerful, valuable, and real than us.  For these reasons we feel 
ourselves called upon, so long as we experience the entity/values/etc. as sacred, to relate to them 
in an essentially ascetic manner.  But, while the ascetic and in some forms terrifying and awe-
inspiring character of the sacred is essential, it is also important to say something about the positive 
existential draw that the sacred has upon us.  It is an assumption of religious practices that we can 
be in more or less true and porous relations to the sacred, and it is an essential aim of such practices 
to help establish and maintain such a relationship.  Such a relationship is experienced not only as 
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one which we are called upon to establish, but also as one that we, when we’re rightly oriented 
and thinking and feeling correctly, actively yearn to establish.  The reason for that is that to the 
extent we can get in the right relation to the sacred, we are able to participate in its distinctively 
powerful, authoritative, valuable, and essential being.  To the extent that we relate to the sacred 
improperly, we cut ourselves off from that deep source of being and thereby do violence to 
ourselves, perhaps of a quite terrible sort.  I think this is part of the significance of the story 
of Nadab and Abihu - in violating the sacred they violate themselves to deadly effect. But to the 
extent that we establish and maintain the right relation to the sacred, we experience a fundamental 
transformation and enhancement of our being, power, and worth.   
 These positive aspects of our relationship to the sacred are an essential supplement to the 
account of the modes of transcendence constitutive of human existence and the account of 
existential vitality that we developed in the preceding chapters.  The claim that I would like to 
make is that that though we can maintain our personhood and achieve a certain degree of relatively 
robust existential vitality without actively, ascetically cultivating a relationship to the sacred--not 
going beyond the basic default attunement to it that our society affirms and which we can 
(pragmatically) respect without any deep investment—it is essential to achieving the most robust 
and essential (in the telos-realization sense) forms of self-transcendence and existential vitality.  If 
we define ourselves purely in relation to what we take to be non-sacred values (like comfort, 
physical health, amoral sources of power, etc.) that are commensurable and violable, our personal 
being, defined in relation to the realization of those values, is inevitably experienced as having that 
kind of relativized and violable status.  If this is the case, and looking ahead to our discussion of 
the status of religion and the sacred in the contemporary world, and if that mode of understanding 
ourselves and our place in the cosmos becomes (partially) hegemonic, we are liable to have an 
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existential, moral and political crisis on our hands.  Heidegger’s account of the technological 
understanding of the being and the way in which it reduces everything, human beings included, to 
mere resources involves a diagnosis of precisely this kind of problem—one which we will be 
discussing in the final chapter.  On the other hand, if we understand ourselves to be in defining 
relation to something sacred, which involves being in some sense a participant in the inviolable, 
this involves a heightening of our own sense of the reality and inviolability of our own being as 
persons.   
 From this more first-personal perspective we can also better understand the full 
significance of the mysterious, irreducible, inviolable, and not entirely articulable character of the 
sacred.  The sacred is understood to be at or near the ground of evaluative being.  As the mysterious 
and intuitable but not fully intelligible ground of our other evaluative commitments, and as we 
said above, its inviolability extends in some sense to the discursive domain.  One can’t treat sacred 
things as open matters of debate in the way one can other matters, or if one does, one at least feels 
a great deal of pressure to proceed cautiously and an imperative to engage in the discussion in a 
manner that shows the appropriate kind of respect for the sacred things in question.  This is most 
true with those things that are unambiguously and universally held to be sacred, but it is also true 
to a lesser extent of those things that subsections of society hold sacred.  Insofar as the sacred gives 
substance to people’s lives and serves as a bedrock that bolsters the sense and being of themselves 
as persons, proper attunement will be one of their most urgent existential tasks. 
3.2 On Collective Effervescence, Ritual, and Religious Truth 
In fact, if religious ceremonies have any importance at all, it is that they set collectivity in 
motion… 
 ...Hence it is society that is foremost in every consciousness and that dominates and 
directs conduct [in the religious ritual], which amounts to saying that at such times it is 




- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life  
 
 It should be clear at this point that it cannot be the case that what is most essential to 
religious life is simply the holding of beliefs about what is and isn’t sacred and what a life faithful 
to the sacred involves.  Durkheim thinks this claim is wrong-headed, however, and the central aim 
of this section is to unpack Durkheim’s claims to the effect that the central phenomena of religious 
life are forms of ritualized religious action, which give rise to and provide experiential evidence 
for the beliefs concerning the sacred and related matters upon which religions center.  As we will 
see, there is a direct tie between this claim about the ways in which certain kinds of practices give 
rise to religious belief and the claim that Durkheim makes throughout that religion is most 
essentially concerned with cultivating modes of action that are true/responsive to the sacred as 
opposed to cultivating a more or less coherent and accurate set of beliefs about what exactly it is.   
 We saw above that Durkheim defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices 
relative to sacred things…” and though we’ve hopefully unpacked the notion of “sacred things” 
the character of the religious beliefs and practices relative to them is our concern here.  It is worth 
noting, before we speak about this particular(ly central and essential) form of social practice, that 
Durkheim understands all forms of distinctively human thought and feeling to be the product of 
collaborative action, communication, and interaction.  The basic categories in terms of which we 
make sense of our world are not, he claims, a direct function of our biological nature, and the same 
goes for the feelings that make possible our lives together.  Neither are they essentially the product 
of great creative individuals imposing some sort of form on reality.  Rather, they progressively and 
in a fundamentally decentered manner emerge from out of collective life--which is not to say that 
this process cannot be shaped and distorted by problematic forms of inequality and coercion--in 
such a way that the only author to which they can be attributed is that of the collective, as it reacts 
162 
 
to the nature of its members and the natural as well as social situation in which they find 
themselves.  Given this general claim, it is unsurprising that Durkheim sees religions as emerging 
out of distinctive forms of social gathering and practice and action. 
 Religion, therefore, centers for Durkheim on certain forms of religious ritual that give rise 
to a distinctive phenomenon he labels “collective effervescence” which in turn gives rise in those 
who experience it to the feeling of being “swept up into a world entirely different form the one 
which they have before their eyes” (ibid., 228).  This distinctive feeling, which in its most intense 
and fundamentally disclosive form involves an experience of communion with and around the 
sacred, is a function of that fact that the importance of religious rituals centers on the way in which 
they “set collectivity in motion” (ibid., 352).  Whereas in much of their lives the members of the 
(religious) community in question are somewhat isolated from and perhaps in competition with 
one another, in the religious ritual they gather together as a group in order to celebrate, through 
certain distinctive forms of ritualized collective action, that which they take to constitute the most 
essential bond connecting them to one another.  As a result, they are distinctively attentive and 
actively responsive to those sacred things and the social bonds to which they undergird and to 
which they give rise.  Durkheim describes this basic dynamic of alternation between profane 
dispersal and relative self-absorption and elevating, sacred communion in aboriginal Australian 
societies in the following, insightful though characteristically and problematically reductive, 
passage:  
 In fact, if religious ceremonies have any importance at all, it is that they set collectivity 
in motion; groups come together to celebrate them.  Thus, their first result is to bring 
individuals together, multiply the contacts between them, and make those contacts more 
intimate.  This in itself modifies the content of consciousness.  On ordinary days, the mind 
is chiefly occupied with utilitarian and individualistic affairs…. We remain in relationship 
with our fellow men; the habits, ideas, and tendencies that upbringing has stamped on us, 
and that ordinarily preside over our relations with others, continue to make their influence 
felt.  But they are constantly frustrated and held in check by the opposing tendencies that 
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the requirements of day-in, day-out struggle produce and perpetuate.  Depending on the 
intrinsic energy of those social feelings, they hold up more or less successfully; but the 
energy is not renewed…  
…On feast days, however, these concerns are overshadowed obligatorily; since they are in 
essence profane, they are shut out of sacred periods.  What then occupies the mind are the 
beliefs held in common: the memories of great ancestors, the collective ideal the ancestors 
embody--in short, social things.  Even the material interests that the great religious 
ceremonies aim to satisfy are public and hence social… Hence it is society that is foremost 
in every consciousness and that dominates and directs conduct, which amounts to saying 
that at such times it is even more alive, more active, and thus more real than at profane 
times… The renewal is in no way imaginary, and the individuals themselves benefit from 
it, for the particular social being that each individual bears within himself necessarily 
participates in this collective remaking.  The individual soul itself is also regenerated, but 
immersing itself once more in the very wellspring of its life. (ibid., 352-3).  
 
This passage captures the basic dynamic of religious life against the background of which we can 
understand more specific religious phenomena.  
 At the heart of this account is the view developed and defended in the previous two 
chapters, that human persons are constituted in and by self-transcendent relations with others with 
whom they share a social world and that the vitality of those persons depends upon the mutually 
supportive, porous, and extensive character of their relations to others.  The basic claim is that the 
profane world is constituted by diminished enactment of and responsiveness to constitutive self-
transcendent relations that tends to grind down our deep relationality and sense of active 
responsiveness to the sacred, other things being equal.  Religious rituals are practices whereby the 
community is able to literally gather together in such a way that they are able to gather together 
the relational strands that tie them to one another and to the sacred things in relation to which they 
aspire to stand united.  This process involves a partial suspension of the identities and projects that 
have the potential to isolate them and divide them against one another as they celebrate and 
experience and reinvigorate those fundamental ties in virtue of which they are all one in some 
active community oriented towards goods that are goods for all.  In the ritual, provided they are 
able and desire to participate wholeheartedly, they come to embody, in their actions and thoughts 
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and emotions, the attitudes and relations constitutive of true, faithful membership in the relevant, 
fundamental “we.”  And given the ontology of persons we’ve been trying to unpack, they feel their 
being elevate; they feel they become more real; and they are able to experience unique forms of 
satisfaction and attunement that make them feel more existentially integrated and ontologically 
secure and leave with the desire, which tends to fade and come into conflict with other profane 
desires, to remain truthful to that identity. 
 It is also important to flag and address the almost automatic way in which this process takes 
place as Durkheim describes it.  He speaks of gathering per se as involving an increase in the 
contacts between individual persons as well as the intimacy of those contacts, and it seems as 
though he thinks that it falls out of that increased interconnection as a matter of course that they 
feel this existential heightening.  There are three aspects of this claim that are worth dwelling 
on.  The first is that Durkheim sees the persons’ experience as being directly truth-responsive and 
grounded in the real: these transformative experiences are not a function of believing some perhaps 
illusory thing about the character and meaning of the gathering but rather a mode of direct 
responsiveness to the persons surrounding them.  This realism is something that we’ll want to 
affirm.  That being said, it seems that Durkheim might be taking this claim too far: is every 
gathering that induces some sort of collective effervescence a religious gathering?  Is a mob or a 
crowd at a football game having a religious experience on a par with a group of people assembled 
at a temple or a group of aboriginal Australians assembled to celebrate the kind of rite he’s 
describing in the above passage?  I think the answer to this question has to be “no,” or “it 
depends”—for reasons grounded in our discussion of sacred things as those that are set apart due 
to their distinctively fundamental ontological and normative status.  That is to say that we need to 
assess particular gatherings on a case-by-case basis, with an eye to understanding the attitude with 
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which the persons in question gather and the existential fruit that the gathering yields.  That being 
said, where the gathering falls short of being a full-fledged religious gathering, it will likely 
nevertheless provide some version of the satisfactions of the reorienting and at least temporarily 
transformative experience we find in fuller form in religious rituals.  We will return to this murky 
in-between in the next chapter after we have fully developed Durkheim’s account of the explicitly 
religious ones. 
 Durkheim nowhere provides an explicit, precise definition of what he means by rites and 
rituals, leaning on our common sense understanding of what that term denotes, and I think it’s 
helpful to bring in Roy Rappaport’s definition of ritual, which helps to clarify certain of its 
features: “I take the term ‘ritual’ to denote the performance of more or less invariant sequences of 
formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers.” (Rappaport, 24).  There are 
two aspects of this definition worth underlining: that the mode of comportment instituted in the 
ritual is one which in some sense precedes and is authoritative over those who participate in it and 
that it is distinctively formalized.  The latter is important because it enables the participants in the 
ritual to act in an unambiguously coordinated manner that flags their common belonging and 
membership in the relevant “we.”  The former is important because it points to the ways in which 
the modes of comportment and the realities to which they aspire appropriately to respond are 
grounded in something logically and temporally prior to the orientations of the particular 
participants.  It also helps to shed some light on the issue we just raised about the distinction 
between rituals religious and non-religious: contra Durkheim’s seeming suggestion in the passage 
above, not any gathering of persons will count as religious on this definition.  Finally, it raises the 
important question about the origins of rituals and the myths that interpret and help give substance 
to them.  Rappaport helpfully flags the way in which they must be understood to be generated in 
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relation to a “we” that precedes any of the particular participants, which foregrounds the question 
of religious transformation and the generation of new forms of religiosity.   
 The question is how the “we” authors forms of action and responsiveness that precede and 
give shape to the lives of individuals living those “we” relations.  Durkheim develops this point, 
and makes a claim about the deep content and orientation of religious beliefs and practices when 
he calls attention to the deep affinity between the roles that our social worlds play in our lives and 
the role that gods are understood to play in them.  It is a passage that we discussed very briefly in 
the last chapter and which points to the ways in which the divine and social authorship of religious 
rituals are inextricably intertwined, though we will need to say something more precise about how 
we can make sense of this claim in relation to the fact that societies are never static monoliths but 
always house a great deal of plurality, internal tension, and potential for transformation:  
Society in general, simply by its effects on men’s minds, undoubtedly has all that is 
required to arouse the sensation of the divine.  A society is to its members what a god is to 
its faithful.  A god is first of all a being that man conceives of as superior to himself in 
some respects and one on whom he believes he depends.  Whether that being is a conscious 
personality, like Zeus or Yahweh, or a play of abstract forces as in totemism, the faithful 
believe they are bound to certain ways of acting, that the nature of the sacred principle they 
are dealing with has imposed upon them.  Society also fosters in us this sense of perpetual 
dependence… (ibid., 208-9). 
 
These claims all chime with those we made in the previous chapters about the social constitution 
of person, and they all point to ways in which divine inspiration needs to be understood in relation 
to social inspiration.  The question is: how does society author rituals and beliefs, granted that it 
must do so through the mediation of particular individuals?  What does this process involve and 
how can we understand it?   
 Relatedly, there is another question that we need to address.  Durkheim speaks recurrently, 
as we’ve already discussed, of the respects in which religions need to be understood as truth-
disclosive and -responsive.  This point is related to the authorship of religious practices and beliefs 
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insofar as the latter are on this picture understood as truth-responsive as well as -constitutive.  So, 
the related questions with which this basic account presents us are: where do religions come from 
and in what sense can they be true?  To help us answer these questions I would like now to turn to 
Heidegger’s accounting of the working of the Greek temple, the truth it illuminates, and the way 
in which it provides that illumination, in his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.”   
*     *     *  
 
 The questions of origin and truth that we’ve flagged are absolutely central to Heidegger’s 
concerns in “Origin.”  He is concerned, of course, with the origin of works of art as well as with 
the ways in which those works work--which centers, he argues, on a distinctive, unconcealing 
“happening of truth.”  What is involved here is a version of the very old and widespread account 
of artistic creation as enabled by a certain kind of ecstatic inspiration, as well as a distinctive 
understanding of truth as unconcealment that is also very old, a variation on which can perhaps in 
some form be found in Aristotle. This shared Aristotelian point of reference is, I think, a source of 
the fascinating and productive affinities between Heidegger’s and Durkheim’s accounts of human 
life generally and religious life in particular.  Heidegger is concerned with artworks and thus his 
essay might seem not to be of direct interest for our investigation of religious phenomena, but it 
seems to be of no small significance, particularly given his increasing emphasis on human beings’ 
constitutive relation to the gods over the course of his career, that the paradigmatic example he 
provides of a work of art that works is that of the Greek temple in pagan antiquity.  Given what 
we’ve argued so far about the centrality of religious practices and beliefs to lighting up the deep 
truths about our existence and social worlds, his claim on his part shouldn’t surprise us.  And, as I 
hope to show, the affinities between the accounts go much deeper than this implicit general claim 
about the power of religious artworks.  I will start by quickly flagging some of the commonalities 
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between Heidegger’s account of the Greek temple and Durkheim’s account of religious practices, 
before turning to those aspects of Heidegger’s account that can help us to enrich and open up 
Durkheim’s general picture. 
 Heidegger is concerned with art and the ways in which an authentic relationship to art can 
be disclosive of truth in ways we will be discussing shortly.   The central problem with our 
contemporary relationship to art is that, under the influence of (post-)Kantian aesthetics and the 
prevailing understanding of being to which it gives expression, we tend to think of works of art in 
privatized, individualized terms as a matter of relating to works that give us a distinctive kind of 
subjective “aesthetic” pleasure.  As he puts it in the “Afterward,” “perhaps experience [in a loaded, 
subjectivized sense] is the element in which art dies” (Heidegger 2002, 50).  The Greek temple is 
of interest to Heidegger in part because the Greeks would have had a radically different attitude 
towards it, which he describes in terms of its being related to as sacred and set apart to house the 
gods who dwell within it: 
When a work is brought into a collection or placed in an exhibition, we also say that it 
is “set up,” but this setting up is essentially different from the construction of a building, 
the raising of a statue, the presentation of a tragedy in the holy festival.  The setting up we 
refer to is an erecting in the sense of dedication and praise.  Here “setting up” no longer 
means merely putting in place.  To dedicate means to consecrate [heiligen], in the sense 
that, in the workly construction, the Holy [heilige] is opened up as the holy and the god is 
called forth into the openness of its presence.  Praise belongs to dedication as doing honor 
to the dignity and splendor of the god…it is in the dignity, the splendor, that the god comes 
to presence.  In the reflected glory of this splendor their glows, i.e., illuminates itself, what 
we called “world.”  To erect [Er-richten] means: to open up the right in the sense of the 
measure, which guides us along, in which form that which is essential gives its guidance…  
To be a work means: to set up a world… (ibid., 22). 
 
The affinities with Durkheim should be clear.  What Durkheim describes in terms of the sacred, 
Heidegger refers to with the term “the Holy,” which in German is etymologically link to the notion 
of being “whole,” pointing to the ways in which contact and communion with the holy can help to 
make us experience a wholeness not otherwise available to us insofar as it puts us in contact with 
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the ground of our and the gods’ being.  Heidegger, like Durkheim (Durkheim 1995, 350), sees 
gods and humans as in some sense mutually dependent and constituted by the relations in which 
they stand to one another.  It is because the temple is set up as sacred that it is possible for the god 
to come into presence such that the devotees of that god can establish contact with it.  This claim 
fits with Durkheim’s account of the sacred, while also flagging that his at times almost mechanistic 
account of how religious experiences are generated through the gatherings of persons is at odds 
with that account.  Our stance is essential—both for the sacred to show up and for us to become 
properly responsive to the sacred. 
 It is also significant for our purposes that he chose an example of art that not only is 
religious but also, crucially, “portrays nothing…The work is not a portrait…” (Heidegger 2002, 
20, 21).  In addition, it is the locus of a large number of rituals in which people gather together to 
celebrate and renew their contact with the god in question.  In both these respects the example fits 
with Durkheim’s account of religion: it is not about generating a straightforwardly accurate picture 
of reality but rather about attuning us to truth in a deeper sense, and the ability to do the latter is 
caught up with the kinds of ritualistic practices that religion makes possible.  Having outlined these 
general affinities, we can now return to the passage cited at the beginning of the chapter, which 
brings together these common strands in a powerful way:  
A building, the Greek temple, portrays nothing… Through the temple, the god is present 
in the temple.  The presence of the god is, in itself, the extension and delimitation of the 
precinct as something holy.  The temple and its precinct do not, however, float off into the 
indefinite.  It is the temple work that first structures and simultaneously gathers around 
itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, 
victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its 
destiny.  The all-governing expanse of these open relations is the world of this historical 
people.  From within his expanse the people first returns to itself for the completion of its 
vocation… 
 Standing there, the temple work opens up a world while, at the same time, setting this 
world back on to the earth which itself first comes forth as homeland [heimatliche 
Grund] ...  
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Standing there, the temple first gives to things their look, and to men their outlook on 
themselves.  This view remains open as long as the work is a work, as long as the god has 
not fled from it… This is not a portrait intended to make it easier to recognize what the god 
looks like.  It is, rather, a work which allows the god himself to presence and is, therefore, 
the god himself.  The same is true of the linguistic work.  In the tragedy, nothing is staged 
or displayed theatrically.  Rather, the battle of the new gods against the old is being 
fought.  In that the linguistic work arises from the speech of the people, it does not talk 
about this battle.  Rather, it transforms that speech so that now every essential word fights 
the battle, and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what is great and what 
small, what is brave and what cowardly, what is noble and what fugitive, what is master 
and what slave… (ibid., 20-21).   
 
The religious works that Heidegger describes here--the temple and, more briefly, the tragedy-
-do not aim to accurately represent the gods in the way that a portrait aims to accurately 
represent a person.  Rather, the aim is to allow the god(s) and sacred truths, values, and 
decisions to come into presence so that the devotees can commune and make contact with them 
in a more direct and ecstatic manner.  Religions and religious works of art, in other words, are 
oriented towards putting us in touch with the divine, allowing us to intimately commune with 
and respond to it, as opposed to being in the game of providing us with a picture of them as 
though at a remove.  Where this succeeds, the world of the people who hold those holy things 
to be holy is opened up, the paths of meaningful action are made clear, and they are put in a 
position to make decisions that allow them to enact their fidelity to them.  And, though these 
terms likely mean somewhat different things, in Heidegger’s talk of the setting up of the world 
of a people and Durkheim’s talk of the (re)constitution of the basic sacred structure of a society, 
we see both thinkers making a similar claim about the ways in which religious rituals properly 
reveal and reinvigorate the basic normative orders in the light of which our social orders are 
ultimately, properly constituted.     
 The claim that tragedy isn’t essentially representational might strike the reader as more 
implausible than the claim about the temple, but I think the claim is insightful and 
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illuminating.  It echoes the claim which Mary Douglas makes about what might seem to be 
representational religious rights in her essay “Rightness and Categories,” in which she 
describes the Dinka people in Sudan as relating to the divine in their sacred rites in precisely 
this incarnational, more unmediated way: 
Their wish for community to be possessed by divinity is realized (not represented) in the 
trance of their priests whom the spirit does possess.  The quivering flesh of the dying victim 
[of the sacrifice] is not symbolizing something other than itself, it is an example of the same 
quivering in the flesh of the person in trance.  The community is not depicting something, 
but giving itself a sample of its idea of true community.  Against this sample it measures its 
own achievement of the ideal.  The sacrifice is a self-referencing enactment.  In structuring 
the community’s self-perception, it structures its future behavior: as [Nelson] Goodman 
says, the version of the world that has been adopted itself affects the world.  (Douglas 2002, 
293). 
 
It is in part because religious ritual tends to involve this more direct mode of communing with the 
divine that its content cannot be easily translated into straightforward representational terms. There 
is simply not enough distance between the religious practitioner and the object of her religious 
devotion to take up the distanced perspective necessary to produce adequate representations.  With 
this in mind, we will now turn to the distinctive understanding of truth that structures and gives 
shape to Heidegger’s account, and which can help us to get a better grip on the truth-disclosive 
character of religious rituals as Durkheim describes it in Elementary Forms.  
 There is an idea that is central to Heidegger’s thinking throughout his work, which is 
foregrounded in this essay, that our notion of truth as correct correspondence between propositions 
and states of affairs, while well and good as far as it goes, is not the understanding of truth that we 
ought to take to be fundamental.  Before finding ourselves in a position in which we can make 
statements that are more or less true to the world in which we find ourselves, that world must first 
show up to us such that we can be true to it in our statements and actions.  In order for a scientist 
to engage in physics experiments, for instance, the world needs to show up as composed of matter 
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that can be adequately described in quantifiable terms.  In order for a person to make true 
statements about ethics, the world needs to show up as making normative demands on the persons 
who inhabit it.  And in order for someone to be in a position to make true statements about and act 
in a manner true to the sacred, it first needs to show up as permeated with sacred realities and 
significance.  The claim that we hope to vindicate, and which is at the center of Heidegger’s 
account of the working of the Greek temple, is that religious practices are essentially in the game 
of unconcealing the world in a certain sacred light such that participants in those practices are 
enabled better to discern and respond to its sacred lineaments. 
 One crucial aspect of his account, one which in some sense does justice to or at least fits 
with the question about the degree of objectivity we should attribute to the sacred, is that such 
unconcealment is necessarily partial and takes place against a background of ontological 
obscurity.  That is to say that bringing certain features of reality into the light such that we can 
respond appropriately to them involves leaving others in obscurity.  This partiality of our 
fundamental relationship to truth underlies his use of the term, borrowed from the Greek word 
aletheia, is un-concealment.  This term emphasizes that the concealment of the being of things is 
in some sense fundamental and that their truth can only be disclosed through a partial wresting of 
them from that default position of obscurity.  One of the upshots of this claim, which is grounded 
in an attentive phenomenology of our relationship to truth, is that there can be no totalizing, final, 
and fully transparent disclosure of the truth of our existence.  Heidegger makes this claim, which 
is foundational to his understanding of the “origin” of the work of art in the following passage: 
 In the immediate circle of beings we believe ourselves to be at home.  The being is 
familiar, reliable, ordinary.  Nonetheless, the clearing is pervaded by a constant 
concealment in the twofold form of refusal [to be revealed at all] and obstructing [of certain 
features by others].  Fundamentally, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary, 
uncanny [un-geheuer].  The essence of truth, i.e. unconcealment, is ruled through by a 
denial.  This denial is, however, neither a defect nor a fault - as if truth were a pure 
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unconcealment that has rid itself of everything concealed.  If truth could accomplish this it 
would no longer be itself.  Denial, by way of the twofold concealing, belongs to the essence 
of truth as unconcealment.  Truth, in its essence, is un-truth.  (ibid., 31). 
 
What’s uncanny and extraordinary about unconcealment is the mysterious character of the process 
by which it occurs, the ways in which things are (partially) lifted out of obscurity, and the 
inevitably background opacity against the background of which the illumination of the truth of the 
world emerges.  This points to our finitude and ontological dependence in three respects.  First, 
there is the basic inability to wrest all of reality into unconcealment and our resulting dependency 
on an inevitably partial and finite concealment of the truth of the world.  Second, there is the fact 
that our cognition is essentially dependent on such unconcealment, which takes place in a manner 
in some sense opaque to rationality and over which rationality can exercise only so much 
control.  Finally, there is the crucial point, which we flagged in our discussion of the constitutive 
modes of human self-transcendence in the first chapter, that we are only able to reliably unconceal 
the character of the world through our participation in social practices that help to generate and 
sustain an attunement to a shared, meaningful world to which we can be responsive in our thoughts, 
beliefs, emotions, moods, and actions.  It also flags the fact that though it is features of reality that 
are being unconcealed, the partial and mysterious character of the process by which they are 
unconcealed points to our need to maintain a kind of confident responsiveness to the unconcealed 
world while remaining aware of the perennial possibility that other, perhaps in certain respects 
more adequate, unconcealment will emerge.   
 The role of the Greek temple and the practices that center upon it is not to accurately portray 
something in the world but rather to unconceal the world itself, to gather its truth and the 
meaningful life possibilities and paths that that truth illuminates for the Greeks, and it does this by 
gathering them together in and around a building that is taken to itself gather together those 
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meaningful strands in a distinctively illuminating manner.  It is, I think, this kind of “happening of 
truth” that Durkheim is trying to describe in his description of the truth-responsive workings of 
religious practices.  And I think that with Heidegger’s more attentive description of this 
phenomenon we are in a position to shed some light on the kinds of resolute confidence religious 
persons can have in the truth of their faith, as well as the ways in which that confidence is rendered 
inauthentic where it is transformed into a purported  certainty regarding the literal truth of their 
faith claims that leads them to seek to impose those claims upon others who have no grounds for 
such confidence.   The key to both claims lies in understanding the ways in which religious 
practices are essentially oriented towards the unconcealment of the truth of one’s world as opposed 
to the generation of accurate propositional beliefs about it.   
 Heidegger describes the character of this unconcealment in terms of a rift between what he 
refers to as earth and world that opens what he calls the Open.  This terminology is, of course, 
metaphorical and as such aims to point to and illuminate aspects of our experience of the world’s 
unconcealment without claiming to fully capture its truth in objective descriptive terms.  The 
following passages help to illuminate the meaning that he assigns to the terms “earth” and “world,” 
out of strife between which is opened the Open:  
World worlds, and is more fully in being than all those tangible and perceptible things in 
the midst of which we take ourselves to be at home…. Wherever the essential decisions of 
our history are made, wherever we take them over or abandon them, wherever they go 
unrecognized or are brought once more into question, there world worlds.  The stone is 
world-less.  (ibid., 23) 
 
Earth is the coming-forth-concealing [Hervorkommend-Bergende].  Earth is that which 
cannot be forced, that which is effortless and untiring. … Color shines and wants only to 
shine.  If we try to make it comprehensible by analyzing it into numbers or oscillations it 
is gone.  It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.  Earth shatters 




The world is that with which Durkheim is centrally concerned in his writings--namely the 
normative lineaments of reality as they show up to the practical agent that give meaning to their 
actions and to which they feel in some sense accountable in accounting for themselves.  It is the 
world that opens up the possibilities of meaningful action within and against the background of 
our social worlds.  The world is comparatively clear and intelligible and is the sort of thing about 
which we can speak responsibly in a manner that feels more or less adequate to the phenomena in 
question.  The world comes into view out of and in often tense but nevertheless illuminating 
relation to the earth, which is Heidegger’s term for the more fundamental, non-negotiable and non-
calculable ground of reality, which reveals itself only partly and in a manner that can’t be fully 
captured in terms of the categories of the world, though where the world is able to be a world, it 
provides a home for that realm of meanings and norms that make it possible to live in their 
light.  Unconcealment is the process whereby things are partially brought out of the relatively 
opaque realm of world into the light of partial intelligibility and meaningfulness.    When a world 
has been unconcealed in relation to the earth in which it takes up residence, what Heidegger calls 
the Open is opened, which is to say the realm in which possibilities for meaningful worldly action 
and thought are opened up for us. 
 Heidegger calls the relation between earth and world the “rift” and characterizes it as 
involving a “strife” to the extent that there is no world that fits seamlessly into and can fully 
account for the cognition- and meaning-transcendent richness of the earth.  It is worth recalling 
the deep affinities between this claim and the Pascalian claims that Durkheim makes, which we 
discussed in the first chapter, regarding the “true antagonism” constitutive of the fact of our being 
both social persons participating in a meaningful world and individual organisms with particular, 
concrete sensory relations to the world.  He speaks of this in terms of morality and cognition, but 
176 
 
the claims about cognition, which nicely echo Heidegger’s claims about the earth and world 
dimensions of color, perhaps most clearly illustrate the point:  
We understand only when we think in concepts.  But sensory reality is not made to enter 
the framework of our concepts spontaneously and by itself.  It resists, and, in order to make 
it conform, we have to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to all sorts of laborious 
operations that alter it so that the mind can assimilate it.  However, we never completely 
succeed in triumphing over its resistance.  Our concepts never succeed in mastering our 
sensations and translating them into intelligibly terms.  They take on a conceptual form 
only by losing that which is most concrete in them, that which causes them to speak to our 
sensory being and to involve it in action; and, in so doing, they become something fixed 
and dead [cf. Heidegger on how definitions kill the word].  Therefore, we cannot 
understand things without partially renouncing a feeling for their life, and we cannot feel 
that life without renouncing the understanding of it…  
 This inner contradiction is one of the characteristics of our nature.  According to 
Pascal’s formula man is “both angel and beast” and not exclusively one or the other…” 
(Durkheim 1973, 153).   
 
This essential cognitive finitude and the tension between the different ways in which we relate 
ourselves to reality--one of which involves relative transparency and rational control, the other of 
which involves an ecstatic openness that flags our essential finitude and is essential to maintaining 
a vital relation to reality--point to a further respect in which Heidegger’s illuminates the character 
of religious life.   
 There is always a constitutive tension in one’s more or less faithful responsiveness to the 
sacred.  Though, to the extent that the practices in question are affirmed as valuable, it must be the 
case that the world of the sacred illuminates and can take up residence in the earth, it nevertheless 
remains the case that there are areas of opacity, friction, and uncertainty as one tries to live in a 
manner faithful to that sacred world as an earthly, embodied creature.  Recalling the discussion of 
Buber and Heidegger in the first chapter, this means that one must strike the right general stance 
towards the world and aspire to be faithful to it while being constantly attuned to the specificity of 
one’s situation and the way in which the sacred light is refracted in and through it.  One can perhaps 
align this feature of religious life with the recurrent belief in monotheistic religious traditions that 
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God is radically transcendent and that any attempt to comprehensively capture God’s essence in 
human terms is an idolatrous attempt to reduce God to human categories, aspirations, and so 
forth.  One could also argue that forms of polytheism involve a similar belief insofar as they 
understand sacred things to be riddled with tension and conflict and a certain unpredictability such 
that single-minded fidelity to any one god inevitably involves a merely partial fidelity to the sacred 
forces in the world to which we ought to be responsive.  And henotheistic faiths that affirm a 
variety of gods in some indeterminate way ruled over by one high god too can be understood as 
responding to this basic feature of the sacred, insofar as there is a manifest complexity that is 
resolved in and by the higher god’s rule, albeit in a way that is often unclear to the religious 
practitioners whose main source of contact with the sacred takes shape in relation to the lesser 
deities. 
 Given this constitutive tension involved in religious life, the undue confidence in some 
literal and reductive account of the sacred that we find in fundamentalist religiosity fails to do 
justice to the basic phenomenon of religious life.  It is important that faith is faith, which is 
inevitably presented with challenges and a variety of modes of uncertainty.  And it is important 
that revelation is never total--which points to the ways in which religious traditions must be 
understood as living, open-ended things as opposed to calcified inherited monoliths, if we are to 
remain true to the character of religious life and experience.  This points to the importance of what 
in the Abrahamic tradition is referred to as prophetic witness, which often involves a rearticulation 
of old religious truths in new terms that allow its relevance to a transformed social situation, as 
well as efforts to articulate new revelations that remain faithful to the old truths while 
supplementing them with new ones.  It also gives us grounds for affirming the appropriateness of 
certain varieties of mysticism insofar as they affirm that the most fundamental sacred truths are on 
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the other side of language and human comprehension and thus involve a healthy, though partial, 
relativization of the particular modes of religious belief and action upon which any concrete form 
of religious life inevitably centers.   These points are important to highlight insofar as one of the 
central modes of anti-religious critique of religious traditions, which is often appropriate and sheds 
light on genuine pathologies in overly traditionalist forms of religious life, centers upon instances 
of religiosity that are inappropriately wedded to limited, restrictive dogmas that are backward-
looking and narrow-minded in a way that inhibits human flourishing.  I want to flag that the 
Durkheimian defense of religiosity I am putting forward here acknowledges but isn’t itself 
susceptible to such critiques. 
 I would like now to say something about the ways in which one can have confidence in the 
objects of one’s faith in the absence of any cognitive grounds for believing in the literal truth of 
the claims upon which one’s religious practices are centered.  To this end, I would like to bring in 
Mark Wrathall’s essay “The Revealed Word and World Disclosure: Heidegger and Pascal on the 
Phenomenology of Religious Faith,” in which he develops a practice- and skill-centered account 
of religious faith as opening a world that fits with the account of religious life we’ve been 
developing in relation to Elementary Forms and “The Origin of the Work of Art.”  This account 
should hopefully help to underline the claim that the Heideggerian unpacking of Durkheim’s 
account doesn’t involve any willful arbitrariness on my part and also helps to point to the ways in 
which Durkheim can shed light on the Heideggerian account he develops.   
 As we’ve seen, Durkheim understands religious practices as essentially in the game of 
changing the way in which we see, imagine, think and feel about the world such that we are better 
able to respond to the sacred things upon which our social worlds can and/or do center in a way 
that allows us to live better lives.  Understanding religious belief as in the same game as scientific 
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or other forms of descriptive belief about the objective physical world is, for Durkheim, essentially 
wrongheaded.   In his development of his account of the phenomenology of religious faith, which 
leans on Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, Wrathall comes to a similar conclusion and along 
the way helps to shed further light on the account of religious life we’ve been developing.  It also 
helps to shed light on the ways in which we ought to understand religious belief, about which 
Durkheim doesn’t say as much as we would like.  For Wrathall, religious beliefs cannot be 
understood as essentially concerned to communicate propositions but rather as oriented to 
disclosing the world in such a way that we are able to lead a life properly responsive to the things 
that we hold to be sacred.  Having faith essentially involves cultivating a certain mode of existence 
and in the absence of such a transformation in our existential stance and mode of living, Wrathall 
argues that we must understand purported faith stances as mere superstition. 
 Using some claims that Pascal makes about religious life as a jumping-off point, Wrathall 
claims that faith is properly located not on the cognitive by rather on “the existential register, 
meaning the presence or absence of faith is a matter of the kind of stance one takes on life, the 
practices one engages in, the ways one feels about things.  True faith is found in one’s disposition 
(feelings of the heart) and the actions that arise from those dispositions (living a devout life)” 
(Wrathall, 160).  Citing Aristotle and Hubert Dreyfus, Wrathall claims that we must understand 
religious faith and practice as centering on the acquisition of skillful dispositions and that 
understanding it through this lens we can see that the kind of confirmation of the legitimacy of our 
faith that we can achieve is essentially different from the confirmation of our more 
straightforwardly propositional, descriptive believes about the objective world.  As he puts it, 
“[faith] will have the kind of confirmation of success conditions that all other skills have.  Baking 
skills are confirmed or successful when they allow me to cope with the kitchen.  Religious faith 
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will be confirmed or successful when it gives me the practices and dispositions I need to cope with 
the world as a whole” (ibid., 161).   
 This position resonates with Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer in The Mythology in Our 
Language: Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, where he writes the following: 
Frazer’s representation of human magical and religious notions is unsatisfactory: it makes 
these notions appear as mistakes. 
 Was Augustine mistaken, then, when he called on God on every page of the 
Confessions? 
 But--one might say--if he was not in error, then surely was the Buddhist saint--or 
whoever else--whose religion expresses entirely different notions.  But none of them was 
in error except where he was putting forward a theory. (Wittgenstein, 32). 
 
The point Wittgenstein and Wrathall are making is that religious language, when properly 
understood, works in an essentially different way than do, say, scientific claims.  For this reason, 
religious beliefs are misunderstood to the extent that they are understood as beliefs that could be 
integrated into some sort of descriptive, rationalized theory about the world.  Rather, they are 
beliefs that allow us to reorient ourselves in the world, to see it differently, and to talk about 
religious practices that we engage in which open up a world and set of skills that allow us to live 
differently.  This account of religious belief has a number of merits, one of which is that it allows 
us to avoid seeing religious people, and this is something that Wittgenstein is gesturing towards in 
the passage above, as in some sense bizarrely irrational.  After all, why would you center your life 
on descriptive claims about ultimate reality that have no real empirical grounding?  Why would 
you center your account of the world on bizarre and often deeply mysterious beliefs that are 
without clear evidential grounding if you were simply in the game of coming up with an accurate 
description of the world.  If we understand these beliefs as instead attempting to give expression 
to and illuminate sacred realities with a different ontological status than the objective empirical 
world that the natural sciences attempt to describe, and as oriented towards changing the way in 
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which we see and feel and act in a way that allows us to lead better lives, many of the things that 
lead atheists and agnostics to throw up their hands in exasperation show up in a more sympathetic 
and illuminating light.   
 There are three final things worth saying about Wrathall’s account of the phenomenology 
of faith, concerning its confirmation, claims about its existential necessity, and grace.  On the first 
point, it’s important to flag that he thinks full confirmation and confidence in the stance is only 
available to those who stand within it.  He points out that this involves a non-vicious 
circularity.  As the baseball player’s mode of living is only possible and disclosed through playing 
baseball, so too is the religious person’s mode of living only possible and disclosed through the 
faith stance itself (ibid., 157-8).  There are two things to note about this claim.  The first is that full 
attunement to the skills and relevant situational features in question is only available to those who 
have the skills in question.  That being said, to make a point that Wrathall doesn’t make, it seems 
that people who totally lack those skills can in some sense assess those who do.  Even if I’ve never 
once played baseball, I can tell that Babe Ruth was a better player than my cousin is.  Though there 
are a whole host of important disanalogies between baseball and religion that Wrathall perhaps 
papers over, I would like to argue that something similar can be said about religious skills, 
particularly insofar as they center on things that I in some, albeit more diminished manner, 
acknowledge as sacred.  One can tell if other people’s religious practices are yielding genuine 
existential fruit, and it seems that this capacity is essential to the process of conversion and inter-
religious dialogue.  One doesn’t have to be a Christian, for instance, to have grounds for asserting 
that Martin Luther King’s religious faith and practice allowed him to lead a more truth-responsive 
life than did that of his white segregationist opponents, or of the tepidly integrationist white liberals 
he addresses in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” 
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 The second point concerns the need for faith.  Wrathall notes that those who want to argue 
that religious faith of some sort is necessary have to argue from some general features of our 
existential predicament.  Helpfully, he points out that Pascal and Kierkegaard and others do so by 
highlighting the condition of despair.  Given the centrality that Kierkegaard’s account of despair 
played in our discussion of existential vitality, I would simply like to flag the ways in which we 
have hopefully provided grounds for arguing a perhaps weaker claim: that there are certain 
naturalistically discernible features of human existence that give grounds for thinking that we 
ought to at least take seriously and be open to certain forms of religious life.  There might be yet 
further reasons for thinking this, but I hope that I have provided an existentialized and in some 
sense naturalized analogue of the more narrowly Christian account of despair that Wrathall is 
referring to here.   
 Finally, in his discussion of the ways in which religious belief cannot be understood in 
straightforwardly propositional and cognitive grounds, but rather as belief that enables and helps 
to generate a fruitful existential transformation, he describes such beliefs as working on us, when 
they work, through grace as opposed to reason.  Obviously, the notion of grace being invoked here 
is a Christian one that cannot be invoked in understanding all forms of religious life.  Given this 
limitation, I think it’s important to note that Durkheim’s account of religious rituals and the 
collective effervescence and sense of heightened being and attunement to sacred truth provides us 
with a more naturalized and ecumenical account of what that grace might involve.  For Durkheim, 
the externally grounded source of existential transformation that Wrathall is referring to comes 
from the people around us whose responsiveness to the sacred helps to bolster our own.  Though 
I do not want to simply reject and replace particular religious understandings of grace, I want to 
emphasize that Durkheim gives us grounds for thinking that we can make sense of and affirm the 
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notion even if we are unwilling to affirm the more specific religious beliefs with which Christians 
interpret this phenomenon. 
 Before turning to the question of the origin of religious revelation, I would like to say 
something briefly about gods and why relations with gods and other sacred persons are so central 
to the vast majority of religious traditions.  In some sense, it should be obvious in the light of the 
last two chapters why gods are so central. If our being as persons and the meaning and values in 
the light of which we (aspire to) live is constituted through relations with persons, and if religion 
is aimed at disclosing the deep relational structure and sacred significance of our lives, then it 
makes perfect sense that relations with superlative persons (in more than one sense) would be 
central to religious life.  It makes sense that worshipping Aphrodite as the superlative embodiment 
of erotic love or Jesus Christ as the embodiment of a certain kind of radical self-sacrificial love 
would allow us to become better attuned to and empowered to seize possibilities for such love in 
our lives with the mortals with whom we live.  Were we recurrently, ritualistically to gather 
together with others to hear stories about them and worship them, in the knowledge that we are 
not alone in doing so and that indefinitely many others have led lives attuned by such relations, it 
seems that we would see the world differently and perhaps better—in a way that we couldn’t 
simply by committing ourselves to set of principles embodying or a how-to manual for cultivating 
such erotic or kenotic fulfillment.  When Paul speaks of faith in Christ, as is often noted, he doesn’t 
mean belief that he existed and did certain things and has certain powers and so forth, but rather 
trusting in him and in one’s relationship to him.  If we want to live our lives consistently in the 
light of a certain kind of (possibility for) relationship, it makes sense to do so in relation to a person 
who is eternal, everywhere and nowhere, and in relation to whom indefinitely many others with 
whom one lives also, potentially if not in fact, stand in such devoted relation.   
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 In her immensely illuminating book How God Becomes Real, T.H. Luhrmann provides a 
powerful account—informed by fieldwork with Pentecostal Christians around the world as well as 
witches, orthodox Jew, and others—of the ways in which religious people engage in practices to 
make invisible others real in a way that allows the faithful to cultivate a relationship with them 
that has the potential to be and is aimed at transforming them in various ways.  Her account, unlike 
Durkheim’s, remains agnostic on the question of the ontological status of these persons.  What 
matters is that whether they are in fact unreal or whether they are simply real in a manner that we 
cannot attune ourselves to without cultivating deliberate, ritualistic practices that help to make that 
reality felt, a certain kind of real-making process is essential to the process.  In the preface she 
presents her central theses, five of which are I think (in abbreviated form) worth invoking here: 
First: People don’t (easily) have faith in gods and spirits.  People do not, in fact, behave 
as if gods and spirits are real in the way that everyday objects are real…someone must 
interpret the world through a special way of thinking, expecting, and remembering.  I will 
call this the faith frame.  That faith frame coexists alongside the ordinary ways people make 
sense of the world, and sometimes contradicts them.  The priest says, this is my body, but 
it looks like a dry cracker…And so faith is hard—particularly when an invisible other is 
supposed to love you, care for you, and keep you safe. 
Second: Detailed stories help to make gods and spirits feel real. …vividly imagine 
worlds…enable suspended disbelief.  They also introduce invisible others as characters 
who interact with people, and they set out ways to talk with these others and to experience 
them as talking back. 
Third: Talent and training matter. …People who are able to become absorbed in what 
they imagine are more likely to have powerful experiences of an invisible other…Practice 
also helps… 
Sixth: Prayer practice changes the way people attend to their own thoughts… 
Seventh: People create relationships with gods and spirits…As people practice, as the 
invisible other becomes more real to them, people remake themselves in relation to that 
other.  These relationships can be intensely intimate and drenched in feeling—something 
not quite captured by the word “belief.” …These relationships anchor the faith frame in the 
ordinary world and make it matter. (Luhrmann, xii-xiv). 
 
The first, third, and sixth points help to underline why the Durkheimian emphasis on religion as a 
set of practices is so important and why in the face of tendency for attunement to sacred beings to 
atrophy in profane life it is important to regularly re-engage in ritual practices that help sustain the 
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relevant relationship. The claim regarding the power of prayer in the context of this relationship-
centered account of religion helps to connect up Durkheim and Heidegger’s the account of the 
dynamics of public ritual attunement with more private practices that continue outside of such 
gatherings and which constitute one mode of staying in relationship with one’s coreligionists 
through the second-personal relationship with the relevant sacred other.  This latter relationship 
embodies a kind of peak relationality that is in some sense normative and authoritative in relation 
to all of one’s other most essential relationships, and if one is to live in the latter in the light of the 
former it is crucial to maintain that relationship and in so doing change the way one relates to 
oneself and others in a relatively consistent, existentially integrating manner.  
 I would like now to turn to the question of origins, again with reference to “Origin,” which, 
unsurprisingly, has important things to say on the topic.  The question of origin is connected to the 
question of transformation, insofar as it through a comparable creative process that new religious 
works of art, texts, perspectives, and so forth are brought into the world.  The key here is that to 
really work, sacred works of art--as well as rituals and beliefs--must be understood to be in some 
sense inspired as part of a robustly self-transcendent creative process, as opposed to being an 
expression of some individual artistic/religious genius’s will.  That is to say, it must be understood 
as moved by what a Christian would call an experience of grace, though of course notions of divine 
creative inspiration do not originate or necessarily find their most adequate expression in Christian 
thought.  Heidegger’s account of the creation and preservation of (sacred) works of art in “Origin” 
provides the keys for understanding the means through which sacred works of art and even 
religions are generated and the receptive attitude that allows them best to work as the works they 
are.   
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 Heidegger describes creation and preservation as being equally essential to the 
artwork.  There can be a temporal lag between creation and preservation, as in the case of works 
of art that aren’t properly appreciated and responded to until well after their creation, but the act 
of creation bears within it, according to Heidegger, a fundamental orientation towards a future act 
of preservation.  In more explicitly religious terms, religious revelation is oriented towards the 
faithful who will attempt to faithfully respond to it.  The notion of (artistic) creation is more 
familiar than that of preservation, but Heidegger’s account of creation is very different from the 
more familiar and modern understanding of artworks as products of a unique, great individual act 
of will with which most of us are likely most familiar.  Creation is, for Heidegger, an act that in 
some fairly radical sense transcends and even, ideally, effaces from view the individual or 
individuals through whom that creation is accomplished.  
 We can already see this alternative understanding of creation at work in Heidegger’s claim 
that “truth wills its establishment in the work” (ibid., 37).  This claim comes as a conclusion to the 
following passage, in which the fundamentally responsive character of artistic creation is 
highlighted:  
The establishment of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being of a kind which never 
was before and never will be again.  The bringing forth places this being in the open in 
such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the open into which 
it comes forth.  When this bringing forth brings with it specifically the openness of beings, 
that is, truth, that which is brought forth, is a work.  Bringing forth of this kind is 
creation.  As such a bringing it is, better expressed, a receiving and taking over that occurs 
within the pull towards unconcealment.  (ibid., 37) 
 
There is something extra-ordinary, as Heidegger puts it, in this bringing forth that is constitutive 
of the work’s creation.  This extraordinariness is what he flags in speaking of the work’s being a 
kind of being that never was before and never will be again: insofar as it in fact opens up the 
openness of beings, thereby enacting a happening of truth that illuminates the world in a novel 
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manner, it plays a unique role that no other work has or could in the future play.  It is unique and 
radiant in its uniqueness.  It clears the openness of beings in which it subsequently resides for as 
long as it persists as the work of art it is.  The Christian Bible, for instance, opens up the Christian 
cosmos within which it subsequently is situated and resides so long as it continues to work as the 
work it is, which is to say, as long as the Christian cosmos continues to be unconcealed as that in 
which Christians live.  Here we can see how creation and preservation (which is the relation in 
which the Christian stands to the truth of her faith) are fundamentally intertwined, though I will 
postpone examining that dynamic for the moment.  This happening of truth in creation is not, 
crucially, a matter of an artist heroically imposing form through an act of will upon a reality that 
is simply pliant, formless material in her hand.  The act of creation is a “receiving and taking over” 
and not an imposition. That is to say that it involves receptivity to the as yet concealed truth that 
“wills its establishment in the work.”   
This fundamentally receptive mode of accomplishing the work’s creation involves a 
bringing forth of some possibility of a new basic unconcealment that precedes the artist’s creation 
of the work.  That is to say, there are glimmers of a possible alternative unconcealment of being 
to which the artist/prophet is sensitive and responsive in such a way that she can bring them to full 
fruition in the work.  They precede and, in some sense, transcend her and her work is a matter of 
her responding adequately to them in such a way that they can be brought fully to light for those 
who relate to the work of art in the right sort of way--namely as preservers of the truth that is set 
to work in it.  In any given cultural world, in the broad and non-technical sense of the word, there 
will be a more or less hegemonic unconcealment of beings that wrest certain aspects of them into 
the light of relative intelligibility while leaving others in relative darkness and opacity.  If an artist 
succeeds in creating a genuine work of art she will, through attentiveness to those aspects of the 
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world that are only partially or inadequately unconcealed, be able to bring about an illumination 
of things that is fundamentally distinct from that which is or had been hegemonic.  This 
unconcealment will involve a kind of Gestalt switch.  But for it to succeed there must be one with 
which people can relate given their position in the prior openness of beings.  There must be a kind 
of “aha!” moment in which they recognize something of which they had dim intimations 
beforehand but couldn’t clearly see prior to their encounter with the work.  The artist must, in other 
words, help bring forth a different unconcealment of beings the potential for which the prior 
unconcealment of being(s) bore within itself.  What sets artists apart, and makes it possible for 
them to engage in this work of creation, is their heightened sensitivity to possibilities of this 
alternative concealment born within being as it had been hitherto disclosed.   
The act of creation is in some sense, for Heidegger, an act of will, but, it is willing of a 
different sort.  The following passage from “What Are Poets For?” captures this sense of willing, 
a version of which we will find as well in his account of the “knowing that is a willing” that is 
constitutive of preserving a work of art.  This parallel should help us to see the parallels between 
the attitudes of creators and preservers towards the truth.  The passage on creative willing reads as 
follows:  
Those who will more strongly by the nature of willing, remain more in accord with the will 
as the Being of beings.  They answer sooner to Being that shows itself as will.  They will 
more strongly in that they are more willing…  
 The daring that is more venturesome, willing more strongly than any self-assertion, 
because it is willing, “creates” a secureness for us for us in the Open.  To create means to 
fetch from the source. And to fetch from the source means to take up what springs forth 
and to bring what has so been received.  The more venturesome daring of the willing 
exercise of the will manufactures nothing.  It receives, and gives what it has received.  The 
more venturesome daring accomplished, but it does not produce.  (Heidegger 2013, 116 & 
118). 
 
It’s important to note that the willing willing is a willing that is willing in the sense in which we 
say something like the following: “Okay, I hear what you’re saying.  Then, yes, I’m willing to do 
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that.”  In such instances we are announcing our willing to do something as a response to a call 
from without us.  We don’t will it spontaneously and on our own but rather assent to willing in a 
certain way in the light of a consideration that has been presented to and is external to us.   Though 
Heidegger is describing a more global form of willing that extends beyond artistic creativity, and 
though the creating that he’s concerned with is a more global creating of security for us in the 
open, artistic creation involves a willing of this basic sort.  The secureness that he describes here 
as flowing from this willing willing in accordance with the being of beings is something that is, as 
we will see below, central to the existential vitality that religious practices are oriented towards 
cultivating in their preservers. 
For all of these reasons, it should not surprise us when Heidegger claims that works of art 
in some sense work best when their creator--but not their createdness--is effaced from view:  
The more solitary the work, fixed in the figure, stands within itself, the more purely it 
seems to sever all ties to human beings, then the more simply does the thrust that such a 
work is step into the open, and the more essentially the extraordinary is thrust to the surface 
and the long-familiar thrust down.  Yet there is nothing violent about this multidirectional 
thrust, for the more purely is the work itself transported into the openness of beings it itself 
opens up, then the more simply does it carry us into this openness and, at the same time, 
out of the realm of the usual... (Heidegger 2002, 40).   
 
Heidegger transitions here to a discussion of the work’s preservation, which we will turn to 
below.  Though much of what Heidegger says here should be clear in the light of what we’ve 
discussed thus far, it is important to clarify what he means by the work’s solitude and severing of 
ties “to all human beings.”  In some sense, of course, the work cannot sever all ties to human beings 
if it is to be a work.  The Greek temple can only work to unconceal the truth of being by 
unconcealing it to human beings.  What Heidegger is claiming here is that the work works best 
when we do not relate to it as standing in some sort of essential relation to particular human beings: 
such as, most obviously, the human beings who served as its creators.   
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 This point can perhaps be made clearer by thinking about a work like Michelangelo’s 
“Pietà.”  Insofar as one relates to it, perhaps in or against the background of an art history class, as 
a work created by Michelangelo in a particular historical context, perhaps in competition with 
other sculptors, in a particular cultural and political context, and so forth, its ability to work as the 
work that it is will be attenuated.  Such a person will of course be aware of and in a certain way 
attentive to the fact that it is a statue of Mary’s mourning her dead son, the most salient features 
of the statue will be the virtuosity that it exemplifies, the ways in which it differs from and echoes 
other such representations, and so forth.  In fact, Heidegger would claim that an illiterate, pious 
visitor to St. Peter’s who doesn’t know who made the statue and is simply relating to it as the site 
of some sort of happening of a fundamental truth concerning the Christian world would be much 
better positioned to achieve an authentic relation to the work.  My selection of an example is 
essentially arbitrary, but I hope that it clarifies why the work’s standing alone can help it better to 
work as a work.  If the work is properly not an expression of the artist’s distinctive character that 
she in some sense owns as an expression of her subjectivity, but rather a vehicle for a happening 
of truth that exceeds and transcends all particular individuals, works will better be able to work as 
works when they are related to in abstraction from these more particular relationships in which 
they stand to human beings.  
 Heidegger continues that paragraph with a discussion of the character of preservation, 
which he takes to be as essential to the work’s working as its createdness.  The passage continues 
as follows:  
…To submit to this displacement [out of the realm of the usual and into the openness of 
beings opened up by the work] means: to transform all familiar relations to world and to 
earth, and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order 
to dwell within the truth that is happening in the work.  The restraint of this dwelling allows 
what is created to become, for the first time, the work that it is.  This allowing the work to 
be a work is what we call its preservation.  It is in such preservation that, in its createdness, 
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the work first gives itself as the real which now means, is present in its work-
character.  (ibid.) 
 
The preserving relation to the work of art involves a submitting and allowing in relation to the 
truth happening in it.  This of course is essentially the kind of process that Wrathall is attempting 
to describe in his Heideggerian account of the phenomenology of faith.  The preserver’s relation 
to the truth happening in the work is therefore in many respects akin to that which the creator takes 
towards that truth.  The difference in their actively responsive receptivity to that truth is that the 
creator’s is oriented towards the accomplishing of the work itself whereas the preserver’s is 
oriented towards acting in the light of that truth.  One can, of course, relate to the truth happening 
in a work in both of these ways.  A creator of a work of art can subsequently become one of its 
preservers.  That being said, one might be inclined to think that that it will likely be easier for non-
creators to respond to it in the manner of preservation than it will be for creators, insofar as the 
creator has difficulty bracketing their own individual relationship to the work such that they relate 
purely to the happening of truth within it.  One could speculate here about the unique challenges 
religious prophets might face in relating appropriately to the happening of truth in their own life 
and teaching and the tortured doubts they might have about the extent to which their lives and 
utterances are mere acts of self-will as opposed to expressions of attunement to the self-
transcendent sacred.  Various suras in the Qur’an in which God reassures Muhammad about the 
legitimacy of his prophetic practice in contrast to that of the mere poets surrounding him come to 
mind here.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the creator can likely only stand firmly in this 
relation insofar as the work has found a larger audience of preservers.  It is only through winning 
that larger audience that the creator can stand secure in the faith that it is in fact a happening of 
truth that they’ve accomplished in the work, as opposed to a merely idiosyncratic and broadly inert 
and non-resonant expression of their individual psychology and perspective on the world.   
192 
 
 Having hopefully illuminated the central features of the Durkheimian account of religious 
ritual, truth, and creation, I will now turn briefly to a discussion of the ways in which that effort to 
preserve one’s fidelity to the religious truth works when the religious leave the sacred precincts 
within which religious rituals are celebrated and return to the profane realm.   
3.3 Religious Life Cont’d: Maintaining Fidelity to the Sacred in and Transforming 
the Realm of the Profane 
I hope that I have managed in the preceding sections to outline the central features of the 
Durkheimian account of religious life that I’m aiming to develop and defend.  I would like in this 
final section to briefly address some of the things that Durkheim says about the ways in which the 
religious attempt to maintain fidelity to the truths disclosed in religious rituals when they return to 
the profane world, connecting it up with claims that Heidegger makes about “things” and thereby 
concluding our Heideggerian version of Durkheim’s account of religious life.  This will also 
provide us with the means to discuss our contemporary religious predicament in the “secular” 
Western world.  
 Given the constitutive tension between the realms of the sacred and profane, there is a 
tendency for the sacred to be eclipsed from view when we cease to be gathered together in 
practicing our religious rites and return to our more individualized, quotidian lives, which must 
inevitably center on profane things.  Given this tendency, part of the ascesis of religiosity is to 
attempt to maintain our faithful responsiveness to the sacred when we are no longer gathered 
together to celebrate it.  This involves an attempt to remain gathered in two senses in the face of 
the diffusive tendencies of quotidian life.  The aim is to maintain a sense that ultimately the 
significance of one’s life is that a function of our responsiveness to the sacred that allows our lives 
to be gathered together with those of the others with whom we share our world--this is in some 
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sense the external mode of gathering that we attempt to maintain.  The other is more personal and 
involves our feelings, thoughts, and actions being integrated in a mode of coherent responsiveness 
to that which we hold to be of the utmost, ultimate significance in our lives as personal, social 
beings.  To the extent that we can achieve this fidelity to the literal and metaphorical gathering that 
the religious rites induce, we can help to give a sacred character to our everyday actions in the 
profane realm. This effort is never fully successful (the Christian notion of the kingdom of God as 
present but in its total fulfilment always yet to come, until Christ returns, is I think a way of talking 
about this more general feature of religious life), but it is the project that helps us to cultivate the 
most robust form of existential vitality and meaningfulness that we are capable of achieving.  
 Durkheim characterizes one of the ways in which we attempt to maintain such enduring 
fidelity to religious truths in the following passage, in which he discusses the aboriginal Australian 
attempt to always keep the totem that represents the clan in literal and metaphorical view so as to 
prevent us from wandering too far in the direction of individualized existential fragmentation and 
despair:  
 The image [of the totem] goes on calling for and recalling those emotions [generated 
in the religious ritual] even after the assembly is over.  Engraved on the cult implements, 
on the sides of rocks, on shields, and so forth, it lives beyond the gathering.  By means of 
it, the emotions felt are kept perpetually alive and fresh.  It is as though the image provoked 
them directly. Imputing the emotions to the image is all the more natural because, being 
common to the group, they can only be related to a thing that is common to all.  Only the 
totemic emblem meets this condition… During the ceremony, all eyes are upon 
it.  Although the generations change, the image remains the same.  It is the abiding element 
of social life.  (Durkheim 1995, 222).   
 
The skills of religious life involve attending to the right things in the right way such that one can 
act in a manner faithful to them.  One of things accomplished by engraving the totemic image on 
things that we use and encounter in our quotidian lives is to keep us oriented in the right sort of 
way to our predicament.  It allows the sacred and the group of persons that it assembles to maintain 
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a kind of presence in absence.  Individual prayer, religious works of art, private reading and 
meditation on religious texts, and so forth are all further instances of such efforts to maintain one’s 
religious faith and the existential stance that it enables in the face of the obstacles to such fidelity 
that the profane world tends to throw in our way.   
 Durkheim’s claim, though illuminating, is put in characteristically reductive, arguably 
crude, terms and I would like to conclude this very brief section by bringing in Heidegger’s more 
phenomenological and less metaphysically dogmatic account of the ways in which what he calls 
things can gather a sacred world.  His account also helpfully points to the ways in which things 
can in an open-ended way be imbued with such sacred, disclosive significance.  It is also worth 
flagging the ways in which his choice of a bridge to serve as his example of such a radiantly 
significant and world-gathering thing chimes with his account of the paths opened up by the Greek 
temple--meaningful paths of action that are opened up to us by our communion with the divine:  
The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.”  It does not just connect 
banks that are already there.  The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the 
stream… It brings stream and bank and land into each other’s neighborhood.  The bridge 
gathers the earth as landscape around the stream…  
The bridge lets the stream run its course and at the same time grants their way to mortals 
so that they may come and go from shore to shore.  Bridges lead in many ways.  The city 
bridge leads from the precincts of the castle to the cathedral square; the river bridge near 
the county town brings wagons and horse teams to the surrounding villages...The highway 
bridge is tied into the network of long-term traffic, paced as calculated for maximum 
yield.  Always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening ways of 
men to and fro, so that they may get to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other 
side.  Now in a high arch, now in a low, the bridge vaults over glen and stream--whether 
mortals keep in mind this vaulting of the bridge’s course or forget that they, always 
themselves on the way to the last bridge, are actually striving to surmount all that is 
common and unsound in themselves in order to bring themselves before the haleness of the 
divinities.  The bridge gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities--whether we 
explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint 
on the bridge, or whether that divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.  
The bridge gathers to itself in its own way the earth and sky, divinities and mortals. 
Gathering or assembly, by an ancient word of our language, is called “thing.”  The 




This passage is quite rich--as well as, admittedly rather opaque.  What is important for our purposes 
is that it provides an example of the way in which some sort of reference to the sacred structure of 
the world can take up residence in things that are not explicitly designed, as the totemic image 
carvings Durkheim discusses are, to do so.  It is also important, and fits with the general analysis 
we’ve been providing, that such things are integrated with the literal and metaphorical paths down 
which people walk in their everyday, social lives, and that such charged objects, to use a more 
Durkheimian than Heideggerian term, are understood to bear witness to the sacred structure of the 
world regardless of whether or not we are always consciously acknowledging theme as such.  This 
is an important corrective to the rather crude subjectivist construal of the totemic emblems we saw 
in Durkheim. 
 When Heidegger speaks of “the earth and sky, divinities and mortals” he’s referring to 
what he calls “the fourfold” (ibid., 148).  For our purposes, all that matters is that this construal is 
an alternative construal of the earth/world rift that we discussed in connection with “Origin,” with 
the crucial distinction that the mode in which we are able to stand in proper relation to it involves 
less violent strife and more receptive ecstatic receptivity, which Heidegger refers to as 
Gelassenheit or “releasement.”  We see this change in emphasis in his talk of the bridge’s “letting” 
the stream run its course and “escorting” the mortals who walk upon it.  The idea is that meaning 
is not, as he tended to claim in his more Nietzschean or at least Nietzsche-sympathizing phase, a 
matter of our coercively projecting meaning onto the world but rather in our letting it come into 
view through the right modes of receptivity.  These different stances towards the realism question 
connect up with Durkheim’s own ambiguous statements, and I would like to point out that it fits 
nicely with the more in some sense realist moments in Durkheim, which I would like to 
foreground.   
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It is in relation to the fourfold that the humanly significant world is taken up (hence the 
reference to earth and sky, which are the basic coordinates of nature for a mortal, finite human 
being, as opposed to a physicist).  The claim here is that the bridge he’s describing gathers to itself 
these coordinates/dimensions of meaning such that through it we can stand in more proper 
relationship to it.  I would like to underline the fact that Heidegger unpacks the character of such 
things with reference to the idea of gathering, which points to the ways in which the truths 
disclosed through the literal gathering of people in Durkheimian rites can be illuminated as well 
by things outside the sacred ritual space that gather, disclose, and make present those truths about 
our world and our relationship to it.  The bridge, particularly but not only if it is equipped with 
niches for saints who explicitly point to the divinities, gathers together the basic coordinates of 
meaning in the world with reference to which we aspire to discipline ourselves in our daily lives.   
 Finally, we see the greater realism in the claim that the bridge makes manifest the fact that 
mortals are “actually striving to surmount all that is common and unsound in themselves in order 
to bring themselves before the haleness of the divinities.”  In his discussion of the totemic emblem 
that is inscribed on things used outside of religious rituals, Durkheim seems to see their 
significance as reducible to their in fact keeping the relevant emotions and orientation salient in 
the lives of those who interact with them.  The two claims can be reconciled, but the emphasis of 
Heidegger’s essay I think points to something important.  We might very well disregard or not 
attend with significant care to the significance-disclosing things that surround us.  But if we were 
subsequently to open ourselves to and draw into action-generating responsiveness that 
significance, we would not experience this as a matter of the things going from being meaning-
impoverished to being suddenly saturated with meaning.  Rather, we would feel that we had been 
disregarding something crucial in a way that is now clear to us.   
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This last point is an important one because I think it provides us with one final clarification 
of the character of the religious stance that connects up with the account of artistic/prophetic 
creation at the end of the last section.  Robustly irrealist, subjectivist, and/or culturally relativist 
interpretations of religious phenomena are of course live options and given the aims of this 
dissertation I won’t be attempting to provide a decisive resolution of those debates.  That being 
said, it’s important to emphasize that it’s part of the phenomenology of religious life that there is 
some reality that transcends us and to which we are called to be properly responsive, and thus that 
religious experience is of entities, realities, and meanings that are real and that we can through 
thoughtlessness, self-absorption, and so forth disregard.  Such alienation from the sacred is 
experienced as a deep threat to our being and those who understand themselves as properly in 
relation to the sacred therefore feel a certain degree of default anxiety about the extent to which 
they are remaining true to it.  This anxiety and attempt to discern and respond appropriately to 
what is sacred is at its most acute when one has returned to the profane realm and is attempting, 
more or less consciously and successfully, to remain faithful to what was disclosed as sacred in 
the religious rites.  And to the extent that one is leading an ostensibly irreligious or non-religious 
life, if there is any attunement to the sacred, it will tend to take the form of this background anxiety 
that there is something of the utmost importance to which one is not being properly attentive.  In 
Heideggerian terminology, borrowed from the poetry of Hölderlin, this attunement will be that of 
anxiety, acknowledged or not, that the gods have flown.   
A great deal more could be said about the ways in which we continue to engage with the 
sacred in the profane realm through the stances that we take toward the things in that domain that 
are, deliberately or through a more opaque and impersonal dynamic, imbued with sacred 
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significance.  We will say a few more things about it in the next chapter, but my hope is that I’ve 
said enough to clarify the basic character of that dynamic.   
I would like to conclude this chapter by returning to a question raised above about how we 
should distinguish genuinely religious from pseudo-religious or non-religious phenomenon that 
might seem in some sense to qualify as instances of ekstatic collective effervescence and 
communion.  The examples I raised of phenomena that might seem to count, perhaps worryingly, 
as religious were mobs and sporting events.   Durkheim is inclined to in certain ways blur the 
boundaries between paradigmatically religious and non-religious life, as we saw in his claim that 
the kind of existential uplift and transformation sought in religious ritual is continuous with 
experiences that we have in everyday life when we achieve some sort of robust communion with 
others.  These claims help to support his claim that religious practices can help to transform us so 
as better to attune us to the relations in which we stand to others outside of religious rituals and to 
defend the claim that religious practices can attune us to and equip us to live in the light of the 
relational context that bestows us with our fundamental identity as agents. At the same time, 
however, there are grounds for worrying that too much blurring of the boundaries could undermine 
the power of the theory and render it hard to say what exactly the upshot is of his defense of 
religious practices.  If any number of practices count in some sense as religious then it’s not clear 
what his defense of religious practices amounts to. 
In the light of our discussion of Durkheim and Heidegger’s accounts of the workings of 
religious practices, I think we now have the materials we need to do justice to the claim that there 
is a certain porousness between the experiences characteristic of religious practices and those 
which we have in profane life while accounting for the intuition that there is something distinctive 
about religious practices that set them apart.  Durkheim speaks of the ways in which religious 
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practices orient us to our broadest and deepest social relational context, which progressively 
expands in scope as human lives become progressively entwined, with tribal gods being 
progressively relativized and subordinated to international gods as human societies become more 
interconnected and interdependent.  Heidegger similarly speaks of religious rituals as opening up 
a world in the most fundamental sense, within which the various projects and life paths and 
relationship are opened up.  These claims point to the ways in which a religious practice needs to 
successfully relate us to our most fundamental and expansive relational networks.  That is to say 
that paradigmatically religious practices are those which are explicitly in the game of reattuning 
us at such a global, comprehensive level.  Insofar as concrete interpersonal encounters can reattune 
us to this fundamental relational network they can have a religious significance whether this 
involves a conscious connection of the experience to paradigmatically religious practices or not.   
Furthermore, there are grounds for thinking that there can be practices with a kind of 
intermediate quasi-religious character insofar as the relate us to relational contexts that are much 
broader than those within which we tend to operate in profane life, while nevertheless falling short 
of qualifying as fully religious.  One example that Durkheim provides of such an intermediate 
quasi-religious phenomenon is that of political conventions at which “followers can renew their 
common faith by making a public demonstration of it together.  To strengthen emotions that would 
dissipate if left alone, the one thing needful is to bring all those who share them into more intimate 
and dynamic relationship.” (Durkheim 1995, 212).  Such ritualistic practices have a quasi-religious 
experience in that they call us out of our narrower profane agential stances and preoccupations and 
facilitate a communion of those who share the same commitments that elevates them out of those 
narrow identities into a more expansive and orienting form of mutual attunement.  That is to say 
that while paradigmatically religious practices are global in scope, other practices that aim to 
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achieve a more global orientation can be understood as having an analogous, though more limited, 
aim. 
The other important criterion concerns not the question of whether or not the practices are 
in the game of being religious practices but whether or not they succeed in doing what religious 
practices aim to do.  That is to say that we do not simply want to orient ourselves to what we take 
to be the sacred relational context that gives us our fundamental identity as agents, but to actually 
relate ourselves to it.  We discussed above the ways in which both Durkheim and Heidegger, albeit 
in quiet different ways, seem both to be committed to the idea that there is in religious life some 
reality that isn’t merely subjective or culturally relative to which we are called in our religious life 
to respond.  There are various ways to attempt to capture what this sacred reality is, but with 
reference to Tomasello’s account of the two forms of personhood-constitutive relation—that of 
natural second-personal morality and that of our collective intentional cultural orders—we 
attempted to provide one gloss on how we should think about that sacred order.  The claim there 
was that we are called upon to relate to our collective intentional orders in a manner fully 
responsive to the demands of second-personal morality and that doing so is essential to achieving 
full-fledged existential vitality.  This account of the sacred relational order aims to do justice both 
to the sense that there is space for a certain range of cultural variation in interpretations of and 
forms of realizing the sacred that are nevertheless all accountable to some bedrock normative order 
captured in second-personal morality. 
If we combine these two claims, a full-fledged religious practice is one which is global in 
scope and which attempts to relate us at that level to the genuinely sacred order.  That is to say that 
we can say that certain practices are playing the religious game while failing to succeed at attuning 
us to the sacred, while other practices are not properly religious but can nevertheless help to attune 
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us at a more local level to that which is genuinely sacred.  The latter can stand free of religious 
practices but, if the argument that we have been developing about the importance of religious 
practices is compelling, there are grounds for thinking that they alone will be inadequate to achieve 
the comprehensive modes of attunement to the sacred that we aspire to achieve.   
Finally, there is a question about different modes of more or less authentic participation in 
religious practices—we will focus on ones which are in fact religious and do tend, ceteris paribus, 
to attune us to the sacred relational order.  One might be a participant in such a form of good 
religiosity without participating in it in the right kind of committed, disciplined, ekstatic manner, 
such that one falls short of achieving the full fruit of religious life.  We would say of such a person 
that they are participating in a practice that is genuinely religious without having become through 
such participation true devotees or faithful members of the practice.  On the flip side, one can 
imagine someone participating in a more problematic religious practice in such a way that they do 
in fact manage to achieve the kind of existential attunement to the sacred that religious life is 
properly oriented towards.   
These considerations highlight the ways in which success in religious life requires three 
distinct things: (1) a set of practices oriented towards our deep religious practices that are properly 
global in scope and which (2) succeed in orienting us towards the sacred relational order and which 
(3) we participate in in an appropriately authentic, disciplined, and ekstatic manner.  If all three of 
these conditions are met we have a paradigmatic instance of good religious practice.  Where they 
are missing we can have (1) practices that aren’t fully in the game of being religious practices 
and/or (2) practices in the game of being religious that fall short of hitting the sacred mark and/or 
(3) participation in genuinely sacred-oriented religious practices that falls short of being authentic.  
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Returning to the example of mobs and sporting events, we can say that both typically fall 
short on the first and second dimension, while nevertheless involving a kind of participation that 
can involve the right kind of intense ekstatic responsiveness but which lack robust religious value 
because of the misdirected character or limited scope of the event/practice in question, 
respectively.  Sporting events typically some species of collective effervescence—though not 
always for those spectators who are unmoved by and/or otherwise not fully attuned to the event—
but they are explicitly understood as games that are set apart from without being authoritative over 
the rest of our lives.  Even for those who treat sports fandom as a kind of religion—which claim I 
think is best understood as metaphorical (Dworkin), playful, and/or an expression of an attempt to 
redirect religious longings towards a set of practices and institutions understood at some level to 
fall short of realizing them—understand that this involve a kind of pretending.  In the next chapter 
in discussing disenchantment we will hopefully develop the resources to understand why such a 
form of pseudo-religiosity has become so important to so many people.  Similar things can be said 
of a mob, which achieves a fleeting kind of collective effervescence that nevertheless lacks the 
stability and forms of disciplined practice to constitute a form of genuine religiosity, while also 
typically being misoriented towards deeply problematic ends that are at odds with the genuinely 
sacred relational order.    
There is plenty more that could be said to develop and elaborate these points but I hope 
that sufficient materials have been presented to clarify what makes a set of practices 
paradigmatically religious, what makes them successful as religious practices, and what form of 
participation is required to yield the relevant existential fruit that religious life centers upon.  I 
would like now to turn to the question concerning the purported disenchantment of the world and 
the ways in which such disenchantment both threatens religious life and renders all the more urgent 
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12 Many thanks to Mark Wrathall for pressing me to make these clarificatory points in conversation and email 
correspondence, and to Taylor Carman for suggesting that I affirm a version of the first criterion in response to 
Wrathall’s critique.   
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Chapter 4: “Moral Coldness” and “New Sources of Warmth:” 
Dealing with the Challenge of Disenchantment 
… one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.  This means that the world is 
disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or 
implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed.  (Weber 
1958, 139). 
 
That science today is irreligious no one will doubt in his innermost being, even if he will 
not admit it to himself.  Redemption from the rationalism and intellectualism of science is 
the fundamental presupposition of living in union with the divine. (ibid., 142) 
 
- Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation”  
 
 
…[I]nsofar as religion is action and insofar as it is a means of making men live, science 
cannot possibly take its place.   
 … religion seems destined to transform itself rather than disappear… (Durkheim 1995, 
432-3). 
 
- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
 
Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, 
no matter which group may triumph externally now.” 
 
- Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation” 
 
The only thing that matters is to sense above the moral coldness which prevails on the 
surface of our collective life, the sources of warmth which our societies carry in 
themselves.  (Durkheim 1994, 187). 
 





 One might well think that we have provided, with the help of Durkheim and Heidegger, a 
somewhat compelling account of the existential fruit that religiosity can bear in human life.  That 
being said, one might, perhaps flagging the fact that the interpretations they develop of religious 
life center on examples from cultures that are quite dissimilar to our own, think that this account 
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cannot apply in any straightforward sense to the contemporary world.  In brief, one might think 
it’s no accident that both thinkers chose to talk about such examples and that in our secular, 
disenchanted world, in which we might think that God is in some meaningful sense dead, those 
possibilities for relating ourselves to ourselves and our worlds might seem to be closed off.  There 
is no way to fully address the host of important disanalogies that one might raise in making such 
an objection, but I would like to address some of them through a discussion of the work of another 
of the “founding fathers” of sociology: Max Weber. Max Weber claims that processes of 
rationalization in various cultural domains have dealt a serious blow to religiosity such that, 
looking forward, we can expect it to in many respects atrophy and become a relatively peripheral 
cultural phenomenon.  Though there are many discrete, though intertwined, rationalization 
processes that have brought this about, the perhaps most crucial one is the natural scientific 
discovery that the world is bereft of objective values and magical forces such that those with 
intellectual integrity are forced to concede that the world is “disenchanted.”   
The aim of this chapter is, first, to show that Weber’s view is founded on a misinterpretation 
both of religiosity and of the natural scientific picture of the world.  That is to say that the world 
is not disenchanted in the way that he claims and that there are no grounds for thinking that 
religiosity will or should decline in any radical sense.  That being said, there is some truth to the 
thesis insofar as it is taken as articulating a deformation in the ways in which many of us experience 
the world, albeit one which is to explained in a very different manner than Weber explains it.  We 
will therefore be proceeding in the second section of the chapter to the task of providing an 
alternative Durkheimian and Heideggerian account of what the real phenomenon is—with 
reference among other things to the recurrent claim across many thinkers that the phenomenology 
of disenchantment, however it should be understood and explained, involves an experience of the 
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world as having become “colder.”  In the third section, we will be sketching out some of the ways 
in which the problem can, in the light of an improved understanding of its root source, perhaps be 
rectified.  In the latter two sections we will be discussing the work of Akeel Bilgrami on the subject, 
which was a crucial inspiration for this dissertation as a whole and this chapter in particular.  The 
aim will be to show that though he comes at the question from a somewhat different angle his 
account of disenchantment and the task of secular re-enchantment is in broad strokes harmonious 
with it—with the proviso that we will be making the case that distinctively religious practices 
ought to play a more central role than in healing the wounds of disenchantment than his more 
emphatically secular account suggests.   
4.1 Max Weber on Religion 
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.  “Whither is God?  He 
cried; “I will tell you.  We have killed him--you and I.  All of us are his murderers.  But 
how did we do this?  How could we drink up the sea?  What were we doing when we 
unchained this earth from its sun?  Whither is it moving now?  Whither are we 
moving?  Away from all suns?  Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, forward, in 
all directions?  Is there still any up or down?  Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing?  Do we not feel the breath of empty space?  Has it not become colder? ...” 
(Nietzsche 1974, 18) 
 
- Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science  
 
…the prophet for whom so many of our younger generation yearn simply does not 
exist…The inward interest of a truly religiously ‘musical’ man can never be served by 
veiling to him and others the fundamental fact that he is destined to live in a godless and 
prophetless time… 
 
- Max Weber, “Science as Vocation” 
 
 
Nietzsche tells a story about the death of God that goes something like this.  Living things 
generally value truth as well as falsity insofar as both are essential for life.  With the rise of 
Christianity and other “otherworldly” worldviews such as Platonism, a new orientation towards 
truth emerged according to which (1) there is a fixed, universal, eternal truth that is in some sense 
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outside of or beyond the manifest physical world, (2) that truth is of the utmost existential 
importance to human beings, (3) seeking and living in accordance with that truth requires a rather 
severe set of ascetic practices that involve denial of our merely natural, animal nature.  This 
religious, hyper-valuation of Truth lead to the development of the natural sciences, which in turn 
proceeded to discredit the religious/metaphysical stories that had made our single-minded pursuit 
of the truth meaningful.  As a result, the ascetic devotion to Truth leads us to abandon and turn 
away from the notions of God that initially instilled that devotion in us, which in turn deprives 
formerly authoritative notions about God of the living power over human beings that they once 
possessed when we lived our lives in and through them.  Nietzsche is much clearer on the diagnosis 
than the solution, but it does seem fair to say that the way forward involves something like the 
“becoming gods ourselves” of which the madman speaks – an arrogation of the role of sovereign 
legislator of value for ourselves that we had formerly placed in a higher power outside of ourselves.   
 Max Weber tells a version of this story, which was hugely influential throughout the 
twenty-first century and was a major contributor to what social scientists refer to as the 
“secularization thesis,” according to which religion is doomed to die at the hands of natural 
scientific knowledge and theories that provide a much better explanation of the real (physical) 
world than religions ever could.  Weber aligns religion with (instrumental/technological) magic 
much more closely than Durkheim does, and sees religions as necessarily producing theories about 
the world properly subject to a process of rationalization.  Given this manner of understanding 
religion, modelled as it is on the assumption that it must be in the same kind of game as the natural 
sciences and technology, he quite naturally thinks that scientific theories and technologies have 
discredited religion.  The aim of this section is to attempt to lay out the relationship between these 
(quite common) misconstruals of religion and the generation of the disenchantment thesis, as well 
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as the way in which both are symptomatic of a deeper, different problem that we will be attempting 
to diagnose in the following section. 
Weber opens The Sociology of Religion by making several important claims, seeming 
variations of which we have also found in Durkheim.  He claims, first of all, that one cannot 
understand religious phenomena unless one gives a certain primacy to the viewpoint of the 
“subjective experiences, idea, and purposes of the individuals concerned” (Weber 1991, 1).  This 
is similar to Durkheim’s claim that “[there] cannot be a rational interpretation of religion which is 
fundamentally irreligious” (Durkheim 1994, 185), though there are two differences worth 
noting.  In the first place, the emphasis on subjective experiences is missing in Durkheim, who 
understands religious experience in fundamentally social and in some sense subjectivity-
transcendent terms.  Second of all, Durkheim affirms the viewpoint of the social scientist capable 
of understanding religion as a fundamentally religious one, which the “religiously unmusical” 
Weber would deny. 
Second of all, he claims the “most elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or 
magical factors are oriented to this world” (Weber 1991, 1).  This too echoes a point made by 
Durkheim that religious phenomena “are grounded in and express the real” (Durkheim 1995, 2), 
though again there is a significant difference.  First of all, Weber is speaking here primarily of the 
more primitive forms of religiosity--in contrast to the more otherworldly, post-axial forms--
whereas for Durkheim, though The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is focused on aboriginal 
Australian religion, this will be true of all forms of religious life.  Here one might side with Weber 
in rejecting Durkheim’s claim that religions are fundamentally this-worldly, which claim seems to 
repudiate the more, to use Nietzsche’s term, “otherworldly” orientation of many post-Axial forms 
of religiosity.  Durkheim’s account is, as we’ve already acknowledged, too reductive insofar as he 
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insists that his more reductive naturalistic account is the uniquely authoritative account of 
religion.  There are, however, two things that need to be said in defense of Durkheim.  First of all, 
one can affirm that even more otherworldly forms of religiosity must simultaneously situate us in 
relation to the things of this world.  It might well be the case that one cannot relate to the 
transcendent except by way of the mediation of these worldly things.  Second of all, both Weber 
and Durkheim ultimately agree in asserting that religion must be explained in terms of the relation 
in which it stands to this-worldly things, regardless of the claims to otherworldly relation that the 
religious might make in interpreting their own behavior.  So, ultimately, both engage in a form of 
reductionism and, insofar as it takes a more subjectivist and irrealist form in Weber, Durkheim’s 
account is, I think, more compelling. 
Finally, Weber claims that religious behavior is “relatively rational” (Weber 1991, 
1).  Again, this is a claim similar to but different from the more radical (and admittedly somewhat 
hyperbolic) one which Durkheim makes when he claims that “there are no religions that are false” 
(Durkheim, 2).  Weber wants to argue that religion is intelligible as a response to the human 
predicament and that it is subject to the process of rationalization, which, he thinks, leads 
ultimately to the revelation of the ultimate rational incoherence of all religious worldviews, 
understood essentially as forms of theory about the world.  Durkheim, on the other hand, thinks 
that religions relate us to the sources of value in our lives that are located outside of our individual 
persons, in the social ideals that structure our lives together and are embodied in our relations to 
the people around us.  This view treats religion as epistemically legitimate, though the ways in 
which religions relate us to truths about our predicament will not be of a fundamentally 
propositional or theoretical sort.  Though beliefs are crucial to many religions, they cannot simply 
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be treated, according to Durkheim, as a relatively straightforward, rationalizable set of beliefs that 
can be unproblematically treated as material for a rationalized theory about the world.    
Crucially, Weber elaborates his claim concerning the relative rationality of religious belief 
by talking about acts of magical manipulation: “Rubbing will elicit sparks from pieces of wood, 
and in like fashion the stimulative actions of a magician will evoke rain from the heavens.  The 
sparks resulting from twirling the wooden sticks are as much a ‘magical’ effect as the rain evoked 
by the manipulations of the rainmaker” (Weber 1991, 1).  Here we find two features of Weber’s 
account of religion that set it apart from that which Durkheim provides, namely its emphasis on 
religion (1) as emerging out of magical manipulations of reality and (2) as providing accounts of 
the world that are roughly comparable to those which science provides.  Furthermore, we see his 
understanding of religion as at base grounded in mundane, broadly “selfish” concerns--ones that 
are, nevertheless, subject to transformation in the light of religious interpretations of reality.  This 
variety of reductivism is revealed in his conclusion of the discussion of the this-worldly and 
relatively rational orientation of religion as follows: “Thus, religious or magical behavior or 
thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct, particularly since 
even the ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic” (Weber 1991, 1).   
This last view couldn’t be farther from Durkheim’s.  Concerning the relationship between 
magic and religion, Durkheim speaks of “the repugnance of religion for magic and the hostility of 
magic to religion in turn” (Durkheim 1995, 40).  Whereas magic is concerned with the 
achievement of mundane, individually-defined ends, “take[s] a kind of professional pleasure in 
profaning holy things” (ibid), is generally practiced by loners for individual clients, and plays no 
role in establishing a moral community, religion for Durkheim is fundamentally concerned with 
establishing a moral community.  With this in mind, we can already see how disenchantment, 
211 
 
where that is understood as centrally involving the discrediting of belief in magical worldly forces, 
is not something that Durkheim would see as a threat to human religiosity.   
Durkheim spends a good deal of time in Elementary Forms arguing against the prevailing 
theories of religion of his day, which tended to assume, as Weber at least in part does, that it 
centrally involves a kind of confused epistemically dead-end form of would-be science and/or 
technology.  He recurrently makes the important and plausible claim that these explanations only 
make sense on the assumption that the relevant persons are rather moronic and prone to investing 
enormous amounts of energy in practices that utterly fail to deliver the goods they are supposedly 
in the game of delivering.  In lieu of a deep dive into that rather extended and painstaking effort at 
refutation, I would like instead to cite an anthropological anecdote that Mary Douglas invokes in 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo to refute this kind of 
condescending interpretive move:  
Once when a band of !Kung Bushmen had performed their rain rituals, a small cloud 
appeared on the horizon, grew and darkened.  Then rain fell.  But the anthropologists who 
asked if the Bushmen reckoned the rite had produced the rain were laughed out of court 
(Marshall, 1957).  How naïve can we get about the beliefs of others?  Old anthropological 
sources are full of the notion that primitive people expect rites to produce an immediate 
intervention in their affairs, and they poke kindly fun at those who supplement their rituals 
of healing with European medicine, as if this testified to lack of faith. (Douglas 2001, 59) 
 
Though there is no doubt plenty that is problematic in Durkheim’s interpretation and appropriation 
of aboriginal Australian religious culture in Elementary Forms, he does insist on assuming that we 
must take the practices in question seriously and as assume that, ceteris paribus, the persons in 
question are acting in a reasonable manner.  That is to say that, for all his condescension towards 
the religious, there is something simple-minded about Weber’s own way of thinking about the 
purported simple-mindedness of the religious.   
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The next aspect of Weber’s theory that needs to be addressed is his account of the 
dimension of human existence that drives the formation and development of religion.  We have 
seen that, for Durkheim, human religiosity is a direct function of human nature.  Insofar as “man 
is double,” we have an inbuilt need to relate ourselves to the transcendent sources of value in which 
we are embedded, which is largely a function of the ideals that in fact do or ought to orient our 
lives together, a matter, in other words, of relating in the right way to other people.  Religious 
evolution, on this view, is a matter of adjusting our relationship to and understanding of the social 
ideals that do or should structure our world.  As the imperatives of and encounters with others 
within social life change, so too must religion.  But insofar as religion is a means of relating 
ourselves to social ideals and our embeddedness in social relations, it must inevitably persist.  As 
he puts the point in the passage cited above, “insofar as religion is action and insofar as it is a 
means of making men live, science cannot possibly take its place...religion seems destined to 
transform itself rather than disappear” (Durkheim 1995, 432).  It properly plays by different rules 
than paradigmatic scientific, technological, and economic practices, has a similarly or even more 
essential role in human life, and needs to be understood as the distinctive, truth-responsive and -
generative, action-guiding and -enabling phenomenon that it is.   
For Weber, on the other hand, religious evolution is often driven by attempts to provide 
theoretical explanations of problematic features of human existence like that of undeserved 
suffering.  Religious belief is therefore subject to a process of rationalization in which defenders 
of the relevant religious worldview (1) attempt to render coherent their particular dogmatic content 
in a way that (2) effectively addresses the problem of suffering through the construction of a more 
or less plausible theodicy (Weber 1958, 138-9).  Such theoretical attempts tend to lead in a fixed 
variety of directions, towards various consistent, though ultimately unsatisfying and inadequate, 
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theories that attempt to explain away this problematic feature of human life.  He outlines three 
main forms of such (relatively) rational theodicy, all of which involve some compromise with the 
notion of an all-loving God, which Weber sees as irreconcilable with the manifest existence of 
unjust suffering in the world.   
The first, which renounces the omnipotence of the just god, is dualism, which is found 
most consistently articulated in Zoroastrianism, and which he characterizes as “only a direct 
systematization of the magical pluralism of the spirits with their division of good (useful) and evil 
(harmful) spirits…” (Weber 1958, 358).  Again, the assimilation of good and evil to use value is 
revealing and, if we accept Durkheim’s contrasting account, deeply problematic.  The second is 
the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, which achieves consistency through the renunciation of 
divine benevolence: “Man’s acknowledged incapacity to scrutinize the ways of God means that he 
renounces in a loveless clarity man’s accessibility to any meaning of the world” (ibid, 
359).  Finally, there is the doctrine of karma, which explains seemingly undeserved punishment in 
this world with respect to misdeeds in a past life.  Of this view he writes that “[it] stands out by 
virtue of its consistency as well as by its extraordinary metaphysical achievement: It unites 
virtuoso-like self-redemption by man’s own effort with universal accessibility of salvation, the 
strictest rejection of the world with organic ethics, and contemplation as the paramount path to 
salvation with an inner-worldly vocational ethic” (ibid).   
It is striking to note that the winners in this rationalization contest are not particularly 
appealing.  All three embody a rather pronounced moral callousness.  And this is no accident.  One 
must ignore or explain away inherently meaningless suffering if one is to reconcile oneself with it 
on religious terms.  Weber therefore thinks that religions are incapable of providing an ultimately 
satisfying response to the problem of theodicy, which is essential, alongside his account of cultural 
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and scientific rationalization, to his claim that they must ultimately be rejected as inadequate at 
later stages in the process of rationalization process.  The problem of meaningless suffering 
combines with the revelation of ineradicable value pluralism to render religion unacceptable for 
anyone with the integrity to confront reality in a clear-eyed manner. If his characterization of 
religious rationalization as centering on tinkering with a dogmatic theory about the mechanics of 
suffering distribution is, along with his claim concerning ineradicable value pluralism, correct, 
religions must and probably should atrophy.   
If, as we discussed in the last chapter, Durkheim and Wittgenstein are right in claiming that 
religious beliefs are misunderstood to the extent that they are understood as rudimentary theories, 
we have reason for thinking that this account of (1) the character of the most cognitively satisfying 
religious beliefs and (2) the inevitable foundering of the latter upon things that cannot be explained 
is wrongheaded.  Whatever truth is disclosed in and around the Greek temple, when the Kangaroo 
clan celebrate their religious rights, and so forth, it is not subject to a rationalization process in the 
way that beliefs about the physical relationship between the earth and celestial bodies are.  Though 
there is much to critique in Durkheim’s decision to turn to aboriginal Australian religion as a pure, 
“primitive” form of religiosity, there is a certain plausibility to the claim that attending to cultures 
in which theory is not understood as the paradigmatic form of knowing the world helps to break 
free of the blinders that our fetishization of theory—more on this below—places on our ability to 
understand religious life.   
Durkheim’s contrasting account of the ways in which religions deal with the problem of 
undeserved suffering can help us see that Weber’s account has here confused a theological problem 
that achieves prominence at certain periods of history for certain people with the aim of religion 
across the board.  If we understand religion in less theoretical terms, as centrally grounded upon 
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certain powerful experiences of value, and as comfortable with mysteries that defy human 
comprehension, we can see that the problem of suffering is not a decisive obstacle to religious 
forms of life.  We will see below that Durkheim thinks arguments have very little to do with 
bringing about or undermining religious faith.  Relatedly, he sees the kinds of theoretical reflection 
with which Weber is concerned as far from essential to religious life.  He puts the point in the 
following passage from Suicide:   
What is the end of suffering, above all?...This problem does not exist for the believer 
firm in his faith or in the man strongly bound by ties of domestic or political society…Even 
in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and 
thus do homage to it…But the more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a 
real participant in the religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing 
himself; the more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much 
the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and 
agonizing question: to what purpose? (Durkheim 1979, 212). 
 
Though Suicide was written before Durkheim arrived at his mature account of religion, and thus 
we see in this passage a too-hasty alignment between religious ties and those of the domestic and 
political sphere, the gist of the claim should be familiar.  Religious practices aim at setting us up 
in the right, (good-)life-sustaining relations to our social world.  Though religious persons 
immersed in and shaped by those practices generate theories to help them think about the world 
and connect their religious stance with their other beliefs, the substance of their commitment lies 
elsewhere.  For this reason, no merely theoretical problem like the problem of evil, of which 
religious persons have always been aware, be decisive in undermining them (except where theory 
is misunderstood as being the uniquely authoritative mode of relating ourselves to the truth).  
Rather, suffering becomes problematic when we lose the ability to see it as meaningful in light of 
the committed relations in which we stand to others, as they are disclosed to us by our basic 
existential stance towards the world, explicitly religious or not.  
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 The upshot of all of this is that Weber, like many others, thinks of religion as a theoretical 
endeavor that can ultimately be understood on analogy with the natural sciences and their 
application in technology.  Religion is supposed to show how magical forces and values actively 
shape human life in a morally coherent manner, and provide us with means for discerning and 
using those magical forces in our lives.   Weber thinks that this enterprise is relatively rational but 
has at this point been quite clearly discredited for those who are knowledgeable and courageous 
enough to recognize this fact.  The religious project is one centered on the effort to understand the 
ways in which the world is shaped by ultimately authoritative values and forces responsive to those 
values with an eye to setting ourselves in the right kind of relation to that objective evaluative and 
causal order.  The religious person is searching, in other words, for objective facts about value and 
for a way of tapping into objective value-responsive forces that can support us in our efforts to live 
our lives in their light.  This involves a mistake—at this point, for Weber, one to which only certain 
“big children” who lack the maturity to face hard truths are inclined to make (Weber 1958, 142-
3).  There are no such objective, subjectivity-transcendent grounds of value and there is no moral 
reality “out there” for us to get in tune with.  Rather, the individual is left to her own devices when 
it comes to forming her value commitments and finding a way to live with the fact that they are 
have no further grounding.  When it comes to realize those values, whatever they may be, one 
must simply attempt to accrue enough value-neutral power to reshape the world and the people 
around you in a manner that allows them to be realized—albeit in an essential finite and precarious 
manner.   
 Discussing Weber’s account of the character of human religion and its self-undermining 
evolution through the rationalization process that progressively exposes the deep confusions about 
the nature of reality upon which it rests, is important for two reasons.  On the one hand, it is a 
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highly influential variation on a way of thinking about religion that has been quite widespread, at 
least in educated Western circles, in the past century or two and as such must be confronted and 
critiqued as part of the process of vindicating the alternative Durkheimian account of religion we 
are developing and defending here.  Additionally, it is symptomatic of a deeper problem.  If 
Weber’s account of religion is mistaken in the way that we have argued, it is mistaken for reasons 
that are connected to yet other mistakes that he, in an again rather characteristic way, makes about 
other matters concerning the individual’s place in and relations to the natural and social worlds.  
Our aim now is to turn to these deeper misunderstandings as a means of understanding (a) what’s 
wrong with the disenchantment narrative and (b) what’s wrong with our form of life that might 
explain why so many of us take it to be not only plausible but obviously true.   
4.2 “…the cold skeletal hands of rational orders…:” Weber (and) the Disenchanted 
[Increased intellectualization/rationalization] means that…one can, in principle, master all 
things by calculation.  This means that the world is disenchanted. (Weber 1958, 139). 
 
The natural sciences are] apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the “meaning” 
of the universe die out at its very roots. (ibid, 142). 
 
- Max Weber, “Science as Vocation” 
 
 According to Weber, the world is disenchanted.  The German term translated as 
“disenchantment”—Entzauberung—means the removal of magic(al forces) or the breaking of a 
spell.   Though there are any number of problems internal to the religious project of developing 
rationalized theological accounts of the world, the real death blow or at least permanent weakening 
comes from this purported upshot of natural scientific investigation.  Both meanings of the term 
are important: the purported discovery involves (a) the elimination of magical forces from our 
most rational(ized) conception of the natural world and (b) the breaking of a kind of spell under 
which humanity has thus far lived, projecting as it has its value commitments and hopes and 
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aspirations onto the world in an essentially confused and false manner.  That is to say that it 
involves both a change in our worldview and a change in ourselves.  Weber’s claim is that, at least 
in certain central respects, the former causes the latter.  The Durkheimian/Heideggerian claim is 
in many respects the reverse, as we will see in the next chapter. The task of this section is to unpack 
the account of disenchantment, which is continuous with though distinct from that of religious 
rationalization.   
In “Science as a Vocation,” which is concerned with the broadly Nietzschean question of 
the meaning of the pursuit of objective truth in the absence of metaphysical faith in its transcendent 
value, Weber provides the following characterization of the “intellectualized” state of affairs in 
contemporary society: 
[Increased intellectualization/rationalization] means that principally there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation.  This means that the world is disenchanted.  One need no 
longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore spirits, as did the 
savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed.  Technical means and calculations 
perform the service.  This above all is what intellectualization means.  (Weber 1958, 139). 
 
This passage is revealing in a number of respects.  First of all, there is the claim that 
intellectualization is fundamentally connected to instrumentalization--the ability to master all 
things by calculation.  The world, on this picture, is seen as a bunch of value-bereft stuff that our 
intellects can fully comprehend and with which we are free to do what we’d like.  Second of all, 
there is the identification of the formerly prevailing enchantment with a manipulative, magical 
relation to imaginary spirits whom one either masters or implores, characteristic of the 
“savage.”  This is significant because it understands the enchantment in which we can no longer 
believe as just another means of exerting power over nature--subserviently or dominatingly--and 
not as a matter of communing with self-transcendent sites of value.  Science shows us that 
calculation is a better means whereby to accomplish such manipulation.  
219 
 
 A few pages later, Weber turns to the question of meaning in the world.  Weber portrays 
science and religion as being fundamentally antagonistic--something he claims has generally come 
to be acknowledged, save by some “big children” (ibid, 142): 
[The natural sciences are] apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the “meaning” 
of the universe die out at its very roots. 
 ...That science today is irreligious no one will doubt in his innermost being, even if he 
will not admit it to himself.  Redemption from the rationalism and intellectualism of 
science is the fundamental presupposition of living in union with the divine.  (ibid). 
 
Here the scientific description of the causal structure of material reality is understood in scientistic 
terms as reductive and comprehensively authoritative in a way that inevitably undermines--for 
those who are clear-eyed enough to see this truth clearly--any claim that the world is a site of value 
or meaning external to us.  To the extent that one wishes to persist in orienting oneself to the world 
in religious terms, one must to some extent disavow the rationality that delivers us such an 
understanding.   
 As this rationalized understanding of the world begins, with the implacable momentum of 
rational development, to take hold of society, our relationship to value takes on a different, more 
clear-sighted form.  Alongside this development of scientific knowledge of the natural world 
comes the increasing rationalization of the various spheres of value (aesthetic, ethical, political, 
and religious), which increasingly reveals that these values are in “irreconcilable” conflict with 
one another (ibid, 147).  A commitment to aesthetic value--which, with the development of 
rationalization, is revealed to be fundamentally amoral--reveals itself to be out of sync and in many 
respects at odds with a commitment to ethical value, in the same way that a commitment to the 
values of formalized jurisprudence are revealed to be at odds with the values of the brotherly 
religious ethic embodied in Christianity.  This revelation of the fundamental irreconcilability of 
the various spheres of value leads individuals to have to decide between them: 
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 What man will take upon himself the attempt to “refute scientifically” the ethic of the 
Sermon on the Mount?...And yet it is clear, in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic of 
undignified conduct; one has to choose between the religious dignity which this ethic 
confers and the dignity of manly conduct...According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is 
the devil and the other the God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and 
which is the devil.  And so it goes throughout all the orders of life.  (ibid, 148). 
 
What is decisive as far as the determination of what constitutes valuable action is no longer located 
in any sort of objective reality, social or natural, but rather in the will of particular individuals, 
each of whom has to make an ultimately ungrounded decision one way or another.  Given that 
“nothing is worthy of man as man unless he pursue it with passionate devotion” (ibid, 135), the 
ground of decision will be, for Weber, the internal desires that one happens to have.  If, that is, one 
has the manly fortitude to acknowledge the necessity of taking on the responsibility to make this 
decision.   
One is, therefore, in some sense on one’s own when it comes to these matters.  We exist 
now in a realm of ineradicable value conflict and struggle for power, of disenchanted polytheism:  
Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of 
impersonal forces.  They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their 
eternal struggle with one another.  What is hard for modern man, and especially for the 
younger generation, is to measure up to workaday existence.  The ubiquitous chase for 
“experience” stems from this weakness; for it is weakness not to be able to countenance 
the stern seriousness of our fateful times.  (ibid, 149). 
 
There is a polemic in “Science as a Vocation” against the high valuation of personal experience 
that Weber sees as typical of the youth culture of his day.  Given the importance of Weber 
considers personal experience to be an “idol,” declaring his preference for the more reductive term 
“sensation” and claiming that “only he who is devoted solely to the work at hand has ‘personality’” 
(ibid, 137).  What are we to make of this?  While Weber is certainly right to critique a certain kind 
of lazy and self-indulgent pursuit of personal experiences with which we are all familiar, his 
preference for the term “sensation” and his emphasis on the absolute centrality of disciplined work 
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suggest a deeper and more pernicious rejection of the value of transformative personal encounters 
with persons and things.  Seeking transformative aesthetic or religious experiences, for instance, 
seem to Weber to involve little more than a flight from our work obligations.   
 Given his understanding of the world as value-bereft, and evaluative orientation as a matter 
of decision, followed by more or less successful implementation in the form of disciplined work, 
his undervaluing of personal experience makes sense.  There is no room in his picture of the world 
for experience to serve for much beyond knowledge acquisition or value implementation - the 
world only gives us ultimately meaningless objects and value is a matter of our outward projection 
upon it.  A good life emerges not from open engagement with the world but from disciplined and 
single-minded labor upon it.  We are, for Weber, “destined to live in a godless and prophetless 
time” (ibid, 153).  And the future looks bleak: “a polar night of icy darkness and hardness” lies 
ahead of us.  In the conclusion of “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber writes that not only aspiring 
political leaders, but also the rest of the clear-eyed human population needs to confront certain 
potentially despair-inducing features of our existential predicament and “arm themselves with that 
steadfastness of heart which can brave even the crumbling of all hopes” (ibid, 128).  We must 
become well-buffered, hardened selves capable of persisting in our disciplined work in a world 
bereft of any source of independent value or existential reassurance.  In the remainder of this 
section I will attempt to show why, in the light of the account of human existence and the role of 
religion within it that we’ve developed over the course of this dissertation, Weber’s account of 
disenchantment and its rational grounding is false.  Having hopefully shown the weaknesses of the 
view itself, if not perhaps directly refuting it, we will then be in a position to briefly develop an 




 In the section of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on “Collective 
Intentionality” the sociological section opens with the claim that Durkheim and Weber can be 
understood as staking out essentially opposed positions on the topic, being referred to as a kind of 
Scylla and Charybdis on the subject (Schweikard & Schmid, 5-7).  Weber characteristically seeks 
to explain social facts in terms of the subjective attitudes of individuals, whereas Durkheim places 
a great deal of emphasis on social facts as involving agential dynamics that can’t be understood 
through such a reductive frame.  Though their accounts of the character of our sociality and social 
relations might seem on the surface to have nothing to do with the question of Weber’s account of 
disenchantment, our claim is that they everything to do with one another.  If the account of the 
radical sociality of human persons is correct, Weber’s claim that there are only subjective values 
is in some straightforward sense patently false.  That is to say, crudely, that insofar as you’re a 
person, life is meaningful and value non-subjective.  Though we are inevitably presented, given 
our concrete embodiment and situatedness and the complex matrix of “we” relations in which we 
inevitably stand, to make decisions about which values in the light of which we will strive to live, 
decisions about value are never simply a subjective matter of introspecting, discovering what we 
happen to want, and then making that a value for ourselves. Meaningful individual decisions about 
how to live and what commitments to make are always decisions about how to situate oneself in 
the “we” relations in which one stands to other and one is always called to be appropriately 
responsive and accountable to those others in making those decisions.  This basic picture provided 
the grounds for affirming a variation on the account of despair and the sickness/health of persons 
in The Sickness unto Death, where that was a function of the ways in which one’s taking a stand 
on oneself as an individual person was properly responsive to the constitutive relations in which 
one stood to the other(s) upon whom you depend for your very existence as a person.  According 
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to the view we’ve been developing, in other words, what Weber is describing is the way the world 
looks to someone who’s in despair as a result of a breakdown in their life-sustaining relational life.  
If you think that the way to determine what the meaning in and of your life will be is simply to 
make an individual decision based on the contents of your subjectivity, you’re making a serious 
mistake that likely reflects the fact that you have become alienated in and/or from the relationships 
that ought to be providing you with normative orientation in and to the world. 
 There is a second, related point, here which Akeel Bilgrami makes in a refreshingly direct 
and simple way in his essay “Gandhi (and Marx”) while unpacking Gandhi’s repudiation of 
precisely the sort of view that Weber takes to be obvious to educated people who are manly enough 
to confront harsh truths:  
[Gandhi] rightly saw it as a superstition of modernity that nature must be conceived only 
as that which these [natural] sciences study.  (By superstition, I just mean a belief so 
accepted in the wider belief community that we take it on trust and forget when or how it 
was proved and why and in what ways it helps us to live.)  However, in this case, among 
intellectual classes, it is a dogma that has been maintained by sheer intellectual 
browbeating, dismissing all denials of it as an expression of unscientific mentality…But 
no science contains the proposition that nature is exclusively and exhaustively what falls 
within the purview of these sciences.  This is a proposition asserted by philosophers and, 
if and when scientists assert it, they are doing so not qua scientists but on their own time, 
as philosophers.  These are ideologues who have wholly embraced the outlook that 
emerged around the new science in the late seventeenth century.  When they express such 
a view that are not uttering a scientific proposition but expressing a scientistic outlook, the 
preposterous elevation of science by claiming that all questions about nature are scientific 
questions and implying, therefore, that there exists nothing in nature that falls outside the 
business of science and its laws. (Bilgrami 2014, 156-7). 
 
This claim seems to me to be straightforwardly correct, and it is one that opens up the possibility 
that we could go further than I have done in this dissertation in defending the non-subjective 
character of value, asserting not only that it is grounded in the norms that are baked into human 
nature but that there is some yet more robustly objective grounding for them.  I am inclined to 
endorse such a view—largely because I am inclined to be as committed to the reality of the values 
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in response to which we are constituted as persons—though I will not be arguing for it and do not 
think it needs to be true for us to reject the Weberian position.  Furthermore, the intellectual 
browbeating to which Bilgrami refers is something that we see very much in display in Weber’s 
recurrent claim that those who disagree with him aren’t real men or are “big children.”  The fact 
that Weber uses insults instead of arguments here is symptomatic of the fact that this kind of view 
is in fact an ideology dressed up, as ideologies typically are, simply as what it is rational to believe.  
We will be saying more in the next section about what might explain the grip that this ideology 
has on so many of us. 
 In addition to this negative argument against the kind of position that Weber is committed 
to, Bilgrami also provides a positive argument for the claim that values are objective features of 
reality.   This argument is also delightfully simple and powerful and makes reference to a 
fundamental fact about the phenomenology of agency.  The gist of the argument, from his essay 
“Value and Alienation: A Revisionist Essay on Our Political Ideals,” proceeds as follows:  
[There is] an ambiguity in an utterance that a subject might make: “I will do…”. This could 
be a statement of intention or a prediction…When one predicts that one will do something, 
one steps outside of oneself and looks at oneself as an object of behavioral and causal and 
motivational tendencies, one looks at oneself as another might look at one, and so this is 
sometimes called the “third-person” point of view on oneself.  But when one intends to do 
something one is asking, “What should I do?” or “What ought I to do?,” one is being an 
agent, in the practical sense, not an observer of oneself, one is a practical subject rather 
than an object, and that is why this is described as a “first-person” perspective on oneself. 
 …If all we had were a third-personal view on ourselves, we would have abdicated our 
practical agency… 
 …it is natural to think that there ought also to be a similar distinction that holds for 
perspectives we have on the world.  We can have a detached perspective on it, a perspective 
of study (as is paradigmatically found in natural science…) and we can have a perspective 
of agency on the world, one of responding to it with practical engagement rather than with 
detached observation and explanatory purpose. 
 …Let’s, then, consider what must the world contain, such that it moves us to such 
practical engagement, over and above detached observation and study?...A natural answer 
to the question is that over and above containing the facts that natural science studies it 
contains a special kind of fact, evaluative facts and properties, or more simply, it contains 
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values; and when we perceive them, they put normative demands to us and activate our 
practical engagement… 
 Thus if we extend in this way onto the world a presupposition of the fundamental 
distinction between intention and predication…we get a conception of values that is not 
something we always generate (as Hume and Adam Smith would have it), and then 
“project” onto the world (a long-favored metaphor), but they are properties that are found 
in the world, a world of nature, of others who inhabit nature with us, and of a history and 
tradition that accumulate in the relations among these, and within which value is 
understood as being “in the world”…This understanding of values (sometimes in recent 
years attributed to Aristotle, by John McDowell), therefore, seems something that can be 
motivated by the most commonsensical considerations about what is distinctive about 
practical agency and its unique point of view.  (Bilgrami 2020, 69-70). 
 
Bilgrami goes on to develop this view in much greater depth and I am not inclined or competent 
to really weigh into the metaethical waters here and try to tackle the objections that someone more 
inclined to the projectivist view might make to this position.  I cite it because it points to the ways 
in which the Weberian position is, if we attend to the basic phenomenology of our lives as agents, 
is empathically not obvious and deeply counterintuitive.  It does violence to and alienates us from 
the stance towards the world that we must, as he rightly flags, take up to exercise our personal 
agency.13 And if we are not from the outset committed to a rather blanket dismissal of our 
experience—as Weber seems inclined to do, as we saw, in a different but related sense—it would 
seem that the claim that such a view is obvious is a symptom that something has in our relational 
life—towards ourselves, the world, and one another—has gone wrong.  It is also worth mentioning 
                                                 
13 This doesn’t mean that we can’t try to live in such a perspective—and that it is characteristic of modernity, as 
Bilgrami himself flags, that we do.  But there is something ridiculous about the effort, as the following passage, from 
Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections very amusingly illustrates: “Although in general Gary applauded the modern 
trend toward individual self-management of retirement funds and long—distance calling plans and private-schooling 
options, he was less than thrilled to be given responsibility for his own brain chemistry, especially when certain people 
in his life, notably his father, refused to take any such responsibility.  But Gary was nothing if not conscientious.  As 
he entered the darkroom, he estimated that his levels of Neurofactor 3 (i.e. serotonin: a very, very important factor) 
were posting seven-day or even thirty-day highs, that his Factor 2 and Factor 7 levels were likewise outperforming 
expectations, and that his Factor 1 had rebounded from an early-morning slump related to the glass of Armagnac he’d 
drunk at bedtime.  He had a spring in his step, an agreeable awareness of his above-average height and his late-summer 
suntan.  His resentment of his wife, Caroline, was moderate and well contained.  Declines led advances in key indices 
of paranoia (e.g., his persistent suspicion that Caroline and his two older sons were mocking him), and his seasonally 
adjusted assessment of life’s futility and brevity was consistent with the overall robustness of his mental economy.  
He was not in the least bit clinically depressed.” (Franzen, 137-8) 
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that at the very least the phenomenological point that Bilgrami makes, as well as the claim that we 
need to look outside of ourselves, perhaps not simply but to some great extent towards other 
persons, are ones which, in perhaps problematically attenuated form, the view developed in the 
first chapter of this dissertation provides grounds for affirming.  The affirmation would involve 
elevation of the second-personal stance towards ourselves, in addition to the first- and third-
personal stances, but in broad strokes would harmonize with Bilgrami’s central claims.  Finally, 
the perceptual account of our relationship to value is one a version of which we’ve affirmed in our 
discussion of the ways in which Heidegger understands the happening of truth as unconcealment 
in the Greek temple and we will be returning to Bilgrami’s reconstruction of Gandhi’s related, 
experiential account of moral truth.  But before turning to that we should say something about 
Durkheim’s claims regarding the relationship between science and religion and the ways in which 
he avoids certain of Weber’s errors while arguably, at least at times, falling victim to others. 
Both Durkheim and Weber tend to accept a basic way of thinking according to which 
values are either objective, and thus susceptible of scientific investigation, or they are merely 
subjective.  Where they part ways is in which of these two positions they find most compelling.  
Weber thinks, as we’ve seen, that objectively reality is value neutral and that our evaluative 
commitments are merely subjective.  Durkheim takes something closer to the opposite view, 
thinking that there are standards of health and sickness for societies as well as individuals and that 
a healthy society is one that is—and it’s crucial that what this involves will vary from society to 
society without being merely relative—moral.  As Frederick Neuhouser summarizes it, “[o]ne of 
Durkheim’s most intriguing claim s is that social health and moral health are the same condition 
and that sociology therefore is a moral science” (Neuhouser, forthcoming).  Sociology is among 
other things aimed at discerning and in broad strokes articulating this moral order in a manner that 
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yields prescriptions about how society out to be (re)structured.  If I’m right in attributing a version 
of the agential vs. scientific standpoint contrast to Durkheim, this is another way of getting a grip 
on the normative reality with which religious practices are also concerned.  For Weber, on the 
other hand, there is a stronger, starker contrast between the objective investigation and the value 
commitments of the investigator, which must be kept separate and for which there can be no 
ultimate grounding.  Whereas the Durkheimian sociologist has scientific grounds for making 
claims about how we ought to restructure our societies, for Weber such claims are unscientific 
expressions of what a particular scientist, given her own subjective commitments, would like to 
see done in the light of the value-neutral discoveries she has made.  I think that something like the 
Durkheimian position here is correct, with the proviso that the most authentic and essential mode 
of relating ourselves to the relevant normative demands will not be that of the scientist—a claim 
that we will be returning to at the end of this section. 
Durkheim is also committed to the view that religion and science are not to be understood, 
as Weber tends to understand them, as competing with one another such that affirming the 
discoveries of the natural sciences requires rejecting religion or vice versa, as Weber assumes.  He 
makes this claim in the following passage:  
…Science is often said to deny religion in principle.  But religion exists; it is a system of 
given facts; in short, it is a reality.  How could science deny a reality?  Furthermore, insofar 
as religion is action and insofar as it is a means of making men live, science cannot possibly 
take its place.  Although science expresses life, it does not create life, and science can very 
well seek to explain faith but by that very fact presupposes faith. … What science disputes 
in religion is not its right to exist but its right to dogmatize about the nature of things, its 
pretensions to special expertise for explaining man and the world.  In fact, religion does 
not know itself…  
 However, religion seems destined to transform itself rather than disappear. 
 I have said that there is something eternal in religion: the cult and the faith.  But men 
can neither conduct ceremonies for which they can see no rationale, nor accept a faith that 
they in no way understand.  To spread or simply maintain religion, one must justify it, 
which is to say one must devise a theory of it.  A theory of this sort must assuredly rest on 
the various sciences as soon as they come into existence… But as important as these 
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borrowing from the established sciences may be, they are in no way sufficient; faith is 
above all a spur to action, whereas science, no matter how advanced, always remains at a 
distance from action…In this way, even the most rational and secularized religions cannot 
and never do without a particular kind of speculation which, although having the same 
objects as science itself, still cannot be properly scientific.  The obscure intuitions of sense 
and sensibility often take the place of logical reasons. 
…While exercising the right to go beyond science, it must begin by knowing and 
drawing inspiration from science… (Durkheim 1995, 432-3). 
 
In some sense, this point should be a familiar one.  There are two points that I would like to 
underline.  The first is that, though he unfortunately falls short of making the kind of claim that 
Bilgrami makes, he gestures in this passage to the fact that the natural sciences involve a kind of 
relatively disinterested and alienated stance towards the world that is essential in its proper place 
but which is inappropriate to the stance we must take up in and towards the world as agents.  Our 
attitude towards the world and the task of acting within it needs to be constrained by relevant 
scientific discoveries, but it is essentially, crucially different from that of the scientific investigator.  
Heidegger’s contrast between the being of and manner in which we understand (ready-to-hand) 
equipment that we use in our active lives and the way in which we understand (merely present-at-
hand) objects of scientific investigation gets at something like this contrast and helps to sharpen 
somewhat the rather murky claim that Durkheim is making here.   
 The second claim that is important for our purposes concerns the importance for Durkheim 
of providing a theory of religion that allows us to make sense of the practice in the context of other 
human practices and bodies of knowledge.  This, again, is a response to the partial truth of what 
Weber argues in his account of religious and scientific rationalization.  Institutions that had once 
seemed—including for the likes of the aboriginal Australians and ancient Greeks—in some sense, 
at least for most, unproblematic, have been rendered problematic by a variety of factors, the 
development of natural scientific knowledge among them.  This foregrounding of theory might on 
first reading seem to be in tension with what I said above about the illegitimacy of placing theory 
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at the center of religion in the way that Weber does, but what’s crucial is to distinguish theory in 
and theory of religion.  The latter is crucial for Durkheim, at least at this for his contemporaries in 
the “Western” world, but it is distinct from religion itself which must have a distinctive attitude 
towards the world that is distinct from even if informed by physical, biological, sociological, etc. 
theories. This, again, I think is better understood with reference to Heidegger’s distinction between 
the world in which human beings live and the universe as an object of scientific investigation, 
which we can undertake only by detaching ourselves to some, always limited and only partial, 
extent from the world in which we live our mortal lives.  The claim that religions can speculate 
about things that the natural sciences investigate in a different, more sensibility-driven manner is 
slippery as articulated but I think the claim could, again, be understood as affirming the legitimacy 
of seeing in a given situation possibilities for action, and committing oneself to and cultivating 
active trust in them in a manner that couldn’t be justified by a mere objective description of the 
situation in question.  And yet, despite its distinctness from science, there is a sense as he’s very 
keen to emphasize in the introduction to Elementary Forms, in which religious practices disclose 
and attune us to at least potential truths, which is to say that there is a kind of truth that is crucial 
to action and cannot be directly captured in scientific terms.  And it is that truth to which religious 
practices are oriented.  Durkheim is not very articulate on this point, and does not at all foreground 
it in the right way, likely do to his own scientism, which is distinct from and less distorting than 
Weber’s, insofar as it rightly sees values at work in the world and the meaning that structures 
human social worlds as in some sense natural and in no sense merely subjective, but nevertheless 
which is why I brought in Heidegger’s account of the happening of truth as unconcealment in the 
work of art as a means of giving us a clearer sense of what kind of truth is at issue and how the 
non-theoretical and non-scientific modes of attunement to that truth at the heart of religion work.   
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 This claim is I think crucial, and has the upshot that it serves to in some sense put 
Durkheim’s theory of religion in its place.  That is to say that it underlines the ways in which, 
though valuable in providing some crucial clarification about existential dynamics at the heart of 
religious life, and helpful in overcoming certain misconceptions that might render us wary of any 
kind of engagement with such practices, it cannot itself do what religious practices are in the game 
of doing.  I would like to conclude, before turning in the final section to the task of diagnosing and 
prescribing some curative measures for the problems that explain why Weber’s very problematic 
theory is plausible, by again invoking Bilgrami.  Here what is important for our purposes is 
Gandhi’s critique of a cognitivist, theoretical approach to questions of value:  
What I mean by truth as a cognitive notion is that it is a property of sentences of 
propositions that describe the world. Thus, when we have reason to think that the sentences 
to which we give assent exhibit this property, then we have knowledge of the world, a 
knowledge that can then be progressively accumulated and put to use through continuing 
inquiry building on past knowledge. His recoil from such a notion of truth, which 
intellectualizes our relations to the world, is that it views the world as the object of study, 
study that makes it alien to our moral experience of it, to our most everyday practical 
relations to it. He symbolically conveyed this by his own daily act of spinning cotton. This 
idea of truth, unlike our quotidian practical relations to nature, makes nature out to be the 
sort of distant thing to be studied by scientific methods. It will become something alien to 
that experience, wholly external and objectified. It is no surprise then that we will look 
upon that reality as something to be mastered and conquered, an attitude that leads directly 
to the technological frame of mind that governs modern societies... (ibid, 117)  
 
If we have been right to argue that the kind of truth upon which religious practices are properly 
centered is (a) of fundamental ethical significance and (b) defies being fully captured in moral 
principles or, more generally, propositions, this Gandhian critique of a certain kind of hyper-
cognitive relation to the world generally and normative questions in particular harmonizes with 
and provides further support for the critique of Weber’s account of religion and disenchantment 
that we’ve been developing here.14  Furthermore, and finally, it is worth recalling, as confirmation 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that I am here focusing only on one aspect of the Gandhian critique of the cognitive notion of 
truth as Bilgrami reconstructs it.  According to Bilgrami, Gandhi wants to replace the cognitive notion of truth with a 
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of the claim regarding the ways in which this alienating and disenchanted cognitive relation to the 
world leads to pernicious efforts at mastery and domination, that Weber describes disenchantment 
as emerging out of the realization that “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.  This 
means that the world is disenchanted.  One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order 
to master or implore spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers 
existed.  Technical means and calculations perform the service.”  That is to say both that he 
assumes that from the beginning the religiosity of the savage was oriented towards the effort to 
master the world and that we’ve realized that in order to achieve this perennial human aspiration 
technology and calculation are much better tools. 
4.3 Disenchantment: A Durkheimian Diagnosis and Prescription 
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.  “Whither is God?  He 
cried; “I will tell you.  We have killed him--you and I.  All of us are his murderers.  But 
how did we do this?  How could we drink up the sea?  What were we doing when we 
unchained this earth from its sun?  Whither is it moving now?  Whither are we 
moving?  Away from all suns?  Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, forward, in 
all directions?  Is there still any up or down?  Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing?  Do we not feel the breath of empty space?  Has it not become colder?...” 
 
- Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (aph. 125) (Nietzsche 1974, 18) 
 
Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, 
no matter which group may triumph externally now. 
 
- Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation” 
 
“…and why poets in a desolate time?”  The word “time” here means the age to which we 
ourselves still belong.  The appearance and sacrificial death of Christ, for the historical 
experience of Hölderlin, mean that the end to the days of divinity has set in.  Evening is 
falling…The world’s night disseminates its darkness.  The age is determined by God’s 
keeping himself afar, by “God’s default.” However, the default of God which Hölderlin 
experienced does not contradict the fact that a Christian relationship to God continues 
among individuals and in the churches, and it certainly does not disparage this relationship 
to God.  The default of God means that a God no longer gathers men and things to himself 
                                                 
moral notion of truth, full stop.  I cannot speak to the plausibility of this much more ambitious and to many implausible 
project, and so am focusing here on the narrower point, which is easier to swallow and more directly relevant to our 
purposes in this dissertation.   
232 
 
visibly and unmistakably and from this gathering ordains world-history and man’s stay 
within it.  However, in the default of God notice is given of something even worse.  Not 
only have the gods and God fled, but the radiance of divinity is extinguished in world-
history.  The turn of the world’s night is the desolate time because the desolation grows 
continually greater.  The time has already become so desolate that it is no longer able to see 
the default of God as a default.  (Heidegger 2002, 200). 
 
- Marin Heidegger, “Why Poets”  
 
The only thing that matters is to sense above the moral coldness which prevails on the 
surface of our collective life, the sources of warmth which our societies carry in 
themselves.  (Durkheim 1994, 187). 
 
- Émile Durkheim, “Contribution to discussion ‘Religious sentiment at the present 
time” 
 
A faith above all is warmth, life, enthusiasm, enhancement of all mental activity, uplift of 
the individual above himself.  Except by reaching outside himself, how could the individual 
add to the energies he possesses?  How could he transcend himself by his own strength?  
The only hearth at which we can warm ourselves morally is the hearth made by the 
company of our fellow men; the only moral forces with which we can nourish our own and 
increase them are those we get from others.  (Durkheim 1995, 427). 
 
- Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
 
All criticisms of Weber aside, it seems that there is nevertheless some sense in which what 
he is on to something in saying that our world has become disenchanted and the aim of this section 
is to try to shed some light on that phenomenon, some of the trends that have contributed to it, and 
some ways in which we might undo the damage that it has done.  Unsurprisingly, perhaps, I will 
be using the term in the sense in which we use it in talking about our relationships with institutions, 
persons, and domains of activity.  In these contexts, we will sometimes say things like the 
following:  “Lately I’ve been really disenchanted with academia/the Catholic Church/youth 
culture/the NFL/the Republican Party/etc.”  What is conveyed by statements like that is that 
something that used to be a source of (often enchanting in the sense of magnetically absorbing) 
meaning has revealed different sides of itself that makes us doubt our commitment to it.  In such 
cases we might also say of the thing with which we are disenchanted that “it suddenly leaves me 
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cold” which is to say that where there had been some source of energy, comfort, and support that 
helped us maintain our existential vitality there is now something vaguely hostile and alien from 
which we feel inclined to withdraw.  The problem and its solution when we experience such 
disenchantment are both relational—that is to say that the task is then either to disengage with the 
X in question and engage with another that one finds more meaningful, to work to change the X 
so that it becomes meaningful in the way that it once was, or to change oneself so that one is better 
attuned to it and the meaning it possesses.  Regardless, it is always a way of speaking of a problem 
that calls for an active solution that transforms our relational situation such that we again find 
ourselves in a position of being enchanted with it in a life-sustaining, active manner.   
Feeling such disenchantment isn’t inherently problematic, of course.  Becoming 
disenchanted with one’s church or a political party or employer can often be a good thing, a 
function of our waking up to genuine problems with the institution in question that are in fact good 
grounds for our withdrawing from them.  In this sense a capacity to experience disenchantment is 
essential to being responsible agents who are capable of critiquing and untethering ourselves from 
persons, institutions, and so forth that we’ve historically found ourselves immersed in.  There is a 
problem, however, to the extent that such disenchantment becomes relatively global and we feel 
unwilling or unable to wholeheartedly commit ourselves to much of anything in the world.    
Phenomenologically, this disenchantment involves the sense that our social, relational world as a 
whole is cold, indifferent, and potentially hostile to the things that we value and which we tend to 
feel.  I have included the passages above because they all speak to this widespread sense that 
something has happened in modernity that has rendered our world in this sense cold.  Insofar as 
we feel this way it is a natural response to try to buffer ourselves against the cold, to put layers of 
insulation between ourselves and the world, to cultivate a certain kind of existential self-reliance 
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and perhaps resign ourselves to the kind of tragic futility in the exercise of our agency that Weber 
seems to think a clear-eyed assessment of the metaphysical predicament calls for.  That being said, 
wrapping ourselves up in this way to preserve the warmth that we can generate for ourselves is not 
the only, or even the best solution.  Alternatively, there is the possibility that Durkheim flags—
that there are in fact sources of warmth in our world that can be uncovered and that, if fed properly, 
can help to make the world properly warm again such that the kind of defensive, hardening, and 
self-isolating posture that Weber endorses is no longer necessary.  And, crucially, religion, in its 
capacity to relate us to one another in a manner that allows us to warm one another, will from a 
Durkheimian perspective have a crucial role to play here.   
The metaphor of the sun’s eclipse or setting and the coming of night involves as well, of 
course, the fall of darkness.  Here it is worth recalling the passage we discussed in the first chapter 
in which Durkheim spoke of collective representations as a kind of light that is refracted in our 
bodily lives.  The experienced disenchantment involves a sense not only that we have to rely on 
ourselves for warmth but that we have to rely on ourselves to find sources of light in a world that 
has ceased shining with significance in the way in which it once did.   Similarly, one can generate 
such light but it is no substitute for the light of the sun, and were the sun to go into permanent 
eclipse or were we to float away from it into the darkness of space we would eventually die.  
I dwell on these metaphors to flag the fact that there is a sense in which the picture Weber 
provides fits with our lived experience at least some of the time, even if his explanation for why 
this is the case—that rational investigation has revealed to us that the world is in fact bereft of the 
sources of existential support we historically took it to possess—is wrong.  We tried to show in 
the last chapter that the plausibility and power of religious beliefs is essentially connected to the 
light that they shed on the worlds in which we live and their ability to allow us to live in more 
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productive, rewarding, and fruitful relation to them.  Something similar can be said about other 
broad-stroke narratives like the disenchantment narrative, or the death of God narrative from which 
it issues.  These stories resonate with our experience and mode of comporting ourselves in the 
world and for that reason seem to distill the truth about it.  The evidence for the truth of the view 
is, of course, disparate and diffuse and very hard to pin down.  But, as Durkheim would have been 
keen to point out, this narrative couldn’t have the longevity and tenacity that it does unless it 
resonated with something real and salient in the lives of many contemporary people, to which the 
narrative seems to give expression.  Based on the Durkheimian picture of human existence and the 
role of religious practices within it we can say that the story likely feels true because we are in fact 
cut off from various sources of existential vitality that we rightly look to the world to provide.  
There are I think two interrelated sources of this alienation that we must discuss: namely, (1) 
changes in the way in which we participate in and relate ourselves to our social worlds at the level 
of practice, institutions, and so forth, and (2) changes in the way we think about those relations.  
There is a sense in which the former is more fundamental than the latter, though the latter must not 
be understood as simply epiphenomenal in the sense in which crude forms of Marxism speak of 
ideology as merely a reflection of the material conditions of our lives.  Though attempting to speak 
of the two separately is to some extent artificial insofar as each is deeply caught up in the other, I 
will start by talking about the relevant forms of alienation at the level of practice and then turn to 
a discussion of the role that certain theories or stories we tell about our practices both reflect and 
amplify those more embodied relational deformations.    
 A key work for developing a Durkheimian account of the social pathologies to which we 
must look to explain our experience of disenchantment is Suicide: A Sociological Study.  In this 
work, Durkheim attempts to diagnose the social pathologies to which can be attributed the steep 
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rise in suicide rates in nineteenth-century Europe.  He diagnoses the problem as grounded in the 
rise of what he refers to as egoistic and anomic forces in society, both of which in extreme forms 
constitute threats to persons’ existential vitality.  The former involve a heightened sense on the 
part of individuals that they are not robustly identified with or integrated into their social world, a 
tendency to think that they are in some sense on their own that if unduly amplified tends to result 
in an increase of suicides.  The latter involves a related but distinct sense that there is no clear 
normative order in the light of which people can make sense of their lives and act in a manner that 
makes sense and is seen as clearly, publicly valuable to themselves or others.  Both involve a 
breakdown in relational life and a sense of active integration into the social world.  Durkheim 
diagnoses the rise of egoistic and anomic suicide as follows: 
Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is not sufficiently integrated at all points 
to keep all its members under its control…society, weak and disturbed, lets too many 
persons escape too completely from its influence.  Thus, the only remedy for the ill is to 
restore enough consistency to social groups for them to obtain a firmer grip on the 
individual, and for him to feel himself bound to them.  He must feel himself more solidary 
with a collective existence which precedes him in time, which survives him, and which 
encompasses him at all points.  If this occurs, he will no longer find the only aim of his 
conduct in himself, and, understanding that he is the instrument of a purpose greater than 
himself, he will see that he is not without significance.  Life will resume meaning in his 
eyes… (Durkheim 1951, 373-4). 
 
Anomic suicide, closely related to it, might be dealt with by the same treatment.  Anomy 
indeed springs from the lack of collective forces at certain points in society; that is, of 
groups established for the regulation of social life… (ibid., 382). 
 
The reified talk of society controlling its members is concerning, but if we recall that “society is 
above all an active collaboration” and think of the kinds of social regulation and control involved 
as a function of the “we” relations underlying and organizing those collaborative acts, these claims 
become less problematic.  In brief, they refer to the need for the normatively structured “we” 
relations to be strengthened and for active and clear regulation of individual behavior in the light 
of those “we” relations.   
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 In a society characterized by this kind of relational breakdown, Durkheim suggests that 
certain pessimistic philosophies tend to arise and become widespread: 
Because society is the end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us escaping 
without a simultaneous realization that our activity is purposeless… Thence are formed 
currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but 
expressing society’s state of disintegration.  They reflect the relaxation of social bonds, a 
sort of collective asthenia, or social malaise… Then metaphysical and religious systems 
spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments to formulae, attempt to prove to 
men the senselessness of life and that it is self-deception to believe that it has a purpose… 
On their appearance they seem to have been created out of whole cloth by their makers 
who are sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines.  In reality they are an 
effect rather than a cause; they merely symbolize in abstract language and systematic form 
the physiological distress of the body social… 
…In this case the bond attaching man to life relaxes because that attaching him to 
society is itself slack… (Durkheim 1951, 214) 
 
Though one suspects Durkheim had Schopenhauer in mind here, one suspects that he would have 
been inclined to make a similar claim about Weber’s disenchantment thesis.  The vision of human 
beings as essentially individuals who must determine their own values and impose them on the 
world through a sheer act of will is just the kind of thing that picture that would feel right if one 
lived in a society characterized by such breakdown in mutually-sustaining relational integration.    
The causes of such enervating social breakdown are legion, but one source—of relational 
breakdown as well as of the plausibility of a picture of value as an essentially individual matter—
is the development of capitalism and the model of the human being as homo economicus.  Weber 
is very morally serious thinker and his account of our existential predicament cannot, of course, 
be aligned with the crude economic notion that human beings are self-interested preference 
optimizers, but there is a kind of abstract kinship between the views that it seems, form a 
Durkheimian perspective, can be connected to a breakdown in our sense of participation in some 
larger sacred order that calls upon us to seek ends higher than our own subjective good, in the 
narrow economic sense, or our own subjective values.  As we underlined in the last chapter, 
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Durkheim describes the profane world as precisely that in which our sense of ourselves and of the 
ends with which we are most centrally preoccupied tends to be more narrowly self-interested.  That 
is to say that there is a sense in which the increasing hegemony of market logic and practices in 
our social lives would tend to eclipse the sacred from view in a way that would lead to some of the 
alienating sense of social fragmentation that from the Durkheimian perspective must be seen as 
playing a non-trivial role in rendering narratives like that which Weber presents in his account of 
disenchantment plausible.   
Akeel Bilgrami provides a powerful genealogical account the disenchantment narrative as 
a kind of ideology propagated in order to better facilitate capitalist and imperialist exploitation 
points to the ways in which the plausibility of the narrative is not only a reflection of such processes 
but is—or at least at one point in the past was—actively propagated as a means of allowing them 
to proceed more seamlessly.  We do not have space to do justice to this account, but in brief the 
claim is that if you’re going to proceed to ruthlessly exploit persons and the natural world for 
economic gain you need first to find a way to interpret the world as not placing any robust 
normative constraints on the pursuit of such profane and amoral ends.  This is a kind of Marxist 
variation on the Heideggerian claim that in the contemporary world our fundamental 
understanding of the being of entities—including human beings (here he cites talk of “human 
resources”)—is that of resources that make no demands upon us and are there to be optimized for 
our own ends.  Though their positions differ in a great number of respects, all three thinkers 
understand our world to be characterized by a kind of relational breakdown associated with an 
elevation of a kind of instrumental logic that tends to close us off from relating to the world as 
making demands upon us to take up what I described in the introduction as a religious stance.   
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These anomie- and egoism-inducing transformations in our world are caught up with the 
kind scientism that would seek to discredit the claim that there are subjectivity-transcendent 
normative orders to which we are called to respond, and that there is a legitimate and important 
place for religious practices in human life.  And it is important to note, before turning to the positive 
ways of responding to this predicament, that there are pathological modes of responding to this 
crisis.  For our purposes, the most essential such deformed response is that of fascism.  The word 
fascism, of course, derives from the Italian word fascio, which means “bundle of sticks” and which 
is in turn derived from the Latin word fasces.  The fasces was a bundle of sticks, often with an ax 
at its center, that symbolized a magistrate’s power and, more generally, strength in and through 
unity.  In the last chapter we spoke of the power and importance of religion’s ability to gather 
together human lives and the ultimately significant relational strands that bind them together.  That 
suggests that there is some deep affinity between the religious impulse and fascist politics, which 
might lead one to think that however bad disenchantment is a revival of religiosity is worse.  The 
worry is particularly acute given that Durkheim’s celebration of collective effervescence in public 
rites—including political rallies—was seen by many, including students and collaborators like 
Marcel Mauss, as reflective of a deep blindness to the dark possibilities of the kinds of religious 
dynamics that the Nazis put to work to such terrible effect (Lukes, 338-9).  And then, of course, 
there is the fact Heidegger was a Nazi.  I would like therefore to say something about the ways in 
which the account we’ve developed can explain both why such horrifyingly destructive responses 
appeal and why they don’t deliver the existential goods people turn to them to provide.  
 It is helpful, I think, to understand the appeal of fascism in relation to the form of suicide 
that Durkheim takes to be least characteristic of contemporary society outside of military circles: 
namely, that of altruistic suicide.  Whereas egoistic suicide issues from individuals being deeply 
240 
 
disconnected from their social worlds, and anomic suicide issues from individuals being 
consistently, deeply unclear about the character of the relationships that tie them to their social 
worlds, altruistic suicide results from a devaluation of one’s individuality that results from a very 
strong, self-effacing identification with one’s social world.  Where such identification becomes 
excessively strong it leads to pathological rates of altruistic suicide.  One promising Durkheimian 
avenue for understanding at least a certain dimension of fascism, is as involving a kind of flight 
into unthinking, absolute, and self-destructive identification with a group as a form of flight from 
the sense of egoistic isolation and anomic normative disorientation.  These genuine social and 
existential pathologies are interpreted as the function of some dehumanized enemy’s infiltration 
of a body politic that, absent such infiltration and undermining from within, would be 
unproblematically integrated and vital.  The task of rectifying the relational breakdown is seen, 
therefore, simply as a matter of destroying the enemy or enemies in an all-consuming, utterly 
unifying war that gives one one’s true, simple identity as member of the group in question.  That 
identity is so sacred as to be worth whatever sacrifice one can make to it.  This entire project is 
founded upon systematic deception, as fascist leaders very openly and famously acknowledged, 
and as such is essentially despairing and futile, but it does at least in part and potentially respond 
to a genuine need to break free of the existential dissipation, isolation, and sense of individual 
futility.     
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt provides an account of totalitarian 
movements very much along these lines.  She speaks of the ways in which totalitarian movements 
drew their supporters from shapeless, anomic masses of people who had previously been 
politically disengaged in large part as a result of their alienated sense of disconnection from the 
societies in which they lived and attendant sense of “superfluousness” (Arendt, 311).   They are 
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united to one another not by a real common bond but by a “self-centered bitterness” that results in 
a “weakening of the instinct of preservation”—in line, of course, with Durkheim’s account of the 
causes of egoistic suicide.  It is out of this “new terrifying negative solidarity” that they are drawn 
into totalitarian movements that provide them with seeming relief from these acute forms of 
existential distress.  She writes the following of those who have fully converted to and been 
initiated into the movement, clearly echoing Durkheim’s account of altruistic suicide: 
The disturbing factor in the success of totalitarianism is…the true selflessness of its 
adherents…to the wonder of the whole civilized world, he may even be willing to help in 
his own prosecution and frame his own death sentence if only his status as a member of 
the movement is not touched…within the organizational structure of the movement, so 
long as it holds together, the fanaticized members can be reached neither by experience nor 
by argument; identification with the movement and total conformism seem to have 
destroyed the very capacity for experience, even if it be as extreme as torture or the fear of 
death (ibid., 308-9).   
 
Insofar as the relational breakdown that is the real root cause of the plausibility of the Weberian 
narrative persists, and as in recent years we have been forced in the United States and much of the 
rest of the world to confront with great alarm and panic, such despairing efforts to heal the 
existential wounds in ways that in the end only yield more relational violence will remain live and, 
for many, compelling options. 
The key, from a Durkheimian perspective, in other words, is to search for and develop 
means of addressing this relational crisis that enable us to escape from enervating forms of egoistic 
isolation and anomie towards forms of relational belonging that are genuinely and mutually 
sustaining.  And that requires, among other things, that the second-personal, interpersonal, natural 
normativity that Tomasello, Buber, and others associate with the second-personal attitude needs 
to retain its authority over the forms of tribalistic collective intentionality that can easily lose 
contact with the ultimate personal normative ground in which they are properly rooted.  If our 
Durkheimian account of religiosity is in broad strokes correct, a crucial part of that healing process 
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will involve the cultivation of new forms of religiosity, with attendant rituals, institutions, and 
interpersonal relationships that center around and allow us to cultivate responsive faithful relation 
to what is genuinely sacred and that allow for genuinely integrating, means of connecting our lives 
up in meaningful, moral, sustainable ways with those with whom we share our various social 
worlds.   
As a means of pivoting towards the task of the final section of this chapter, I would like 
now to situate the Durkheimian claim about contemporary “moral coldness” and the possibility of 
finding and feeding “new sources of warmth” with which we opened this chapter in the context to 
set up our concluding discussion of the manner in which we can respond to our relational 
disenchantment:  
…one would like to try to imagine the composition of a future religion, that is to say, 
a religion more conscious of its social origins.  Of course, one must be very cautious in 
doing this.  It is quite pointless to try to guess in what precise form such a religion would 
be able to express itself.  What one can foresee are the social forces which will give birth 
to it. 
If today our religious life is languishing, if the passing revivals that are observed always 
appear as superficial and short-lived movements, it is not because we have turned away 
from some denominational formula or other, it is because our power for creating ideals has 
weakened, it is because our societies are undergoing a phase of profound agitation…we 
find ourselves in a transitional period, a period of moral coldness which explains the 
various manifestations of which we are continually the anxious and saddened witnesses.  
Who does not feel—and it is this which must reassure us—who does not feel that in 
the depths of society an intense life is developing which is seeking outlets and which will 
ultimately find them?  We aspire to a higher justice than any of the existing formulae can 
express in a way that will satisfy us.  These latent aspirations which disturb us will some 
day succeed in becoming more clearly conscious of themselves, in translating themselves 
into definite formulae which men can rally round and which will become a nucleus for the 
crystallization of new beliefs.  It is pointless to try to discern the content of these beliefs.  
Will they remain general and abstract, will they be linked with personal beings who will 
incarnate them and represent them?  These are historical contingencies that one cannot 
foresee.   
The only thing that matters is to sense above the moral coldness which prevails on the 
surface of our collective life, the sources of warmth which our societies carry in 
themselves. One can go further and say with some precision that it is among the working 





We feel disoriented and disconnected in a way that gives rise to a feeling that the world is hostile 
and that we are to be left to our own devices in attempting to navigate it and impose some sort of 
meaningful imprint on it.  This is connected to the ways in which many of the institutions to which 
we belong and practices in which we engage are structured and understood, as well as the fact that 
many of the traditional religious means of orienting ourselves to the world as a whole and the 
fundamental relationships that allow us to take a meaningful stand in and towards it seem in some 
often-problematic way out of sync with our lived experience.  This disconnect can be a function 
of a wide variety of things: an obstinate refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the natural 
sciences, an unacceptable clinging to norms and values that have revealed themselves to be 
oppressive obstacles to full human flourishing, an inability to speak in a meaningful way to the 
crises that we are confronting as individuals and societies today, and so forth.   
These are all problems to be dealt with, not necessities to which we ought to resign 
ourselves.  The problem of “moral coldness” with which we are faced, which constitutes the real 
disenchantment problem, is to be rectified by transforming the relationships in which we stand to 
one another, to the practices in which we engage, the institutions to which we belong, the natural 
world in which we are embedded, and so forth.  And new forms of religiosity that provide new 
“sources of warmth” are going to be important to that process.  And it is from the working classes 
who are struggling to remake the world in a manner that is more just and sustaining for all of its 
members, that he sees such change coming.  We see here an explicit connection between religious 
renewal and broader social and political renewal, as he is calling attention to the ways in which 
the working classes are attempting to better realize the affirmation of the sacredness of the 
individual that is officially at the heart of contemporary societies but which has been too often 
eclipsed and disregarded in the name of precisely the kinds of profane economic logics of which 
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we’ve been speaking.  The examples of the powerful revitalization and deployment of religious 
forces by the oppressed in the religiously inflected social and political movements that Gandhi and 
King helped to lead can be understood as taking up an essentially similar task. Though he is very 
hesitant to make any very precise predictions as to what form those new modes of religiosity will 
take he is confident that it will arise.  It will arise in large part out of innumerable concrete 
interactions between ordinary people and the transformations that they progressively bring about.  
That is to say that it will not be a top-down process and will involve a kind of religious spirit that 
moves through and binds together groups of people in new, transformative ways.   
I would like to conclude by quoting the following passage from the “Conclusion” of 
Elementary Forms in which Durkheim describes the contagious, vitality-enhancing warmth of 
religious faith:  
A philosophy can very well be worked out in the silence of inward meditation, but not a 
faith.  A faith above all is warmth, life, enthusiasm, enhancement of all mental activity, 
uplift of the individual above himself.  Except by reaching outside of himself, how could 
the individual add to the energies he possesses?  How could he transcend himself by his 
own strength?  The only hearth at which we can warm ourselves morally is the hearth made 
by the company of our fellow men; the only moral forces with which we can nourish our 
own and increase them are those we get from others.  Let us even grant the existence of 
beings more or less like those the mythologies depict for us.  If they are to have the useful 
influence over souls that is their raison d’être, we must believe in them.  The beliefs are at 
work only when they are shared.  We may well keep them going for a time through personal 
effort alone, but they are neither born nor obtained in this way, and it is doubtful that they 
can be preserved under those conditions.  In fact, the man who has a genuine faith feels an 
irrepressible need to spread it.  To do so, he comes out of his isolation, he approaches 
others, he seeks to convince them, and it is the ardor of the convictions he brings about that 
in turn reinforces his alone.  That ardor would speedily dissipate if left alone.   (Durkheim 
1995, 427). 
 
4.4 Religion and the Cultivation of (New) Sources of Warmth 
We said above that for all its power and all the ways in which it speaks to an experience of 
the world as cold and dark where it should be warm and illuminated, we can never be fully 
disenchanted.  We made this claim with reference to the idea, defended in the first chapter, that 
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our very standing as persons is constituted and sustained in “we” relations with others that have a 
normative content that makes demands upon us, as well as Bilgrami’s account of the ways in which 
as agents we cannot but experience the world as making demands upon us.  That is to say that the 
resources for throwing off the spell of disenchantment are there if we have eyes to see them and 
ears to hear them, and much of the time, even if in attenuated form, we do.  Insofar as our 
experience of the world as disenchanted involves a kind of despair that despair itself attests to our 
awareness that we are called to respond and realize the values that are embedded in and disclosed 
by these relations.  Therefore, the task of becoming once again enchanted with all that is sacred in 
the world involves cultivating modes of social attunement to the sacred.  As we’ve indicated in 
concluding the last section, Durkheim thinks that new and renewed forms of religious practice will 
have an important role to play in this process, but they are not the sole means for such renewal and 
are not necessary to break free of or throw off the pall of disenchantment.  The aim of this final 
section is first to describe some of the ways in which we can have particularly acute experiences 
of the world as an enchanted and value-saturated place in a manner that does not depend on any 
particular religious filiation.  Having done this we will then make a provisional case that there are 
nevertheless good grounds for thinking that religious practices can and should play a powerful, 
perhaps even essential role, in helping to cure the relational distress that constitutes 
disenchantment, properly understood.    
 It is important, first, to recall the passage from “Individualism and the intellectuals” that 
we cited above in which Durkheim speaks of the way in which, with insufficient consistency and 
fidelity (hence the need for the transformations which he sees the working classes as positioned to 
bring about) to the sacredness of the human person. As we saw, he puts the claim as follows: “The 
human person…is [today] considered sacred in what one might call the ritual sense of the 
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word…Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s life, on a man’s liberty, on a man’s honor inspires 
us with a feeling of horror, in every way analogous to that which the believer experiences when 
he sees the idol profaned” (Durkheim 1994, 62).  That is to say that despite the ascendance of 
certain asocial and egoistic/anomic tendencies and social currents connected to market logic, there 
remains a sense that persons are sacred.  This attunement can be undermined, corroded, and 
eclipsed in all manner of ways, but without its persistence at some level our social worlds would 
more dramatically and fully come undone.  But insofar as we do not have a set of practices oriented 
towards stepping outside of our profane lives and actively cultivating attunement to this sacrality, 
there are grounds for thinking that this officially share commitment is too weak to bind our lives 
together in a life-sustaining normative order.  The ease with which large numbers of citizens in 
democracies seem willing to disregard the fundamental claims about individual dignity upon 
which they rest point to the attunement in question, though present, needs cultivation to be properly 
amplified.  One way to do this, to recall Durkheim’s citation of the working classes, is through 
organizations like labor unions that center on a certain kind of self-interest but also involve a robust 
sense that that self-interest is really our and not simply my self-interest—i.e. a robust sense of 
solidarity.  But though essential such modes of actively heightening commitment to the sacredness 
of persons are not sufficient insofar as they are too domain-specific and do not relate us to the 
fundamental sacred structure of the entirety of our relational lives in the ways in which religious 
practices do.  
 Bilgrami’s account of secular enchantment in “The Political Possibilities of the Long 
Romantic Period” centers in part on the claim that at the interpersonal level of everyday life we 
are attuned to all that the official disenchanted frames for interpreting ourselves and our worlds 
officially disavow: “when one is critical today of the [disenchanted] outlook and its effects that 
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have developed at the public and collective level…one [does so] by the lights available in one’s 
current quotidian frame of ordinary individual responses to each other and to the natural 
environment around us” (Bilgrami 2014, 208).  We find a similar claim in Hubert Dreyfus and 
Sean Kelly’s All Things Shining, which attempts to wrestle with the problems we’ve been 
discussing through the lens of later Heidegger.  They take it to be the case, in line with Heidegger’s 
claims to the effect that the technological understanding of being is more hegemonic than Bilgrami 
suggests, that many of us do often experience the world as in some sense not making demands 
upon us, which leaves us in a kind of nihilistic stance, attempting to will value into being in the 
Weberian/Nietzschean mode and often finding ourselves incapable of it.  But at the same time 
there are moments when this alienation is shattered and we experience the world as shining with 
significance in which we are swept up in an experience that they refer to as “whooshing,” their 
phenomenological translation of the Greek term physis.  One of the examples that they provide of 
such an experience is that of Lou Gehrig’s “Luckiest Man” speech, in which Gehrig, who was 
dying of the disease that would thereafter bear his name, insisted that he was “the luckiest man on 
the face of the earth” and that despite the hardship he was experiencing “I’ve got an awful lot to 
live for.”  Of the experience of the fans in Yankee Stadium listening to the speech they quite 
plausibly say the following:  
It is a fair bet that nobody in the stadium that day felt a tinge of T.S. Eliot’s indecision, or 
Samuel Beckett’s sense of an interminable wait, or David Foster Wallace’s anger and 
frustration at his inability to find meaningful differences in life.  For the moments that led 
up to and were held together by Gehrig’s speech, 62,000 people knew exactly what they 
were about.  And paramount among them was a great man on the verge of death—Henry 
Lou Gehrig himself. (Dreyfus & Kelly, 191-2). 
 
This episode involved a collective, gathering state of emotion of the sort that Durkheim refers to 
in his talk of “collective effervescence” and centered on an encounter with the sacred embodied in 
Gehrig’s speech and person, as that which gives radiant, unquestionable meaning to our lives in 
248 
 
their very finitude and mortality.  This is not a function of the fact that everyone present happened 
to have made a subjective commitment to values they then found embodied in Gehrig’s speech, or 
his speech given voice to some new value or worldview that revealed value they had hitherto 
overlooked or which cast a blinding spell over them. Rather, there was value there on radiant, 
public display that moved them all and gathered them together if only for a moment in shared 
attunement to the sacred.  It was, in other words, something like a religious experience that was 
neither subjective nor theory-mediated nor in any straightforward sense propositional nor the kind 
of thing that the natural sciences could refute or prove.  
 Such transformative encounters can happen as well in relation to works of art, even if our 
default mode of relating to them—or at least the official narratives about it—stands in the way of 
such encounters.  Heidegger provides, of course, an attempt to understand how a certain kind of 
ekstatic relation to works of art can involve a transformation in our attunement to the world that 
he speaks of as a happening of truth.  He also writes, as we saw, that “perhaps experience is the 
element in which art dies,” referring to a certain understanding of “aesthetic experience,” 
paradigmatically articulated by Kant, as a kind of ineffable subjective feeling that is elicited by 
particular kinds of objects.  This privatization and internalization of aesthetic experience, which 
of course fits with the general tendencies towards subjectivization that we’ve been discussing, 
undermines our capacity for experiencing an authentic, transformative encounter with them.    
I would like very briefly to cite another account of the ways in which people are taught to 
engage with works of art in the classroom involve a distinct but not unrelated form of alienation 
and breakdown in the possibility for the kind of transformative encounter that Heidegger describes, 
and which Buber similarly valorizes and glosses in terms of the I-You stance.  It is also a trend 
associated with Kant—namely that of “critical” reading.  In his essay “Uncritical Reading,” 
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Michael Warner describes all of the spontaneous ways in which students relate to works of 
literature that he teaches that he is officially tasked with teaching them not to do:  
Students who come to my literature classes, I find, read in all the ways they aren’t 
supposed to.  They identify with characters.  They fall in love with authors.  They mime 
what they take to be authorized sentiment…They shop around among taste-publics, 
venturing into social worlds and geekdom.  They warm with pride over the national 
heritage…They look for representations that will remediate stigma by giving them 
“positive self-images.”  They cultivate reverence and piety…They get caught up in 
suspense.  They laugh; they cry.  They get aroused (and stay quiet about it in class).  They 
lose themselves in books… 
My work is cut out for me.  My job is to teach them critical reading… (Gallop, 13). 
 
Warner proceeds to suggest that something has perhaps gone wrong here and that maybe his 
students are on to something important.  The kinds of attitudes his students want to take towards 
the books they are reading are deeply, if in simply and naïve ways, relational: they want to be 
moved, to get swept up in something, to identify with it and to form relationships with others that 
are informed by that identification.  Their mode of relating to the text is in some important sense 
what Kierkegaard would call earnest—they want to be touched and changed at a personal level 
and bring their personal selves to the text.  And it’s very much in line with the ways in which 
religious persons relate to the texts upon which they center their lives.  
But they are taught not to do this—in the name of a certain conception of freedom and a 
certain conception of objective scholarship.  Critical reading involves objectifying and analyzing 
literary texts and explaining how and why they work on your emotions as they do—with an eye to 
enabling yourself to resist those moves so as to preserve your objectivity and freedom, the latter 
being understood as matter of retaining one’s own subjective control over one’s attitudes and 
feelings and not getting swept up in things that would undermine that control.  Warner is not 
against the practices associated with critical reading, but he points to the ways in which a single-
minded focus on it can be enervating and alienating. This is I think another instance both of an 
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official disenchanting and alienating ideology that generates certain forms of existential alienation 
and of the limits of its power to fully stamp out the call to a different, more wholehearted mode of 
relational responsiveness to the world.  Warner and associates (Rita Felski’s The Limits of Critique 
and Art and Attachment powerfully articulate a related view), having attended to these tendencies 
in a receptive, charitable manner and in so doing have attempted to legitimate and exemplify a 
transformed mode of relating to artworks that casts off the alienating symptom and facilitator of 
disenchanted relational breakdown.   
 Something like such a transformed relation to the world in which we are woken from the 
zombie-like slumber of our disenchanted and self-absorbed profane autopilot is beautifully 
captured in Wallace Steven’s poem “Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself,” which 
associates such an awakening with the movement from the cold and dark of winter to spring, the 
rising of the sun, and the enchantment of song.  On that note, it is worth noting the connection 
between “enchantment” and music, which Jane Bennett helpfully glosses as follows: “the word 
enchant is linked to the French verb to sing: chanter.  To ‘en-chant’: to surround with song or 
incantation; hence, to cast a spell with sounds, to make fall under the sway of a magical refrain, to 
carry away on a sonorous stream.” (Bennett, 5-6).  When we are enchanted—by music or anything 
else—we are swept—or “whooshed”—up in it and feel something moving through us, often 
provoking us to move in tune with it, that transforms in some our mode of experiencing and being 
in the world: 
At the earliest ending of winter,  
In March, a scrawny cry from outside  
Seemed like a sound in his mind.  
 
He knew that he heard it,  
A bird’s cry, at daylight or before,  




The sun was rising at six,  
No longer a battered panache above snow . . .  
It would have been outside.  
 
It was not from the vast ventriloquism  
Of sleep’s faded papier-mâché . . .  
The sun was coming from outside.  
 
That scrawny cry—it was  
A chorister whose c preceded the choir.  
It was part of the colossal sun,  
 
Surrounded by its choral rings,  
Still far away. It was like  
A new knowledge of reality.  (Stevens, 534) 
 
Stevens situates this inceptual enchanted experience of reality at the “earliest ending of winter” 
and at the moment of emergence from the self-contained “vast ventriloquism / Of sleep’s faded 
papier-mâché . . . .”  The emergence from the cold and the emergence from a state of consciousness 
that is closed in on itself are aligned.  The enchanting bird’s call is associated with the sun that 
gathers the world around it, with new beginnings, and with the return to life both in terms of the 
arrival of spring and the return to wakefulness.  And it is a scrawny cry which is to say that it has 
a poignance and vulnerability not unlike that which was on display in Gehrig’s speech – part of 
the beauty and part of what calls the speaker to open himself up to the song lies in that vulnerable 
channeling of the song by a finite mortal being.  And the sun’s “c” precedes the choir, in the way 
in which the illuminating warming light born in our sociality is precedes us, always already being 
there provided that we can attune ourselves to it.  The main question with which we must wrestle 
now is that of the means through which we can ready ourselves for such re-attunements to the 
sacred value in the world around us in a manner that allows us to consistently open ourselves to 
and radiantly refract its life-giving light. 
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 Provided that our relationship to value is an essentially perceptual matter and not ultimately 
the kind of thing that could be captured in a philosophy or set of principles, the task of amplifying 
the light will be a matter in large part of embodying it such that it can shine forth in our lives in a 
public way.  We will move shortly to the question about the kinds of (ascetic, religious) practices 
that can enable us to embody such receptivity, and in so doing attempt to supplement Bilgrami’s 
reconstruction of Gandhi’s critique of Western disenchanted modes of understanding, but first it 
is important to get this powerful and crucial point on the table.  The crucial passage is the 
following:  
In Gandhi’s writing there is an implicit but bold proposal: “When one chooses for oneself, 
one sets an example to everyone.”  That is the role of the satyagrahi [i.e. the practitioner of 
satyagraha, which literally means “truth-force” (ibid., 105)].  To lead exemplary lives, to 
set examples to everyone by their actions.  As he once wrote: “Faith does not admit of 
telling.  It has to be lived and then it becomes self-propagating.”  Even more explicitly, in 
a letter to Ramachandra Kahre, he says that “the correct reasoning, however, is this.  If we 
do our duty, others also will do theirs some day.  We have a saying to the effect: If we 
ourselves are good, the whole world will be good.”  This is not just a casual remark in a 
letter.  It is an idea that surfaces in many places in his thought and is the basis of an entirely 
different way of thinking about religion and the moral life.  The good, conceived in this 
way as exemplarity, breaks out of the subjectivity of one’s own conscience… (ibid., 112). 
 
There are three respects in which this ethic of moral exemplarity, and the experiential 
understanding of truth at its heart—which, of course, can and should be understood in relation to 
the Heideggerian notion of unconcealment—is relevant to our understanding of religious life and 
disenchantment.  First of all, the account developed in the first two chapters of this dissertation of 
the modes of transcendence constitutive of human personhood provides, again, a helpful way of 
understanding this emphasis on exemplarity.  Second of all, the latter sheds light as well on the 
distinctive power of religious ritual, understood as an act of, among other things, deliberate 
collaborative exemplification of an essential mode of responsiveness to normative/existential 
truth.  Thirdly, it helps us to understand something important about the ways in which religious 
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practices can open up cracks in the “iron cage” in which we find our disenchanted selves confined 
through which an alternative, less alienated mode of life can emerge. 
 If the Weberian account of the ethical predicament of human beings were correct, there 
would be little room for exemplary action to play all that central a role in our lives.  If values are 
simply a matter of subjective decision and agency a matter of working to exercise power over the 
world around us in a way that makes it better reflect and accord with those subjective 
commitments, the fact that someone is exemplifying some other stance in their action wouldn’t 
seem to have any inherent relevance to us.  If we happen to be torn between different inclinations 
we might turn to others with a similar subjectivity to see how they resolve it, but the actions of 
others would not make the sort of direct, ceteris paribus, claim on us as agents that Gandhi seems 
to be invoking here.  We would need to have some reason to build some sort of connection between 
our and the relevant other subjectivities in order for them to have that kind of claim-making power.   
 In the light of the account of human personhood that we’ve sketched in this dissertation, 
on the other hand, the actions of others would very much possess this default claim-making power 
in relation to us.  We flagged in that chapter the ways in which our standing as persons is 
constituted by the “we” relations in which we stand to other persons, which light up the world as 
meaningful to us in a public way that enables us to live in an essentially collaborative and shared 
manner with one another.  We are, as Heidegger puts it, always already being-with others—
proximally and for the most part in a sort of quasi-anonymous and -automatic manner that is 
governed by the (characteristically profane) das Man modes of understanding and comportment 
that serve as a default in our social world, but potentially in a more richly relational, second-
personal manner.  Exemplary action is action that deviates from that script in a manner that is 
visible and, in some sense, radiant, or, to use the Heideggerian terminology favored by Dreyfus 
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and Kelly, shining—both in the sense of being salient and calling attention to itself, and in the 
sense of casting a certain kind of (new/transformed/heightened) light on the situation in relation to 
which it is undertaken.  In drawing the contrast between modes of understanding the behavior of 
others of which chimpanzees are capable and that which is distinctive of human beings from a 
young age, Tomasello speaks of the ways in which human beings attend to the actions of others in 
collaborative situations (and all social life is, as Durkheim underlines, essentially an act of 
cooperation) in the light of the “we” that is authoritative for all the relevant parties.  This is why 
children can relatively easily switch roles in a cooperative task while chimps can’t—they’ve been 
attending throughout to what we as opposed to I am doing and can often quite fluidly position 
themselves in a different role within the relevant we.  When someone very publicly deviates from 
the assumed script in a social interaction this can show up either as an uncooperative rejection of 
the “we” relations in question or an attempt to reconfigure those relations in an improved manner—
which can be recognized as such by all the relevant onlookers, provided they attend in the right 
way.  This way in which our identities and actions are all shot through with mutual reference, 
appeal, and directives helps explain why exemplary action can be so powerful—something for 
which the Weberian view, again, cannot account.  It also explains why Gandhi refers to such an 
active embodiment of attunement to truth as “faith”—one is making an appeal to others, calling 
upon them to recognize and respond appropriately to the truth one is attempting to incarnate.  If it 
is genuine truth, if it is the genuinely life-giving sacred to which one is attuned, one has grounds 
for confidence that others will respond to it as such.  Insofar as the sacred is that which gives 
ultimate meaning to our mortal lives, exemplify fidelity to it in the kind of radically vulnerable 
non-violent manner in which Gandhi and King did, opening oneself up to assault and death upon 
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one’s organism so as to show that that to which one is being faithful is a mode of higher self-
realization as a person as opposed to an organism, makes the sacrality shine all the more brightly.  
 Religious ritual can be understood as a kind of exemplary action undertaken by and for the 
sake of the members of the relevant “we” in question.  There is a mode of coordinated being-with 
one another—from which all manner of differences deemed inessential with reference to the sacred 
orientation in question tend to fall away—that is very deliberately enacted and realized in the ritual.  
It is one in which each one exemplifies in relation to the others the stance that at bottom is 
understood to be that which constitutes the collaborative life that they are seeking to sustain and 
extend and more fully realize throughout their lives.  Each participant tries to act in the relevant 
manner and is aided by the fact that everyone else around them is acting in an essentially 
collaborative manner that reinforces and strengthens their own commitment. That being said, there 
is of course a crucial difference between the ways in which these mutually amplifying exemplary 
dynamics work in a mob, a sports stadium, a Pentecostal revival meeting, and a concert. 
 What is crucial in the case of religious ritual as well as the kind of exemplary action that 
Gandhi is concerned with—which, of course, is understood as a kind of religious exemplarity—a 
certain kind of ascesis with respect to the that which is genuinely sacred is essential.  In order to 
be a satyagrahi engaging in exemplary acts of non-violent resistance, one had to go through a 
process of spiritual and ethical purification and cultivation—something that was also true for the 
participants in the civil rights demonstrations directly inspired by Gandhi that Martin Luther King 
Jr. helped to orchestrate. This necessity in some ways falls out of the fact that the relationship to 
truth in question is not that simply of assenting to a set of propositions.  The relationship between 
ascesis and truth in question, which has a somewhat atavistic character at least in so far as the 
Weberian frame is taken to the be characteristically modern one, is well described in the following 
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that Foucault makes in an interview titled “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” which helpfully centers 
on Pascal, whom as we saw Durkheim repeatedly invokes in describing the constitutive tensions 
and challenges of leading a meaningful human life:   
Pascal was still in a tradition in which practices of the self, practices of asceticism, were 
tied up to the knowledge of the world. We must not forget that Descartes wrote 
“meditations” - and meditations are a practice of the self. But the extraordinary thing in 
Descartes’s texts is that he succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of 
knowledge, for a subject constituted through practices of the self.  
This is very important. Even if it is true that Greek philosophy founded rationality, it 
always held that a subject could not have access to the truth if he did not first operate upon 
himself a certain work which would make him susceptible to knowing the truth--a work of 
purification, conversion of the soul by contemplation of the soul itself...  
Descartes broke with this when he said “To accede to truth, it suffices that I be any 
subject which can see what is evident.” Evidence is substituted for ascesis...It suffices that 
the relationship to the self reveals to me the obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend 
that truth definitively. Thus, I can be immoral and know the truth. I believe that this is an 
idea which, more or less explicitly, was rejected by all previous culture. (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 251-2).  
 
Insofar as the truth in question is not simply cognitive, the relation in which we stand to it is not 
simply cognitive.  As we cannot be true to those whom we love simply by holding a certain set of 
beliefs about them and acting in a manner informed by those beliefs, but must rather cultivate a 
kind of comprehensive, abiding, multi-modal attunement to their persons, so too when it comes to 
the crucial norms and meanings that ought ever more fully to structure our social worlds, a more 
radical transformation of the self is called for.  This transformation requires, to use a phrase from 
Buber, a combination of will and grace—one must attempt to transform oneself so as better to be 
attuned to the relevant reality, while nevertheless being essentially dependent on that reality and 
those who collaborate with one in disclosing and attempting to remain faithful to it, for the right 
sort of relation to be established and maintained.   
 In general terms, the ultimate aim of such ascesis, and the truth to which I think it should 
be understood as properly attuning us, is powerfully articulated by Bilgrami in his notion of 
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“unalienated life” in the following passages (from “The Political Possibilities of the Long 
Romantic Period” and “Value and Alienation,” respectively:    
The world (both the natural and the social world) I have said contains value properties that 
present us with perceptible normative demands to which our (practical) agency must 
respond.  If this is so, then, as Aristotle first suggested implicitly in the various ingredients 
that go into his notion of phronesis, we have to see the world right, to see correctly what 
its normative demands are.  The point is essentially phenomenological…And to be 
unalienated , I believe, is for our agency to be in responsive sync with these perceptually 
presented normative demands….That is what it is to be at home in the world…And the 
centrally important point then is that for one to see those demands of the world for what 
they are, one’s own orientation to the world in viewing the normative demands of its value-
laden layout has to be primarily not through the lens of one’s own individual point of view 
but from a larger point of view. 
 Consider a physical analogy that needs to be extrapolated to the social—how when one 
(an individual) drives a car one orients oneself perceptually to the demands of the road 
ahead not from the point of view of one’s own individual body but from the point of view 
of something larger than one’s individual body, that of the whole car…If that transition did 
not happen, one would crash the car…the tragedy of the commons is akin to the tragedy of 
such a car crash.  (Bilgrami 2020, 84-5).   
 
Alienation of the sort that Gandhi and Marx were concerned with has, as a central strain, 
the idea that when human beings are made anonymous in a mass society within a capitalist 
economic formation that is typical of the modern West, we become individuals in a sense 
that is so atomistically realized and reified that the very idea of the social or of the collective 
becomes a mere abstraction.  It has no palpable or phenomenological place in the lives of 
individuals nor any reality which could be the basis of genuine unalienated relations 
between them.  But we must ask: What is the idea or ideal of the social collective that 
makes for an unalienated life and which has been so undermined by these developments in 
the West that Gandhi and Marx have analyzed in such abundant detail?...  
… What we aspire to, when we seek a socially unalienated life with one another, is the 
realization of the ideal that nobody in society is well off if someone is badly off. (Bilgrami 
2014, 164).  
 
Recalling the themes that we developed in the first two chapters, it involves a sense of ourselves 
as (a) called to belong to a collective intentional order to which we are passionately identified at a 
fundamental level in which (b) our relations with every member are actively held accountable to 
second-personal normativity.  Such an unalienated life would be the fullest realization of the 
“uprooting of despair” by self’s achieving the ability to “rest transparently” in the power that 
constitutes it.  Bilgrami is also right to point to the ways in which certain profane atomizing logics 
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and attitudes undermine our ability to take up this stance.  And, finally, in line with Durkheim’s 
account of personal freedom as a matter of ascetically disciplining ourselves in the light of our 
fundamental social relations, he is also right to present this ideal as a correction to our more 
individualistic understanding of freedom, which involves inappropriately understanding it to be in 
deep ineradicable tension with the ideal of equality. 
What I hope the Durkheimian picture of human existence and the role of religion within it 
I hope adds to this account is an understanding of the powerful role that religious practices can and 
should play in efforts to realize such an unalienated, non-despairing and truly free form of personal 
-as-social life.  First of all, despite all the things that I’ve said to render the view possible, it is I 
think a faith stance.  The tensions between collective intentional orders, which tend to take on a 
tribalistic, us vs. them cast, and second-personal morality are serious and there is no way of proving 
that we have it in us to find a way to properly deal with those tensions.  As such, our ability to 
fully believe in its possibility depends on our ability to see it realized in the world on a small scale.  
The analogy with the Christian’s faith in the coming of the kingdom of God is I think a helpful 
analogy.   If Durkheim’s account is correct, part of the existential ground of the Christian’s faith 
in the possibility of such a kingdom, in which each is the servant of everyone else and all are united 
in bonds of wholehearted love, is a function of the Christian community’s ability to be 
transformed—through grace, which can be understood in either an orthodox Christian or 
Durkheimian manner—and in some way realize it amongst themselves.  This gives them a faith 
that the kingdom of God is both here—in attenuated but real form—and to come.  When King 
speaks of the beloved community that realizes the ideal of unalienated life, I think it is safe to say, 
he speaks in precisely this way.  The participants in acts of non-violent resistance must transform 
themselves so as to become capable of relating to one another and their oppressors as members of 
259 
 
such a community in a way that shines forth in the world, and thereby help more expansively to 
realize it:  
[Nonviolence] does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship 
and understanding.  The nonviolent resister must often express his protest through 
noncooperation or boycotts, but he realizes that these are not ends in themselves; they are 
merely means to awaken a sense of moral shame in the opponent.  The end is redemption 
and reconciliation.  The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved 
community, while the aftermath of violence is tragic bitterness. (King, 49-50). 
 
To put it mildly, cultivating an attitude of attunement to such a possibility and making sacrifices, 
perhaps including death, in order to realize it is extremely difficult work, particularly in a world in 
which atomized profane logics and attitudes are relatively prevalent. With the Durkheimian 
account of the transformative power of religious practices to bring about such reattunement, 
commitment, and opening to new possibilities in the background, I think it should be clear why a 
Durkheimian would think that such practices have an essential role to play here. 
 Finally, there is I think the Heideggerian development of the Durkheimian claim 
concerning the way in which religious practices can (re)attune us to the world in transformative 
ways helps us to see why religious practices and modes of understanding are going to be essential 
to breaking the hold of abstract modes of understanding the ties that bind us together.  As 
presented, I think that there is potentially a sense in which the ideal of unalienated life should be 
understood as a vastly improved and crucial account of the ways in which we ought to relate 
ourselves to the world in which we live.  It is I think compelling and essential and captures some 
of the essential existential goods that we attempted to describe in our discussion of existential 
vitality.  Having accepted the ideal, questions arise as to how we ought to realize and embody it in 
a manner that renders its desirability and feasibility radiantly manifest.  And here it seems that 
there is a strong case to be made that religious practices, broadly construed, will and should have 
a powerful role to play. 
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Here it is I think helpful to think about Benedict Anderson’s account of the central role that 
nationalism came to play in all liberal democratic and Marxist revolution.  The overall claim is 
that a set of abstract commitments, however important they might be, are for most people 
insufficient to motivate people to sacrifice their lives for them.  The  national “imagined 
communities” that emerged in all of these revolutions allowed people to passionately attach 
themselves to a human, personal community that was concretely imagined and around which 
various practices and monumental artworks were established that allowed them to integrate their 
collective intentional commitments to their more second-personal, interpersonal relationships—
the nation was imagined as an extension of and one of the integrating relational networks that 
sustained the family, one’s particular community, and so forth. In the case of American “civil 
religion,” as Robert Bellah characterizes it in “Civil Religion in America,” such national imagined 
communities were in turn embedded in an (increasingly ecumenical and, of course, often though 
not always deeply problematic) religious understanding of the place of the nation in God’s creation 
and providential plan to realize the full flowering of human freedom.  Early on Anderson flags this 
crucial dimension through a discussion of tombs of the Unknown Soldier, which gather relational 
significance in something at least loosely analogous to the manner in which Heideggerian “things” 
do: 
No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs 
and tombs of Unknown Soldiers.  The public ceremonial reverence accorded these 
monuments precisely because they are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies 
in side them, has no true precedents in earlier times.  To feel the force of this modernity 
one has only to imagine the general reaction to the busy-body who ‘discovered’ the 
Unknown Soldier’s name or insisted on filling the cenotaph with some real bones.  
Sacrilege of a strong, contemporary kind!  Yet void as these tombs are of identifiable mortal 
remains or immortal souls, they are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national 
imaginings.  (This is why so many different nations have such tombs without feeling the 
need to specify the nationality of their absent occupants.  What else could they be but 
Germans, Americans, Argentinians…?). 
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The cultural significance of such monuments becomes even clearer if one tries to 
imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals.  Is a sense 
of absurdity avoidable?  The reason is that neither Marxism nor liberalism is much 
concerned with death and immortality.  If the nationalist imagining is so concerned, this 
suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings.  
…The great weakness of all evolutionary/progressive styles of thought, not excluding 
Marxism, is that such questions [concerning deep existential questions connected to our 
mortal finitude] are answered with impatient silence.  (Anderson, 9-10). 
 
It is worth here recalling our brief discussion of the power of fascist and totalitarian movements 
in the last section as well as the deep if not necessarily irresolvable tension between collective 
and second-personal normativity.  I, following Anderson and Durkheim among others, do not 
think that nationalism is necessarily problematic, provided the love for and fidelity to the nation 
is embedded within a robust community to the larger human community to which it belongs.  
That being said nationalism is of course dangerous and can often be destructive and insofar as 
one wishes to cultivate a robust attachment to the sacred structures that ought to bind together 
the world at large one will need to cultivate practices involving the kind of disciplined, 
religious ascesis-facilitating reattunement that Anderson describes. 
Given that such enormously expansive relational networks are even harder to 
spontaneously see as the ultimately decisive communities to which we belong, it will be 
essential to do precisely the kind of religious work that Anderson sees nationalism as 
performing.  And, of course, there is at least some claim that the universalistic religious 
traditions that we have inherited possess at least some resources for facilitating such 
commitment and sense of mutual, constitutive belonging.  Monotheisms’ passionate second-
personal attachment to a loving God who discloses and sets up the deep sacred structure that 
ought to bring our lives together has, it seems, at least the potential to allow us to cultivate the 
kind of alignment of second-personal and collective intentional orders that we so desperately 
need.  This will require that the different varieties of monotheism be able to affirm one another 
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in a manner that breaks down some of the more tribalistic religious conflicts with which world 
history is littered and adopt a position like that of Kind when he said in a Palm Sunday sermon 
on Gandhi that “the greatest Christian of the twentieth century was not a member of the 
Christian church” (King, 26).  Similarly, it seems that attunement to our shared membership in 
a natural ecological order characterized by rich relations of mutually sustaining 
interdependence, and which is being destroyed in a manner that threatens the existence of all 
of us, has the potential at least to orient us towards our radical mutual belonging to one another.  
But, along with Durkheim, I do not take myself to have grounds for making any kinds of 
concrete predictions here.  Instead, I simply hope that the Durkheimian account of religiosity 
that I’ve developed over the course of this dissertation can help clear away some of the 
prevalent Weberian misunderstandings of religion as a mode of atavistic irrationalism born of 
weakness of character that stand in the way of the kind of re-engagement with such traditional, 
as well as more genuinely new, forms of religiosity in a manner than can help to rest (and act!) 
transparently in the power that constitutes us.   
Finally, I would like to address a powerful objection that could be levelled to this set 
of claims.  One might think that one could properly orient oneself to the global relational tasks 
with which we are presented through a diverse collection of appropriately complementary and, 
at least in certain instances, relatively expansive sets of practices oriented towards properly 
attuning us to the most important relationships in our lives.  One could, for instance, have 
healthy familial relationships and friendships, be active in a political party and a labor union, 
and join groups centered around certain of those goods which one takes to central to one’s 
personal fulfillment (e.g. book/fan clubs, a gardening club, a film society, etc.). And provided 
that across all of these institutions, practices, and relationships one was able to cultivate and 
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retain proper attunement to the normative demands and relationships fundamental to one’s life, 
religion would be inessential.  There are two responses that I would like to make to this 
powerful, plausible, and for our purposes clarifying objection.  The first is to admit that I do 
not believe myself to have provided good grounds for thinking that religious practices are 
essential for everyone to achieve the kind of relational vitality and integration that I have 
argued we all at bottom properly aspire to and are called upon to realize.   The second is to 
claim that I have, nevertheless, provided good grounds for thinking that at a societal level, by 
and large, we have good grounds for thinking that religious practices are in fact going to be 
essential to rectifying the deep relational ills with which our social worlds are riven. 
First of all, it seems that there might very well be a number of people who are capable 
of coordinating their various identities, relationships, and projects with one another that allows 
them to integrate them towards proper responsiveness to the sacred.  If each of the sub-worlds 
in which they lived was itself thoroughly responsive to the imperatives of second-personal 
morality, and attuned to the various collective intentional orders in which it was embedded and 
to which it was related, this might be feasible.  Even where there were tensions, inadequacies, 
and blind spots, certain individuals might be able to—leaning on the various forms of relational 
orientation and understanding they cultivated in these various sub-worlds—consistently 
manage to critique, creatively reshape, and transform that in those sub-worlds which was 
defective.  That being said, the task of being both within and without each of them, and 
participating in each in a manner informed by a higher relational ideal, might provide quite 
difficult as an individual task.   There is a great deal more that could be said here but insofar 
the overarching thesis of this dissertation requires simply that most human beings will not be 
able to transform their lives in the relative manner save through participation in a set of 
264 
 
practices and institutions oriented towards this task, I can concede this point without 
undermining the central thrust of the argument.  I will therefore now attempt to say more about 
the challenge one might present to this, less ambitious but still to many very counterintuitive 
and implausible claim, and the considerations that I take to speak in its favor. 
There are two broad angles, distinct but of course deeply interrelated, from which the 
case in religion’s favor can be made: the first-personal and the collective.  I will start with the 
latter, insofar as the task with which we are presented from the former perspective is in no 
small part a function of the character of the latter.  Though this is far from the only relevant 
consideration, the plausibility of an affirmative answer to the question regarding the 
importance of religion will to a great extent depend upon the degree to which we understand 
the contemporary world to fall short of the relational ideal that we’ve sketched.  To the extent 
that there are rather acute, comprehensive, and systematic relational problems with which it is 
shot through, the need to have a set of practices oriented towards cultivating a radically 
different mode of relational stance will be more pressing.  Insofar as the Durkheimian account 
of disenchantment that I have developed in this chapter is correct, there are grounds for 
thinking that simply leaning on non-religious practices and institutions to rectify the relational 
ills of our world will prove inadequate.  There are grounds for thinking that the depth and scope 
of the crisis calls for a set of practices that are strange and in a distinctive sense otherworldly 
if we are to transform ourselves so as to enable us to transform the world.  The 
“otherworldliness” in question involves something analogous to but distinct from the negative 
of this world in favor of another non-actual word that Nietzsche so vociferously, and with some 
merit, attacks in his writings.  Rather than a simply made up world that is set apart from and 
serves as an illusory substitute for the real world, the kinds of otherworlds in question are 
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counterfactual but at least potentially practically realizable worlds in which our relations to 
one another would be transformed comprehensively so as to render them more robustly and 
transparently responsive to the call of the sacred. If our social worlds need such radical 
transformation it seems that we need such distinctive practices set apart from those more 
enmired in that of our relationally damaged quotidian lives in order to orient us to this sacred 
possibility and attune us to it such that we can better embody and propagate it.  Furthermore, 
looking further ahead, one could make the claim that even if we arrive at a point where these 
forms of comprehensive relational deformation have been deal with, religious practices will 
remain essential as a means of maintaining the right kinds of global relational networks and 
preventing their breaking down in a similar or novel manner. 
There is another distinct perspective from which the plausibility of the argument on 
behalf of religiosity can be discerned.  One might think that political parties, issue-based social 
movements, labor unions, and other such normatively serious institutions and organizations 
could do the relevant heavy lifting.  There is no denying that they are and will continue to be 
absolutely essential and I have no desire to delegitimate or peripheralize their claims.  That 
being said, in addition to perhaps typically being caught up with problematic relational features 
of our contemporary world, often fall short of the achieving the right kind of truly global 
relational stance.  By “global” I mean comprehensive, as opposed to earth-wide, though the 
latter will in today’s world be a crucial component of it.  For those who are committed, perhaps 
for good reason and perhaps not, to the existence of supernatural entities relating to the 
relational field on our planet will not be sufficient.  Whatever the relational field is, there is a 
need to relate to that which we take to be its fundamental sacred structure, and the claim here 
is that political parties, labor unions, and so forth do not typically have such scope.  They tend 
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both to be focus on a—often crucial—subset of relations and values within them and they tend 
as well to be characterized by forms of us vs. them identification that, while no doubt often 
useful, must be embedded within modes of mutual attunement that are more expansive and 
inclusive and which embed our very real disagreements and conflicts within a context of a 
deeper call to mutual belonging.  That is to say that whatever place friend vs. enemy 
distinctions of the sort that Carl Schmitt sees as of bedrock significance in our political lives 
might be—whether in the context of class conflict, political conflict, ideological disagreement, 
and so forth—if they are not to become forms of despair the threat of our coming to treat them 
as bedrock identities must be held at bay.  Though religious institutions and practices, of 
course, often take precisely such form I think that they can, insofar as they aspire to attune us 
to the sacred relational structure within which all of our differences and conflicts ought to be 
situated, provide a helpful corrective to such divisive and fragmentation-oriented tendencies.   
The writings and lives of Gandhi and King, of course, point to the ways in which such active 
attunement to the deep relational background can be cultivated alongside and as a means of 
bolstering the transformative power of social movements and forms of 
social/political/ideological struggle that are oriented towards the achievement of narrower 
transformations that inevitably require the cultivation of a certain kind of oppositional stance.  
Part of their power, it seems, was crucially connected to their embodied faith that the 
oppositions in question, though crucial to highlight and act upon, were not ultimate and that a 
new world in which they had dissolved and/or simply been properly relativized and defanged 
was possible.  If we are to actively and faithfully orient ourselves towards such a radically 
transformed world, it seems, there are good grounds for thinking that we will need religious 
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 Many of us call ourselves “Weird Christians” albeit partly in jest.  What we have in 
common is that we see a return to old-school forms of worship as a way of escaping from 
the crisis of modernity and the liberal-capitalist faith in individualism. 
 Weird Christians reject as overly accommodationist those churches, primarily mainline 
Protestant denominations like Episcopalianism and Lutheranism, that have watered down 
the stranger and more supernatural elements of the faith (like miracles, say, or the literal 
resurrection of Jesus Christ).  But they reject, too, the fusion of ethnonationalism, 
unfettered capitalism and Republican Party politics that has come to define the modern 
white evangelical movement. 
 They are finding that ancient theology can better answer contemporary problems than 
any of the modern secular world’s solutions… 
 … Weird Christianity is equal parts traditionalism, and, well, punk: Christianity as 
transgressive alternative to contemporary secular capitalist culture.  Like punk, Weird 
Christianity has its own, clearly defined aesthetic.  Many Weird Christians across the 
denominational and political spectrum express fondness for older, more liturgically 
elaborate practices… (Burton 2020) 
 
- Tara Isabella Burton, “Christianity Gets Weird: Modern life is ugly, brutal 
and barren.  Maybe you should try a Latin Mass.”  
 
On my altar at home, I keep a copy of the United States Constitution next to my 
candles and talismans, as a way of asking Spirit to protect our country from nefarious 
forces.   
I’m doing magic when I march in the streets for causes I believe in.  (The proliferation 
of “HEX THE PATRIARCHY” placards fills me with particular witchy glee.)…  
I use the word “witch” to signify both my Pagan spiritual beliefs – that nature is holy, 
thus the planet we live on and the bodies we live in are all sacred – and my role as a complex 
woman who speaks her mind, behavior that is still often met by society with judgment or 
disdain.   
I’m a witch when I’m celebrating the change of the seasons with my coven sisters, as 
well as when I stand against the destruction of the environment.  I’m a witch when I’m 
giving thanks to the sun, moon and stars, and when I’m working to subvert the corrosive 
narrative of sexism, racism, queer-phobia and xenophobia. (Grossman 2019) 
 
- Pam Grossman, “Here’s What Being a Witch Really Means: My grandma 
Trudy used to tell us that she had ‘healing hands.’ I soon discovered that I 
did, too.”   
 
“Among the people of QAnon, faith remains absolute. True believers describe a feeling 
of rebirth, an irreversible arousal to existential knowledge. They are certain that a Great 
Awakening is coming. They’ll wait as long as they must for deliverance.” (Nyce 2020) 
 






  I would like to conclude by briefly recapping the argument of the dissertation and then 
returning to the passages with which I opened the in the hope that it will help to tie together 
the various strands of the argument developed in this dissertation and suggest some of the ways 
in which they might be applied in and to the contemporary world.  I will then turn to 
Heidegger’s (in)famous claim in his posthumously published interview with Der Spiegel that 
“only a god can save us” and attempt to show in one sense, given the various arguments 
developed in the previous pages, we might take this to be true.   The claim, in line with the 
position that was briefly sketched out in the conclusion of the last chapter, will be that some 
sort of fundamental religious reattunement is essential if we are to heal the relational wounds 
that, in a wide variety of senses, constitute pressing existential threats to humanity.   
 In the introduction I drew a perhaps crude contrast between two fundamental stances 
one could take towards the task of living a human life, one of which I characterized as religious 
and one of which I characterized as irreligious.  The former involves an understanding of our 
being as persons as shot through with radical dependence on relationships to realities that both 
transcend and constitute us in our essential being.  For those who have such an understanding, 
living a good life requires that we acknowledge this fact and aspire to stand in disciplined, 
committed, and wholehearted relation to that self-transcendent reality.  The irreligious stance, 
on the other hand, is predicated on an understanding of the task of living well as a matter of 
affirming, developing, and actively imposing on and realizing in the world the internally 
contained substance of our selves.  I situated the project of this dissertation with respect to 
other in certain respects religion-friendly or -sympathetic philosophical positions by saying 
that while many of the latter affirm that some variation on the religious stance is the right one, 
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they think that the essential truths at issue are ones to which a proper philosophical 
understanding of certain features of human existence can sufficiently attune us.  One of those 
positions was that of Akeel Bilgrami, which was one of the main inspirations for this 
dissertation in general and for the account of disenchantment in particular.  On the one hand, I 
have done something similar in the first two chapters of this dissertation.  That being said, one 
of the ways in which the Durkheimian position developed here goes beyond such views is in 
attempting to defend religious practices in particular, in all of their often-strange concreteness, 
as performing arguably essential or, at the very least, for many people close to essential, role 
in allowing human beings to take up and fully occupy the appropriate religious stance. 
 The first two chapters aimed to defend an account of human nature that vindicates the 
claim that the basic religious stance to the task of existing is the right one insofar as our 
existence as persons is constituted by the relations in which we stand to others and our ability 
to live good, free, fulfilling lives depends on our active cultivation of those relations.  The first 
chapter attempted to provide the kind of naturalistic account that Durkheim sought of the 
emergence of human beings’ constitutive sociality and the emergent relational dynamics that 
it generates.  Having done so with the help of Michael Tomasello’s account of the emergence 
and relationship between joint and collective intentionality.  The former involves a kind of 
natural, egalitarian normativity structures that our defining relations with concrete others in 
small-scale interpersonal relationships is in some sense ultimately authoritative in human life, 
while the latter involves attachment to a more diffuse “we” that is governed by a more complex, 
abiding set of normative imperatives.  The latter is essential to our existence as persons who 
take meaningful stands on themselves over the course of their lives, but is also ethically 
problematic insofar as there is an evolutionarily grounded tendency for those relations to be 
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defined in antagonistic us vs. them terms.  One of our existential aims is to find a way to 
reconcile those two competing pulls, to get the two kinds of “we” relation into a harmonious, 
mutually sustaining relation.  With the help of Heidegger and Buber I then attempted to 
elaborate on the need for us not only to reconcile our collective normative identities with 
bedrock natural morality but to cultivate relations with others that allow us to more 
wholeheartedly, in a manner that does justice to the richness of our concrete selves, bring our 
concrete selves into meaningful relation with others in a variety of different such relations.  
These thinkers also help us to think, I argued, about the complexity and difficulty of living the 
very complex tensions between the different relational aspects of our identities and the ways 
in which standing within them requires a set of skills, dispositions, and so forth that go beyond 
a general respect for explicitly articulable norms.   
 In the second chapter I tried to, on the basis of the existential map sketched out in the 
first chapter, to make the case that there is an intelligible and essential sense in which we can 
talk about the vitality of persons in distinction from that of human organisms and that 
understanding that vitality, which I termed existential vitality, is essential to understanding 
what religious practices are in the game of cultivating.  I used Søren Kierkegaard’s account of 
despair as a way into the topic, using Durkheim’s construal of the godlike constitutive powers 
of our social worlds as a means of opening up that account in such a way that we could see its 
power.  The basic claim is that, as socially constituted persons, we depend on our relations to 
the other(s) who constitute us and render our lives meaningful and that we can either respond 
to that fact by affirming and positively developing those relations or by denying them.  We 
spoke about the ways in which our relations to our contemporaries as well as to those who are 
dead and yet to be born are essential to our existential vitality, and described some of the ways 
272 
 
in which the breakdown of those relations can render our personal lives a kind of living death.  
This account is important both for clarifying what Durkheim means when he talks about the 
ways in which religious aim to enhance our being and vitality as well as to set up the discussion 
in the fourth chapter of the ways in which the kind of relational breakdown that is at the root 
of the experience of the world as disenchanted can be rectified. 
 In the third chapter we attempted to provide an account of the ways in which religions 
work.  The centerpiece of that discussion was Durkheim’s account of the way in which our 
social worlds are constituted and sustained by those normative orders and relations that are 
held to be sacred and the ways in which religious rituals work to put us in existential-vitality-
enhancing relation to those sacred orders.  We then turned to Heidegger’s account of the 
happening of truth in and around the Greek temple to develop Durkheim’s powerful but 
somewhat underdeveloped claims concerning the ways in which we can speak of religions 
being true and serving, in a distinctive manner, to attune us to fundamental existential truths.   
We concluded by discussing the ways in which one people make efforts to maintain fidelity to 
that disclosed sacred order when they return to the profane activities with which they are by 
and large preoccupied. 
 Finally, in the fourth chapter we attempted to both argue against Max Weber’s account 
of disenchantment and to explain why, if it is as problematic a view as we present it to be, it is 
nevertheless so compelling to so many people.  We first attempted to show why his 
understanding of religion, which is a version of a kind of view held by many educated persons, 
is inadequate and why it leads him to the mistaken claim that the advance of the natural 
sciences tends inevitably to undermine the plausibility of religiosity.  We then attempted to 
show, with the help of Akeel Bilgrami, why his related claim that the natural sciences discredit 
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belief in a normative order that transcends our subjectivity.  After providing arguments for the 
illegitimacy of the view, we attempted to explain its plausibility as a function of genuine 
alienation in and from the relations with others which provide personal, meaningful substance 
to our lives.  I then, finally, turned to a discussion of the ways in which transforming those 
relations is essential to healing the existential wounds that render the disenchantment narrative 
plausible and made the case, in the line of the preceding argument, that religious practices have 
an essential role to play in that healing process. 
* * * 
 
 Before concluding with a discussion of Heidegger’s claim that only a god can save us, 
I would like to address some of the ways in which the accounts of contemporary religious 
phenomena from the popular press that I cited at the opening of both the introduction and this 
conclusion help to illustrate some of the points that I’ve tried to make here.   I will speak about 
the “Weird Christianity” phenomenon, Wiccanism, and QAnon in that order. 
 First of all, there are two claims in the rise of “Weird Christianity” that harmonize with 
claims we made in the third and fourth chapter.  First of all, the repudiation of the attempt to 
reduce Christianity to a set of general reasonable principles points and the attraction to a 
distinctive aesthetic and set of concrete ritual practices makes I think a good deal of sense in 
the light of the account of the religious happening of truth that we’ve developed out of 
Elementary Forms and “The Origin of the Work of Art.”  In whatever way religious truth 
happens the concrete stories, rituals, and artifacts in relation to which it happens will be crucial, 
and efforts to replace as opposed to harmonizing them with abstract principles will undermine 
their attuning power.  Secondly, the claim that for many of these Weird Christians defiance of 
market logics that aspire to render everything commensurable within some profane market 
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logic points to the ways in which religious practices can attune us to a calling higher than that 
of such modes of understanding, with their characteristic tendencies to facilitate disenchanting 
alienation.  The delightful construal of such modes of religious as “well, punk” points to the 
ways in which they involve setting up, in line with points made in the first chapter, opening up 
a sub-world or special world apart from the prevailing das Man order that aims to transcend 
and reshape the dynamics of the latter by establishing a productive tension between the sacred 
and the profane oriented towards remaking the latter in the light of the former.  
 The second example is also a helpful illustration of some of the points that we’ve been 
making concerning the ways in which religious practices can help us to gather together the 
significance of the various relationships, values, and commitments out of fidelity to which we 
aspire to act.  Grossman is keen to highlight the ways in which a wide variety of different 
practices that might seem unrelated are for her all modes of living out her fundamental religious 
identity as a witch.   This existential integration of her various commitments also gives her a 
sense of power to change the world in a manner that makes it better attuned to the sacred 
embodied human persons and the natural world in which they live.  This power is, again, 
understood as a means of combatting various ills associated with the kind of disenchanting 
market logics—as well as more long-standing forms of existential violence like patriarchy, 
homophobia, and so forth.  It also provides a helpful example of a new form of religiosity that 
has emerged over the past century or so, pointing both to the truth of Durkheim’s claim that 
new religions will inevitably be born out of the religious, social, and existential confusion in 
which we currently find ourselves.  And it foregrounds the fact that it remains very much an 
open question which modes of religiosity will prove to be most compelling in the future.  
275 
 
 Finally, the QAnon passage points to a powerful and disturbing example of the power 
of despair-induced and -amplifying forms of quasi-religiosity that our state of relational 
breakdown that point to the importance of cultivating positively integrating forms of religiosity 
that can better answer to genuine needs that render these pathological forms of religiosity 
appealing.  It is, in line with the points made in the last chapter, not surprising that QAnon 
really took off during the pandemic, when people were isolated from one another on account 
of the quarantine and facing a deep and disturbing existential threat to their lives on a number 
of different fronts.  People who were isolated and deeply disoriented suddenly found a war to 
tie together the significance of all their experiences of the world as hostile, alienating, and 
normatively incoherent and deficient.  Suddenly they were a part of a community devoted to 
the combatting the evils of the world in a way that would allow a new world—not run by 
powerful people whose insensitivity to human dignity is understood to issue in systematic child 
rape—to burst into existence.  The QAnon phenomenon, of course, is deeply caught up with 
the rise of Trump and his rallies with their ritualistic call and response slogans and MAGA 
hats and so forth, all of which, as Arlie Russell Hochschild powerfully argues in Strangers in 
Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, are susceptible to a clear 
Durkheimian reading as a pathological form of religiosity (Hochschild 221-230).  I say all 
these things not, of course, to defend such a mode of religiosity but to point to the ways in 
which it is humanly intelligible as a terrible but in some way understandable response to real 
social, existential, and spiritual ills.  The problem, of course, is that they are all founded upon 
and shot through with lies—propagated most loudly by that princeling of lies our former 
president—and only facilitate further relational breakdown and (personal and, in the case of 
Covid and vaccine denialism, physical) death.   
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* * * 
S: Good.  Now the question naturally comes up: can the individual in any way influence 
this network of inevitabilities, or could philosophy influence it, or could both together 
influence it inasmuch as philosophy could guide the individual or several individuals 
toward a specific action? 
H: Let me respond briefly and somewhat ponderously, but from long reflection: 
philosophy will not be able to effect an immediate transformation of the present condition 
of the world.  This is not only true of philosophy, but of all merely human thought and 
endeavor.  Only a god can save us.  The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a 
sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or for the 
absence of the god in the time of foundering (Untergang); for in the face of the god who is 
absent, we founder. 
S: Is there a connection between your thinking and the emergence of this god?  Is there 
in your view a causal connection?  Do you think that we can think god into being here with 
us? 
H: We can not think him into being here; we can at most awaken the readiness of 
expectation.   
… 
H: If one thinks in different terms a mediated effect is possible, but not a direct one.  
Hence thinking, as it were, can usually change the situation of the world.  (Heidegger & 
Stassen, 38).   
 
- Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview”  
 
Prior generations responded to similar crises [as those which we confront] by turning to 
communism.  But today, Marx, Lenin and Mao no longer offer a scythe sharp enough to 
fell the stalks of capitalism… 
 
While indigenous values, beliefs and practices are as diverse as indigenous people 
themselves, they find common roots in a relationship to land and water radically different 
from the notion of property.  For indigenous people, land and water are regarded as sacred, 




My own, Tsq’escenemic Secwepemc people, for example, express these views daily 
through our words and place names. Both the word Secwepemc, which is the name of our 
nation, and Tsq’escenemc, the name of our community, contain the suffix emc, which has 
multiple uses and translations, including person, the people, land, ground or soil, and even 
to milk or to nurse…  
 
Ingrained in each Salish community…is the idea – even older than our indigenous 
languages – that the people are of the land and the land is of the people.  These kindred 




- “The western idea of private property is flawed.  Indigenous peoples have it 
right,” Julian Brave NoiseCat 
 
 
I would like to conclude by saying something about the (in)famous claim that 
Heidegger makes in the above passage from his posthumously published interview with Der 
Spiegel.  I chose the phrase as a title because it is so jarringly provocative and because I wanted, 
to cite Samuel Scheffler citing David Lewis, to claim as much as I could get away with 
(Scheffler, 17).  I am inclined to affirm the claim, but if I have merely made a case for its being 
more plausible than it might at first seem I’m content with that.  I hope that I have shown that 
there is a powerful case to be made that the partial eclipse of the sacred and breakdown in 
attuning to our lives and worlds as shot through with sacred significance in the contemporary, 
in some meaningful but not total sense “disenchanted” world is a problem to which we ought 
to aspire to find some religious remedy.  We have grounds for thinking, though, that are not 
quite as helpless here as Heidegger suggests.  He is right that there we have limited control 
over the process and that there is a clear sense in which he is right to say that we cannot simply 
think gods into being but at most “awaken the readiness of expectation.”  If the Durkheimian 
account of the transformative power of religious ritual and the claims we made in the last 
chapter regarding the incompleteness of the eclipse of attunement to the world as sacred are 
correct, we have grounds for thinking that transformations in our embodied modes of relational 
life are at least as significant a means of throwing off the pall of disenchanted alienation as the 
thinking and poetizing to which Heidegger refers.  The citation cited from NoiseCat’s op-ed 
points to one way in which a turn to and cultivation of a certain mode of religious 
understanding and practice characteristic of indigenous cultures could help us to achieve such 
an end—in a way that more “secular” non-religious modes of thought arguably cannot.  I have 
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tried here to help clear away some of the modes of understanding that often obstruct our ability 
to open ourselves in the right way to the transformative power of such practices, but the real 
transformations will only occur through such open-ended engagement.   
That is also to say, returning to a claim I made in connection with Wittgenstein’s 
comments about the greyness of wisdom in contrast to the color of life and of religion, that 
there is a point past which philosophical reflection can no longer aid us save by pointing to an 
extra-philosophical task and domain about which it can only in some sense speak inadequately.  
As a philosophical account of a work of art can shed light on it without replacing it, so too can 
it shed some light on religious life without being able to replace or give entirely adequate 
expression to it.  That is to say everything I have said in this dissertation in some sense stands 
outside of the phenomena of which I tried to speak and that it cannot ultimately do justice to 
what happens after one opens oneself up to it.  To again invoke Wittgenstein, what 
philosophers as such cannot speak about they must pass over in silence—or, alternatively, in 
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